dissenting:
The facts are set forth in detail in Judge Montemuro’s opinion for reversal. In brief, after the trial began, the Kaisers (the plaintiffs) agreed to settle with defendant Zev’s Garage. The jury returned a verdict on June 11, 1980. On July 2, 1980, the Kaisers and defendant Penny, without the consent of the trial judge, filed an “order” requesting the Prothonotary to mark the case “settled, discontinued and ended.” On September 23, 1980, the trial judge signed an “order of judgment” which specified: “The *310usual post-trial motions, including exceptions to the order, may be filed within twenty (20) days hereof.” Twenty-two days later, Penny filed exceptions.1 Appeals were taken on October 20, 1980 by both the Kaisers2 and Penny, after which the lower court denied Penny’s exceptions.3
Judge Montemuro would find that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order of September 23, 1980, since no claims for contribution were made by any party. I would not reach this question. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) provides: “Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” See Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307, 328 A.2d 845 (1974) and Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974). If any party was dissatisfied after the jury rendered its verdict, it could have filed post-trial motions within ten days. Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1. If the parties wanted to settle the case notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, they could have filed a motion for judgment n.o.v., indicat*311ing the consent of whichever parties consented. After the lower court signed its order of September 23, 1980, the parties could have requested reconsideration of the order. Since the lower court indicated that it would entertain “exceptions” filed within twenty days, appellants should have applied to the lower court within that period of time. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b) indicates the procedure to be followed. I would find that the failure of appellants to present their issues to the lower court in a timely manner now precludes them from raising their issues on appeal.
I would quash these appeals.
. These exceptions were not included in the reproduced record.
. One argument made by the Kaisers on appeal is that the settlement agreements precluded the lower court from entering its order of September 23, 1980. Pa.R.C.P. No. 230 provides that a voluntary non-suit shall be the exclusive method of voluntarily terminating an action, in whole or in part, by the plaintiff during the trial, and further provides that a non-suit cannot be obtained after the close of all the evidence. Rule 237 sets forth the procedure for obtaining judgment on the verdict by filing a praecipe with the Prothonotary (after notifying all parties). No rule provides a procedure for a party to terminate a case other than by having judgment entered, either on praecipe for judgment on the verdict, or by direction of the judge. In order to terminate the action after the jury’s verdict, the parties should have obtained the consent of the trial judge.
Another argument made by the Kaisers, and accepted by Judge Montemuro, is that the lower court had no power, no “jurisdiction", to enter paragraph four of its order (in favor of defendant Penny), since Penny did not file a counter-claim in the case. Looking at the entire order, it seems clear that the overall effect of the order is simply to mold the verdict, however inappropriate the language of paragraph four may be standing alone. Certainly a trial judge has the power to mold a verdict.
. I agree with Judge Montemuro’s conclusion that this order of November 28, 1980, having been entered subsequent to the filing of the appeals, was a nullity. Pa.R.A.P. 1701.