delivered the opinion of the Court.
Duke Carver, Jr., a San Antonio policeman, obtained a writ of mandamus compelling George W. Bichsel, the Chief of Police, to reinstate him as a member of the force. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 312 S.W. 2d 688. We here affirm the judgments of the courts below.
The Legislature in 1947 enacted a statute which, among other things, prescribes the procedure to be followed upon the suspension of a policeman.1 It is necessary here to determine the meaning of a part of Section 16 of the Act which says:
“In any Civil Service hearing hereunder, the department head .is hereby restricted to his original written statement and charges, which shall not be amended * * (Emphasis ours).
In September of 1957, Chief Bichsel suspended Carver and served him with charges alleging that he had violated rules of *395the department. Carver appealed to the Civil Service Commission and there excepted to the legal sufficiency of the charges.
The Commission conducted a hearing on October 16. During the hearing, the attorney for the City conceded that the charges were legally insufficient. He requested permission to withdraw them, stating that Carver would be reinstated and that other charges would be filed against him at a later date. This request was granted.
On the following day, the Chief again suspended Carver and served him with a second set of charges. They alleged virtually the same facts, and the charges were substantially the same as those in the original set. They related to and grew out of the same incident. The difference was this: the original charges alleged violations of rules of the police department. The Civil Service Act, in Section 16, says that policemen may be suspended only for violations of civil service rules. So the second set of charges alleged violations of certain civil service rules.
A date was set for a hearing before the Commission on the second set of charges against Carver. Before the hearing his counsel went before the District Court. He prayed for an injunction to restrain the Commission from holding the second hearing and a mandamus to compel his reinstatement. Both were granted and that action has been affirmed.
It was Carver’s contention that the Civil Service Act means just what it says:
“In any Civil Service hearing hereunder the department head [the Chief] is hereby restricted to his original written statement and charges which shall not be amended.”
His position was that the second set of charges are really an amendment of the first or original set, and that the statute in unmistakeable terms limits the Chief to his original written statement which may not be amended. Hence, he said, the Chief had no authority to bring the second set of charges and the Commission was not authorized to try him thereon.
The City contended that the statute, fairly construed did not prohibit the City from dropping an imperfectly drawn charge and from beginning anew with corrected charges. It argued that the statute prohibits the amendment of the charges during the trial before the Commission. It said that the charges were *396similar to an indictment which may be quashed and a new one presented later.
The provisions of this statute are unique. None with similar provisions has been cited to us and we have found none. This is therefore a case of first impression.
The general rule is that amendment of charges is authorized or permitted when those which are drawn are insufficient.2 If it were not for the above statute, this would be an entirely different case.
We must agree with Carver and the courts below that the statute does limit the Chief to his original written charges which may not be amended. That is what the Act says. It is not contended that the statute is ambiguous, and its validity is not attacked. It is our duty, then, to follow it.
The wisdom of the provision is a legislative matter. The Legislature is now in session; and if that body be dissatisfied with the effect of our construction of the Act, it may take appropriate remedial measures.
In Austin Fire & Police Departments v. City of Austin, 149 Texas 101, 228 S.W. 2d 845 (1950), this Court said through Chief Justice Hickman:
“Whether it would be a wise policy for the Legislature to require home rule cities to standardize the wages of their firemen and policemen based solely upon senority, disregarding all other factors, is not for us to decide, but it is our duty to decide whether it has done so by the Act under review.”
So here, the wisdom of limiting the Chief to his original written charges and prohibiting amendment thereof is not for the Court to decide. Our question is whether the Legislature has so provided. We think it has. The Legislature may have had in mind the shielding of police and similar employees from harassment which could be accomplished by the filing, dismissal and refiling of charges based upon the same transaction. Such action would result in successive suspensions and thus defeat one of the purposes of the Civil Service Act which is to provide for and protect the rights ' persons serving as officers and em*397ployees of municipal fire and police departments. City of San Antonio v. Wiley, 252 S.W. 2d 471, writ ref., n.r.e. (1952).
While the charges do bear some similiarity to an indictment, the analogy cannot sustain the City here. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that an indictment may be amended as to form at any time before an announcement of ready for trial is made. Art. 533. Fortunately there is no provision which limits the State to its original indictment. Here, however, the Legislature has plainly said that the Chief shall be limited to his original written charges which may not be amended.
We do not have before us a case in which the change desired or required in the original charges is the correction of a typographical error or a matter of similar nature. Whether the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with small or trifling matters) would apply will have to be determined when such a case arises. The question would be then whether the change is an “amendment” within the meaning of the statute.
Even assuming, however, that the statute does not prohibit the filing of a second set of charges, it contains another limitation. Section 16, after authorizing the Chief to suspend indefinitely any officer, says:
“* * * but in every such case the officer making such order of suspension shall, within one hundred and twenty (120) hours, file a written statement with the Commission * * *
The alleged misconduct took place on September 8. The original statement and charges of the Chief were served on Carver and filed with the Commission on September 17. They suspended Carver as of September 19, 1957.
The above provisions require that charges shall be filed within 120 hours (or within five days) of the suspension. The second set of charges were not filed, however, until October 17, almost thirty days after Carver was suspended. If the new charges be regarded as corrections to the original charges arising out of the same incident, they were invalid under that part of the statute prohibiting amendment of the charges. If they were new “original” charges arising out of the same incident, they came long after 120 hours from Carver’s suspension on September 19. They were thus filed too late.
*398We agree also with the Court of Civil Appeals in its holding that a mandamus is a proper remedy in the situation presented. The controlling questions concern the scope of the statutory power of the administrative agency and the meaning of the statutory prohibition against new and amended charges under Section 16 of the Act. Those are judicial rather than administrative questions. 73 C.J.S. 366, Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, Sec. 46. No question of administrative discretion is involved. AH material facts are agreed upon.
Construing this same Act in an earlier mandamus action, this Court said:
“The full performance of all conditions established by the civil service laws is an essential prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the removing body over the subject matter of the removal of an officer.” City of Sherman v. Arnold, 148 Texas 516, 226 S.W. 2d 620 at 622 (1950).
Since the charges before the Civil Service Board were not legally brought under the statute in question, the Chief of Police was not authorized to remove Carver on them, and the Board had no authority to proceed to uphold his suspension under them.
The judgments of the courts below restoring Carver to duty are affirmed.
Opinion delivered February 18, 1959.
. — Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Act for cities of over 10,000 population, Acts 1947, 50th Legislature, page 550, as amended, being Article 1269m, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes.
. — 4 McQuillan on Municipal -poration (3rd ed., 1949) 344, Section 12.257; Bromfield v. Lexington, 233 Ky " ■ , 25 S.W. 2d 393 (1930); People v. Auburn, 85 Hun. (N.Y.) 601, 33 N.Y.S. 165 95).