dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that we are bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.1967), and that this order is subject to two reasonable interpretations.
I fully realize and concur that contempt proceedings are criminal in nature and should conform as nearly as practicable to those in a criminal case. Ex parte Payne, 598 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texar-kana 1980, no writ), and that “the decree must spell out the details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that such person will readily know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed upon him.” Slavin, supra at 44; Ex parte Hodges, 625 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.1981).
This order is subject to two reasonable constructions, both of which require relator to make support payments. The amount required to be paid is readily ascertainable under either construction. While the relator in Slavin complied with the order according to his construction, the relator in the case at bar has failed to comply with either construction. Relator knew with certainty he was either to pay X amount or Y amount under the order. Rather than complying with one or the other, he chose instead to completely ignore this order.
*676This is conduct which, I believe, is punishable by contempt. I would deny the writ.
In the event the above reasoning is erroneous, I believe another option is available. As stated in Slavin, “The decree was sufficiently certain as long as all ... children were less than eighteen years of age.” 412 S.W.2d at 44. At the time the order in the case at bar was entered, the oldest child was twelve years old. Thus, for a period of some six years, relator knew exactly how much to pay under this order. Consequently, unless a valid excuse is shown, I believe a contempt action could lie for a failure to pay during this period of time.