concurring and dissenting. I concur in the opinion of the Court with respect to the composition of the Vermont Real Estate Commission, the validity of Commission Rules 26(c)(3) and (4), and compliance with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. I conclude, however, that Rule 27(b) is beyond the rulemaking power of the Commission, and I dissent from the majority’s opinion upholding this rule.
Rule 27 provides:
(a) A supervising broker is responsible for the professional conduct of salespersons under his or her supervision, as shown by the records of the Commission. A principal broker is vicariously responsible for the professional conduct of all licensees employed by or associated with the licensee.
(b) A broker may not require as a condition of employment or association that a salesperson join any organization during any period that the salesperson is satisfying the experience requirement.
The experience requirement is set forth in 26 V.S.A. § 2292(e). It requires that a person desiring to become a real estate broker be “actively employed as a licensed salesperson by or associated with a licensed broker in this state for a period of not less than one year.” See also Vermont Real Estate Comm’n Rule 2(7) (defines experience requirement to include training for at least a year during which the salesperson must complete “a minimum of six closed real estate transactions”).
The Commission defends Rule 27(b) as necessary to ensure that persons who want to become brokers are not denied the opportunity to do so because they do not want to join a particu*536lar organization or can not afford to do so. The testimony in support of the rule from the Commission was that the Legislature had intended to make it easier for persons to become brokers and the Commission did not want “any constraints or any obligations on any salesperson” other than the minimum imposed by the statute and rules. In its response to the comments on the rule, the Commission stated that the rule “removes a potential barrier to satisfying the experience requirement.” Nothing in the record or in the rulemaking record suggests that salespersons who did not want to join a particular organization were barred from obtaining jobs to satisfy the experience requirement.
We require that rules be reasonably related to an agency’s enabling legislation. In re Club 107, 152 Vt. 320, 323, 566 A.2d 966, 967-68 (1989); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to authority delegated by Congress). In this case, the enabling legislation limits the Commission’s rulemaking power to those “necessary for the performance of its duties.” 26 V.S.A. § 2252(a)(1). The Commission has parlayed an authorization to establish an experience requirement for future brokers into a regulation of a private employment contract based on potential barriers to entry with no indication of an actual barrier. If the Commission can adopt this rule, it can regulate all phases of the employment contract, requiring, for example, that a certain wage be paid, that health insurance be given or that a certain number of vacation days be available. It also appears that subpart (b) of Rule 27 directly interferes with the ability of brokers to comply with the requirement of subpart (a) that they ensure salesmen operate ethically and responsibly. Plaintiff (and presumably other professional organizations) offer training at reduced cost to members and promulgate ethical standards. Brokers are likely to see membership in a professional organization as the most efficient way to teach responsible practice during the apprenticeship period.
I cannot find this regulation necessary for the Commission to perform its duties. The Commission admits it is based on a potential problem, not one actually found to exist. Thus, I do not believe it is reasonably related to the enabling legislation. I dissent from the decision to uphold Rule 27(b).