Dissenting Opinion by
ADKINS, J.I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because, in my view, the Circuit Court did not err in finding “extraordinary cause to extend the time” under Maryland Code (2001, 2008 RepLVol.), Section 3-107 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”).
*421Preliminarily, I briefly recap the facts1 that led the Circuit Court to its conclusion that there was “extraordinary cause,” which included the following:
♦ For two years of the five-year period, Ray refused medicine to treat his mental health. Perkins hospital must still take steps to ensure he takes his mental health medicine.
♦ The underlying charges involve allegations that Ray tried to kill his girlfriend. Although he has been told not to contact the alleged victim, he continued to send letters to her during his stay at Perkins. In one letter he told her she had lied about him and she had “now you turned into a witch and was now a true warrior.” The victim fears him. He has also called the victim, who was very disturbed by his calls.
♦ Ray has written hundreds of letters to law enforcement personnel reflecting his delusions, some of which were threatening.
♦ Ray presents a clear and present danger to himself and others as a result of his mental condition, which was diagnosed as schizophrenia. Although Ray has responded somewhat positively to his current medication, if he were released, he would likely not take his medicine.
♦ In his most recent evaluation in September 2007 he continued to be delusional, and has exhibited “active psychotic symptoms that influence his behavior.”
♦ The four psychiatrists who examined him all agree that, with additional treatment using the drug Clozapine, he will likely be competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future.
As part of its analysis for concluding that there was, as a matter of law, no “extraordinary cause,” the majority writes:
*422[T]he Judge determined that Ray’s dangerousness and ability to be restored to competency required Ray’s continued institutionalization beyond the prescribed five-year period, conceivably for an indefinite period. It is anomalous indeed, in light of the mandate for civil commitment for an incompetent defendant who cannot be restored, that Ray, who was identified as restorable, could be held indefinitely without a commitment proceeding.
As an initial point, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of Ray’s confinement in an institution as for “an indefinite period” without a “commitment proceeding.” Under CP Section 3-106, once a court decides, “after a hearing,” that an individual is “incompetent to stand trial and, because of ... a mental disorder, is a danger to self or the person or property of another” the court may commit the person to an institution. And, under subsection (c) of Section 3-106, after such commitment the court is required to hold a hearing every year to determine whether the person still meets that criteria.
More importantly, I do not share the majority’s view that the Circuit Court’s finding of extraordinary cause creates an anomaly.2 Indeed, what is anomalous is the comparison, applying the majority’s holding, between what happens to: (i) an incompetent and dangerous defendant needing inpatient care who is not likely to be restored to competency in the foreseeable future, and (ii) an incompetent and dangerous defendant needing inpatient care who is likely to be restored in the foreseeable future.3 Let me explain.
Under CP Section 3-106(d), the court must commit the “incompetent and not restorable” person, but the statute *423contains no directive about what should be done with the “incompetent yet restorable” person.4 Nor have I found any provision addressing how to treat this person elsewhere in the Criminal Procedure Article or in Title 10, Part III of the Health-General Article (Involuntary Admissions). Without any mandate that this “incompetent yet restorable” person be committed, civil commitment of the person is optional, and dependent on initiation of civil commitment proceedings by a person or institution with a legitimate interest. See Maryland Code (2000, 2005 RepLVol.), Section 10-614 of the Health-General article (addressing who may file an application for involuntary admission of an individual to a facility).
In my view, this is an anomaly because the prospect of achieving competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future does not render a person any less dangerous, or less in need of current commitment to an institution.5 Thus, I conclude that the legislature’s failure to include any mandate in CP Section 3-106 to civilly commit this “incompetent yet restorable” person, or otherwise address this situation, means that it did not anticipate this situation arising often. Because the legislature did not consider this situation to be an ordinary one that would often arise, I deduce that it did not intend to exclude this set of circumstances from the meaning of “extraordinary cause to extend the time” before mandatory dismissal under CP Section 8-107(a). Without extending the pending criminal charges, civil commitment is the only option, *424and I emphasize that it is optional, not mandatory. Moreover, I see nothing in the law which guarantees that there will be no gap between the present commitment and a civil commitment.
In addition to Ray’s dangerousness and restorability, we also should consider that, although five years have passed since his original commitment, Ray has recently written threatening letters to the victim of his alleged assault with the intent to murder, and that the victim fears him. If charges were to be dismissed, and Ray released for as little as one day, it is entirely possible that he could go straight to the victim’s house or workplace and inflict harm on her. He has also written hundreds of letters to the prosecutor in his case, which have recently become more threatening.
The majority relies on the notion that dangerousness and restorability cannot be “extraordinary” because:
[Extraordinary cause must require more than dangerousness and restorability, in order to avoid the necessity of civil commitment that requires greater procedural protections. Dangerousness, the norm for defendants institutionalized at Perkins, cannot be viewed as extraordinary, especially because it is but one factor for civil commitment.
While dangerousness may be the norm for defendants at Perkins, there is no showing that the normal Perkins resident is also one who, after five years, has sufficient improvement so as to be restorable to competency in the foreseeable future.
Perkins psychiatrists have identified a specific medicine that they believed could improve Ray’s mental capacity to such point that he would be competent to stand trial, but cannot administer that medicine until Ray’s brother, his legal guardian, consents to such treatment. The Circuit Court found credible the psychiatrists’ testimony that if he “were to be released (these charges dismissed) he would not take his medication” because he does not acknowledge his illness. As a consequence, “his mental illness would likely be exacerbated.” It found credible their testimony that Ray “presents a clear and present danger to himself and others[.]” All of *425these factors just mentioned contributed to the Circuit Court’s conclusion that there was “extraordinary cause.”
Finally, I point out that Ray does not fit within the intended protections sought by the Maryland Disability Law Center and others in promoting the formulation and passage of CP Section 3-107, which are set forth in the majority opinion. As the majority details more fully, the impetus for the bill was to protect people:
• who are never going to be restored to competency to stand trial
• who are committed beyond the maximum penalty that could have been imposed if convicted
• whose detainment has no review by the courts
Ray simply does not fit this description. Further, as the majority records, the Mental Health Association of Maryland “urged a favorable report on the Bill, focusing on the need to move non-violent individuals out of institutions rather than permitting them to languish in facilities well beyond the maximum time that they could have served for their alleged crime.” The continued detention of Ray, who is considered violent and dangerous, and who is subject to an annual hearing by the court, is not inconsistent with the goals of any of these organizations.
. These facts and others were all set forth more fully by the majority.
. The majority sees an anomaly in that Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.), Section 3-106 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP”) mandates civil commitment for a person who is incompetent, dangerous, and cannot be restored, but criminal-type commitment for a person who can, in the foreseeable future, be restored to competency to stand trial.
. I assume, in both cases, that the individual is unwilling to be voluntarily committed, and there is no less restrictive alternative.
. This is assuming the CP Section 3--106(d)(l) findings are made. The required findings are:
(i) the defendant has a mental disorder;
(ii) inpatient care is necessary for the defendant;
(iii) the defendant presents a danger to the life or safety of self or others;
(iv) the defendant is unable or unwilling to be voluntarily committed to a medical facility; and
(v) there is no less restrictive form of intervention that is consistent with the welfare and safety of the defendant!.]
. “Incompetent to stand trial” simply means “not able: (1) to understand the nature or object of the proceeding; or (2) to assist in one's defense.” CP § 3 -101(1).