Stearman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

BELL, Chief Judge,

dissenting, joined BATTAGLIA, J.

It is well settled that the Maryland General Assembly has mandated that all Maryland automobiles be covered by poli*458cies of automobile insurance that contain certain required coverages. See Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), §§ 17-101 to 17-110 of the Transportation Article and Maryland Code (1995, 2002 Repl. Vol.), §§ 19-501 to 19-516 of the Insurance Article; Jennings v. G.E.I.C.O., 302 Md. 352, 357, 488 A.2d 166, 167 (1985). Pertinent to this case, each automobile insurance policy minimally must include liability insurance for the “payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising from an accident of up to $20,000 for any one person and up to $40,000 for any two or more persons,” § 17-103(b)(1) of the Transportation Article; § 19-504 of the Insurance Article, and property damage liability insurance of up to $10,000. § 17-103(b)(2) of the Transportation Article; § 19-504 of the Insurance Article.1 Section § 19-502 of the Insurance Article, nevertheless, makes clear that “an insurer [is not prevented] from issuing, selling, or delivering motor vehicle liability insurance policies that provide liability coverage in excess of the requirements of the Maryland Vehicle Law.” In this case, the insurance contract was for a face amount of liability coverage in excess of the statutorily required minimum amounts.

While insurance contracts may lawfully and appropriately exclude particular risks, this Court consistently has held that

“exclusions from statutorily mandated, insurance coverage not expressly authorized by the Legislature generally will not be recognized. See, e.g., Enterprise v. Allstate, 341 Md. 541, 547, 671 A.2d 509, 512 (1996) (‘Where the Legislature has mandated insurance coverage, this Court will not create exclusions that are not specifically set out in the statute’); Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual, 334 Md. 669, 686, 641 A.2d 195, 203(1994) (‘this Court has generally held invalid insur*459anee policy limitations, exclusions and exceptions to the statutorily required coverages which were not expressly authorized by the Legislature’); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 531-532, 611 A.2d 100, 102(1992); Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 622, 552 A.2d 889, 891 (1989); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. USF & G, 314 Md. 131, 141, 550 A.2d 69, 74 (1988); Gable v. Colonial Ins. Co., 313 Md. 701, 704, 548 A.2d 135, 137 (1988) (‘As a matter of statutory construction, where the Legislature has required specified coverages in a particular category of insurance, and has provided for certain exceptions or exclusions to the required coverages, additional exclusions are generally not permitted’); Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 239, 528 A.2d 912, 915 (1987) (‘we will not imply exclusions nor recognize exclusions beyond those expressly enumerated by the legislature’); Jennings v. Government Employees, 302 Md. 352, 358-359, 488 A.2d 166, 169 (1985) (Ve will not insert exclusions from the required coverages beyond those expressly set forth by the Legislature’); Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Webb, [291 Md. 721, 730, 436 A.2d 465, 471 (1981)] (“conditions or limitations in an uninsured motorist endorsement, which provide less than the coverage required by the statute, are void”); Pennsylvania Natl Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 160-161, 416 A.2d 734, 739 (1980).”

West Am. Ins. Co. v. Popa, 352 Md. 455, 475, 723 A.2d 1, 10-11(1998). See also Salamon v. Progressive Classic Insurance Company, 379 Md. 301, 303-304, 841 A.2d 858, 860 (2004).

The Court of Appeals, in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983), abolished inter-spousal immunity in negligence cases.2 In so holding, concluding that there was no “subsisting public policy” to justify retention of the doctrine, it rejected the reasons asserted in favor of that immunity as providing “no reasonable basis for denial of recovery for tortious personal injury.” 296 Md. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521. *460The necessary and, indeed, the only logical result, or significance, of the Boblitz decision was to place the injured spouse on an equal footing with strangers, i.e., to permit one spouse to sue the other for negligence and to recover the damages to which he or she is entitled to the same extent as a stranger could. Significantly, the decision was not dependent upon the existence, or nonexistence, of insurance. Whether and, if so, how, the Maryland Financial Responsibility law would impact on inter-spousal suits in which insurance is a resource was not presented.

