The defendant, James Moran, appeals a ruling of the Superior Court {Arnold, J.) bringing forward and imposing nine months of a twelve-month suspended jail sentence. We affirm.
The record supports the following. The defendant was convicted in 2002 of committing an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), see RSA 358-A:2 (Supp. 2002) (amended 2003, 2004); RSA 358-A:6, I (1995). He was sentenced in 2003 to twelve months in the house of correction, stand committed; restitution; and two years of probation, effective upon release. The defendant was also “ordered to be of good behavior” and prohibited from “own[ing], operating] or managing] a construction or building trades company for 10 years.” We affirmed the guilty finding on direct appeal. See State v. Moran, 151 N.H. 450, 454 (2004). The defendant did not appeal his sentence. See id. at 452.
The defendant began serving his twelve-month sentence in December 2004. He pled guilty to another misdemeanor CPA violation in March 2004 (the 2004 offense). The trial court sentenced him to twelve months in the *320house of correction, suspended, provided that “[a]ny suspended sentence may be imposed after a hearing at the request of the State brought within 4 year(s).” The court also ordered two years of probation, restitution, and “good behavior” and, ultimately, that he refrain from “own[ing], operat[ing], control[ling] or managing] a home contracting business for a period of 10 years.”
Although the defendant completed probation for the 2004 offense in March 2006, he remained on probation for the earlier offense. In April 2007, the State moved to bring forward the twelve-month suspended sentence because the defendant had violated the good behavior provision and ten-year proscription on certain types of work; had failed to make timely restitution payments; and had acted “in a managerial capacity of ... a business registered ... as a general contractor.”
After a hearing, the trial court found “that the State [had] met its burden of proof.” For violating the 2004 sentence, the defendant was sentenced to twelve months in the house of correction, stand committed, with three months suspended for a period of ten years. He was further ordered to make restitution and comply with the ten-year prohibition outlined in the 2004 sentence.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by bringing forward and imposing nine months of the twelve-month suspended sentence because: (1) the length of elapsed time exceeded the trial court’s authority to suspend incarceration for a misdemeanor offense; and (2) the ten-year prohibition was not a condition of the suspended jail sentence.
I
We first consider whether the defendant properly preserved each argument for our review. The State claims that the defendant waived his ability to challenge the suspended sentence by negotiating a plea in 2004. We disagree. In New Hampshire, “consent of the defendant cannot make [an otherwise illegal] sentence legal, regardless of whether that consent was given knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Burgess, 141 N.H. 51, 54 (1996).
We find the State’s procedural distinction from Burgess unpersuasive. It is true, as the State points out, that the instant case is procedurally distinct because it is more accurately described as a collateral challenge rather than a direct appeal. However, because the defendant has asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to deprive him of his liberty, see Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 378 (1986), the legality of imposing his suspended sentence is properly before us on discretionary appeal to the extent that he presented these arguments to the trial court in the first instance. See SUP. Ct. R. 3 (defining “Mandatory appeal” to exclude “an *321appeal from a final decision on the merits issued in an imposition of sentence proceeding”); State v. Gibbs, 157 N.H. 538, 540 (2008) (discussing and addressing merits of appeal of imposition of sentence); cf. Crosby v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 152 N.H. 44, 46 (2005) (“[A] defendant’s failure to object to a sentence at the time of its imposition does not bar the later filing of an extraordinary writ.”).
Although the defendant’s first argument was asserted in the trial court, our review of the record shows that his second, concerning the ten-year prohibition, was not. Accordingly, that issue is not preserved for our review, see State v. Patterson, 145 N.H. 462, 466-67 (2000), and we turn to the parties’ substantive arguments concerning only the challenge to the trial court’s authority to suspend a misdemeanor jail sentence.
II
The parties agree that the relevant statute governing the sentencing court’s authority to suspend a misdemeanor jail sentence is RSA 651:20 (2007) (amended 2008). Although we normally “review a trial court’s decision to impose a suspended sentence for an unsustainable exercise of discretion,” Gibbs, 157 N.H. at 540, resolution of the instant dispute requires statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Petition of State of N.H. (State v. Laporte), 157 N.H. 229, 231 (2008).
“This court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” Id. “In interpreting a statute, we first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation.” Id. “We do not consider legislative history to construe a statute that is clear on its face.” Id. “Finally, we do not strictly construe criminal statutes, but rather construe them according to the fair import of their terms and to promote justice.” Id. (quotation omitted); see RSA 625:3 (2007).
We recognized in State v. Ingerson, 130 N.H. 112 (1987), that RSA 651:20 contains no express limit upon how long a sentence may be suspended. Ingerson, 130 N.H. at 115. Both parties agree on this point, but dispute its significance.
The defendant argues that the absence of any express time limit leads to various absurd results and, thus, should be rejected in favor of his alternative limiting constructions derived either from the maximum probation periods, see RSA 651:21 (2007); RSA 651:2, V (2007), or from adding “the maximum length of incarceration plus the maximum length of probation for the underlying offense.” Conversely, the State argues that *322this absence signals legislative intent to permit the judiciary to exercise wide-ranging sentencing discretion subject only to constitutional limitations.
We find the absurd results posited by the defendant unpersuasive insofar as they rely upon the premise that the trial court sanctioned perpetual sentence suspension. Much to the contrary, the trial court brought forward and imposed suspended incarceration roughly three and a half years into the four-year period established by the 2004 sentence.
