concurring.
This court’s position is inconsistent. In citing the well-known rule of construction that inconsistent or ambiguous provisions of an insurance policy will be construed against the insurer, the court implicitly concedes that Mission’s insurance policy could have been “reasonably” interpreted in two ways. Yet, both prior and subse*738quent to this statement, the court states the policy language conveyed a “specific intention” not to limit its liability to $100,-000 for the death of a passenger. This is incomprehensible. Hence, I concur only in the result.
The operative language in Mission’s policy is in Coverage D, which provides $1,000,-000 coverage for “Single Limit Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability [INjclud-ing Passengers.” The text for Coverage D, in another part of the policy (Paragraph D) provides as follows:
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death....
Coverage D, however, is modified by the following endorsement:
LIMIT OF PASSENGER LIABILITY ENDORSEMENT
IT IS AGREED THAT WITH RESPECT TO COVERAGE D, THE COMPANY’S LIMIT OF LIABILITY FOR BODILY INJURY SUSTAINED BY ANY ONE PASSENGER SHALL NOT EXCEED $100,000 ... MULTIPLIED BY THE NUMBER OF PASSENGER SEATS ... BUT IN NO EVENT MORE THAN $300,000.
The sole question before us is whether or not the term “bodily injury,” as contained in Endorsement # 1, includes the “death” of a passenger.
Mission, arguing that the endorsement does include a passenger’s death, reads Paragraph D as providing for three types of coverage: 1) bodily injury sustained by non-passengers; 2) destruction of property; and 3) bodily injury sustained by passengers. The endorsement limits all losses in the third category, whether the loss is a bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death.
Petitioners argue that the endorsement, by its terms, pertains solely to “bodily injury” of passengers. Any other covered loss sustained by a passenger, that is, “sickness or disease, including death,” is not subject to the restrictive endorsement and is covered up to $1,000,000.
Mission responds that this reading is too cramped and technical. “Bodily injury,” as used in Coverage D, obviously includes death. If “Single Limit Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability [INjcluding Passengers” does not include death, then there is no limit on the coverage provided by the policy. If it does include death, then, to be consistent, the term “bodily injury” as used in the endorsement should include death as well.
Petitioners respond that the text of Coverage D, as found in Paragraph D, expressly refers to “bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death.” Therefore, if Mission intended to limit coverage for sickness, disease and death, it should have explicitly stated that under the “Limit of Passenger Liability Endorsement.” A fair reading of this language is that “bodily injury” does not include death.
Thus, depending on what part of the policy is consulted, both parties’ interpretations are plausible. Under such circumstances, I would apply the established rule of construction that where an ambiguity exists, the language of a contract should be construed most strictly against the drafting party. See Republic Nat’l Bank v. Northwest Nat’l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Tex.1978). As Mission prepared the insurance policy and is, thus, responsible for its language, I would adopt the petitioners’ interpretation. Consequently, I agree with the judgment of the court, but not its opinion.
COOK, J., joins in this opinion.