The foregoing must be kept in mind when the issue this case presents is considered. An issue of first impression for this Court,3 it involves the validity of an household exclusion that reduces the amount of the recovery available to a wife injured in an automobile accident as a result of the negligence of her husband from the face amount of the husband’s insurance policy to the statutory minimum liability limits. The policy of automobile liability insurance at issue in this case defines “insured” in terms of the insured car, a temporary replacement car or a newly acquired car and included the named insured’s spouse. In addition, the coverage provided by the policy excludes

“ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF AN INSURED’S FAMILY RESIDING IN THE INSURED’S *461HOUSEHOLD TO THE EXTENT THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF THIS POLICY EXCEED THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY REQUIRED BY LAW.”

Carla Stearman, the wife of Jay Stearman, collectively the appellants or the “Stearmans,” was injured in a collision involving a single car, of which her husband was the driver. She alleged that her injuries were the result of her husband’s negligence.

The majority holds that the household exclusion is valid. It relies on Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166 (1985) and, primarily, State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide Mut., et al, 307 Md. 631, 516 A.2d 586 (1986).

In Jennings, the insured was injured while a passenger in a car owned by him and driven by his stepson, who resided in the insured’s household. The automobile liability insurance policy which the insured carried on the car contained an exclusion for “[bjodily injury to an insured or any family member of an insured residing in the insured’s household.” 302 Md. at 353, 488 A.2d at 167. In response to the insured’s declaratory judgment action, in which he sought a declaration that, because the household exclusion in the policy was “void because it is contrary to statute,” GEICO was obligated to pay the default judgment he had obtained against his stepson, GEICO filed a declaratory judgment action of its own. It sought a declaration that, by virtue of the exclusion, the insured was “not entitled to any coverage.” Id. at 354, 488 A.2d at 167. This Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, which had upheld the validity of the household exclusion provision. Id. at 362, 488 A.2d at 171. Rejecting GEICO’s defense of the validity of the household exclusion clause on the basis that no Maryland statutory provision expressly forbids it, we held

“the household exclusion clause is inconsistent with the public policy which the General Assembly adopted in Ch. 73 of the Acts of 1972, providing for compulsory automobile *462insurance for all Maryland automobiles with specified required coverages.”

Id. at 357, 488 A.2d at 168.

State Farm addressed an issue neither presented nor decided in Jennings, “[w]hether the ‘household exclusion’ is wholly invalid, or whether its invalidity extends only to the amount of the minimum liability coverage required by the compulsory insurance law.” 307 Md. at 633, 516 A.2d at 586-87. In that case, the automobile liability insurance policy at issue provided bodily injury coverage limits above the minimum required by law, but it excluded coverage for injury to “any insured or any member of an insured’s family residing in the insured’s household.” Id. at 633, 516 A.2d at 586. The named insured was injured when his insured automobile, in which he was a passenger, was driven off the road by a friend, who was driving the car with the insured’s permission. The driver’s insurance carrier sought a declaratory judgment that the policy exclusion at issue, denominated a “household exclusion,” was void as against public policy. Id. at 634, 516 A.2d at 586. We held “that the ‘insured’ segment of a ‘household exclusion’ clause4 in an automobile liability insurance policy is invalid to the extent of the minimum statutory liability coverage. So far as the public policy evidenced by the compulsory insurance law is concerned, it is a valid and enforceable contractual *463provision as to coverage above that minimum.” Id. at 644, 516 A.2d at 592. We reasoned that “[a] contractual provision that violates public policy is invalid, but only to the extent of the conflict between the stated public policy and the contractual provision,” explaining:

“The public policy involved here is that all automobile liability policies shall contain bodily injury or death liability coverage in at least the amount of $20,000/$40,000. To permit the ‘household exclusion’ to operate within those limits would be to ‘deprive injured persons of the protection which the Legislature intended to provide’ ... and would violate public policy.... But liability coverage in excess of that minimum is expressly authorized. ‘Nothing in this subtitle or in Title 17 of the Transportation Article prevents an insurer from issuing, selling, or delivering a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance providing liability coverage in excess of the requirements of the Maryland Vehicle Law.’ ... ‘There shall be available to the insured the opportunity to contract for higher amounts than those provided under Title 17 of the Transportation Article ... ’. The General Assembly has not restricted the ability of parties to contract for or to limit coverage with respect to that ‘excess’ or those ‘higher amounts.’ The public policy embodied in the compulsory insurance law extends only to liability coverage up to and including the statutory minimum coverage.”