Next, we observe that, in order to fashion an appropriate sentence in the interest of justice, the trial court possesses broad, inherent power to suspend a misdemeanor sentence. See State v. Smith, 119 N.H. 674, 675 (1979); State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 22 (1973); State v. Valrand, 103 N.H. 518, 519 (1961). While dicta in recent cases might suggest that this authority derives from a legislative grant, see, e.g., State v. Kierstead, 141 N.H. 803, 804 (1997); State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 476 (1995); State v. W.J.T. Enterprises, 136 N.H. 490, 495 (1992), “[f]rom the earliest times in this state as a matter of practice and precedent it has been assumed that courts had the power to suspend either the imposition or the execution of a criminal sentence.” Valrand, 103 N.H. at 519. Statutes prescribing the terms upon which a sentence may be suspended confirm this power, id. at 520, and may permissibly limit its full exercise, Couture v. Brown, 82 N.H. 459, 461 (1926); State v. Drew, 75 N.H. 402, 403 (1909); see also 2 R. McNamara, New Hampshire Practice, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 33.22, at 482-83 (2003).
RSA 651:20 is the legislative enactment presently governing the judicial exercise of authority to suspend sentences. We have said “that the trial judge, acting under RSA 651:20, .. . [and within its limitations,] may suspend any portion of [an] original sentence while it remains unserved.” State v. Lemire, 116 N.H. 395, 397 (1976). The legislature may further “circumscribe the court’s power to suspend, provided that the sentencing process as a whole complies with the requirements of due process.” State v. Homer, 153 N.H. 306, 313 (2006); see Burroughs, 113 N.H. at 24.
Prior to enacting RSA 651:20, the legislature limited to three years the suspension of a misdemeanor sentence, providing:
When, in case of a misdemeanor, execution of a sentence to the house of correction is suspended or the case is otherwise filed, a mittimus for the service of the sentence may be issued within three years from the date of the sentence and not thereafter.
RSA 607:12 (1955) (repealed 1973).
*323With the enactment of the Criminal Code in 1971, Laws 1971, 518:1, the three-year cap was omitted from RSA 651:20, the new statute governing the exercise of suspension authority. We presume that this omission was deliberate. The judiciary has a recognized need for “options to adapt [a] sentence to a particular individual in the manner best suited to accomplish the constitutional objectives of punishment, rehabilitation and deterrence.” Burroughs, 113 N.H. at 24.
Supporting this presumption is the fact that the legislature amended RSA 651:20 five times since we pointed out the lack of temporal limits in Ingerson and prior to the defendant’s conviction. See Petition of State of N.H. (State v. Fischer), 152 N.H. 205, 211-13 (2005) (discussing the different versions of RSA 651:20). None of these amendments included temporal limits. See Laws 1996, 286:5; Laws 1994, 129:1, 192:5; Laws 1992, 254:13; Laws 1990, 266:3. If we had incorrectly construed the statute in Ingerson, the General Court would presumably have clarified the text in the course of the five subsequent amendments. See In re Eric C., 124 N.H. 222, 225 (1983).
Contrary to the dissent, we find no temporal limits on the power to suspend within RSA 651:21, the statute which governs the revocation of a suspended sentence. RSA 651:21 does indicate that probation may be imposed “during the time any portion of the sentence remains suspended.” RSA 651:21. Imposing probation, however, is but one of multiple sentencing options available to a presiding justice when fashioning a proper sanction, see id.; State v. White, 131 N.H. 555, 559 (1989) (“Probation is a tool available to the judiciary in the rehabilitative aspect of the sentencing function.”). Other options include “ordering] that the defendant serve [the suspended] sentence in full or in such parts and at such times as is deemed best, . . . [and/or] further suspending] any part not ordered to be served upon such terms and conditions as the court may order.” RSA 651:21. Accordingly, RSA 651:21 provides no vehicle for importing into RSA 651:20 the temporal limits upon probation within RSA 651:2, V, as that would be limiting the greater by the constraints placed upon the lesser. Cf. White, 131 N.H. at 558 (probation does not mark the end of the sentencing function).
Furthermore, the text of RSA 651:20 makes clear that its subparagraphs are the only legislative limitations upon the judicial exercise of authority to suspend incarceration. See RSA 651:20, I (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as provided in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c), the sentence to imprisonment of any person may be suspended by the sentencing court. . . .” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we decline to *324read into RSA 651:20 words that the legislature did not see fit to include. See State v. Gubitosi, 157 N.H. 720, 724 (2008).
Undoubtably, a misdemeanor jail sentence cannot be suspended indefinitely because “fundamental fairness... entitles [the defendant] to be informed about the time period in which the trial court may exercise its authority to call forward either [the] conviction or [the] sentence . . . .” Ingerson, 130 N.H. at 114. However, the temporal maximum upon all suspended sentences “would in our view be ... a policy area better decided by the legislature.” Id. at 117. It may so act. Unless and until it does, the trial court’s sentencing discretion with respect to suspending misdemeanor incarceration is bounded on a case-by-case basis only by constitutional limitations. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 15, 18.
Affirmed.
Broderick, C.J., and Dalianis and Galway, JJ., concurred; Duggan, J., dissented.