dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority quite correctly points out that we must indulge every reasonable inference in the non-mov-ant’s favor, and that “[fjoreseeability requires only that the general danger, not the exact sequence of events that produced the *796harm, be foreseeable.” My colleagues and I only disagree as to the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the following evidence:
1. Ms. Sparks testimony that she requested the MMC security guards to escort Blanca into work the morning of March 20.
2. Officer Pederzani’s testimony that Enrique ran from the officers that morning.
3. Officer’s Pederzani’s testimony that there should be a heightened sense of security when the security department knows there is a trespasser in a domestic situation coming on the property repeatedly-
4. Officer Darks’ testimony that if Enrique was seen on the property the morning of March 20, the police should have been called and whoever saw him that morning should have had him arrested.
5. Officer Ross’ entry into the daily log that Enrique was “stalking” Blanca.
The majority states “MMC did not know and did not have reason to know from past experience of a likelihood” that Enrique would endanger the safety of others or would commit a violent crime against Blanca. This may be true if the past does not include the morning of March 20. I believe the evidence noted above raises a fact issue concerning foreseeability, whether MMC may have assumed a duty to protect Blanca, whether the acts or omissions of MMC were negligence and whether that negligence was a proximate cause of Blanca’s death. Consequently, I would reverse the summary judgment and remand for a trial.