dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in the thorough and thoughtful opinion of Judge Payne. In my view, in enacting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-7(b)(2), the Legislature did not intend that a college student, picked up by a classmate for school and severely injured in a motor vehicle accident, should be denied coverage under his mother’s insurance policy if it later turns out that the friend lacked permission from the owner of the vehicle, a state of affairs of which the victim was entirely unaware. Because that is the effect of the majority opinion, I cannot subscribe to it.
Like the court in Hall v. Minder, 298 N.J.Super. 243, 246-48, 689 A.2d 207 (App.Div.1997), which interpreted N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c), an analogous provision of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law, I conclude that although the PIP statute does not explicitly require knowledge of lack of permission, “a literal interpretation “would be inconsistent with the overall purpose’ ” of the Act, 298 N.J.Super. at 249, 689 A.2d 207 (quoting Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 25, 660 A.2d 1153 (1995)), which we have held to be “ ‘a social necessity,’ ” Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 242, 247, 649 A.2d 1272 (1994) (quoting Darel v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 114 N.J. 416, 425, 555 A.2d 570 (1989)), overruled in part on other grounds by Shaw v. City of Jersey City, 174 N.J. 567, 574, 811 A.2d 404 (2002). In the face of such social necessity, the scope of coverage of a PIP policy should be approached liberally, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-16, and exclusions from coverage, narrowly interpreted. See Walcott v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., *107376 N.J.Super. 384, 393, 870 A.2d 691 (App.Div.2005) (citing Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos., 86 N.J. 100, 106-07, 429 A.2d 1039 (1981)).
So viewed, the PIP statute does not require the exclusion from coverage of every single citizen who accepts a ride from a friend or relative who later is shown to lack permission from the owner. To be sure, there are circumstances under which a person should know that the use of the car is questionable. Such persons clearly fall within the exclusion. To the contrary, the innocent passenger is entitled to coverage. In concluding otherwise, the majority sweeps too broadly and thus, I respectfully dissent.
Justice ALBIN joins in this opinion.
For reversal in part/remandment—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS—5.
For affirmance—Justices LONG and ALBIN—2.