Id. at 643-44, 516 A.2d at 592 (quoting Keystone Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hinds, 180 Md. 676, 682, 26 A.2d 761, 763 (1942); Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol., 1984 Cum. Supp.), Art. 48A, § 541(b) and § 541(c)(2)) (some citations omitted).

As indicated, this Court has not considered before the impact of the abolition of inter-spousal immunity on the viability of a clause in an insurance policy containing an household exclusion from bodily injury coverage above the minimum statutorily mandated amount. Nevertheless, rather than doing the analysis afresh, noting that the Court of Special Appeals addressed the issue in Walther v. Allstate Insurance Company, 83 Md.App. 405, 406, 575 A.2d 339, 340 (1990), the majority simply sets out the argument made by the Walthers *464in that case, acknowledges that it is identical to the argument the Stearmans make in this case and states that it agrees with the intermediate appellate court’s reasoning. 381 Md. at 451-52, 849 A.2d at 548-49. Moreover, it concedes that the public policy in Maryland is “crystal clear[, s]pouses can sue each other for anything that strangers could, with no fear that the defendant spouse will be permitted to raise interspousal immunity as a defense.” Id. Taking an approach reminiscent of that taken by the Walther court, the majority argues, however:

“The question is, who pays the judgment, the negligent spouse or the negligent spouse’s insurance company? Does Maryland’s change in public policy regarding the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity require the insurance company of the negligent spouse to pay for the recovery of the injured spouse, even though the contract between the negligent spouse and the insurance company provides that there will be no recovery above the statutorily required mínimums? Such a contract provision is clearly allowable under the mandatory minimum requirements laid out by the Legislature.”

Id. at 452, 849 A.2d at 549. In any event, it concludes that, even though “recognizing] that the public policy displayed by the complete abrogation of the interspousal immunity doctrine could be viewed as a policy that conflicts with the public policy displayed by the mandatory minimum liability insurance requirements set by the Legislature,” id., “the General Assembly, not the Court, is the appropriate body to reconcile these conflicting policies.” Id. at 453, 849 A.2d at 549.

With respect to State Farm, other than stating the holding and the rationale underlying it, characterizing the holding as “clear,” and noting its conclusion that “[t]he majority of jurisdictions that squarely address the issue before us has reached a result consistent with ours in this case,” the majority provides little analysis or logic to support its conclusion that it is dispositive. Id. at 444, 849 A.2d at 544.

To be sure, the majority rejects the argument advanced by the appellants, that West Am. Ins. Co. v. Popa, 352 Md. 455, *465723 A.2d 1 (1998) is dispositive, as “this Court has consistently held that exclusions from statutorily mandated insurance coverage not expressly authorized by the Legislature generally will not be recognized.” Stating that their argument is not persuasive, the majority simply repeats what we said in Van Horn v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 334 Md. 669, 694-95, 641 A.2d 195, 207-08 (1994), in distinguishing State Farm from that case:

“In State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide Mut., supra., this Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., supra 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166, that a ‘household exclusion’ clause in an automobile liability insurance policy was contrary to the public policy embodied in Maryland’s compulsory motor vehicle insurance law. We went on in State Farm, however, to hold that the household exclusion clause was invalid only to the extent of the statutorily prescribed minimum liability coverage of $20,000/$40,-000. We pointed out that it could ‘readily be inferred that the premium took account of the exclusion contained in the policy’ (307 Md. at 638, 516 A.2d at 589), that the majority of compulsory insurance jurisdictions had invalidated household exclusion clauses only to the extent of the statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum liability coverage (307 Md. at 641-643, 516 A.2d at 591-592), and that ‘[a]s a general rule, parties are free to contract as they wish’ (307 Md. at 643, 516 A.2d at 592).”

To the argument by the appellants that § 19-502(b) of the Insurance Article, pursuant to which the insurance company may provide more than the minimum amount of insurance required to be carried, reflects a legislative intent that, once the greater amount has been provided, exclusions from that coverage amount may not made except when explicitly permitted by legislative act, the majority’s only response is that:

“The plain language of [§ 19 — 502(b)] evidences an intention to permit insurance companies to offer policies that contain greater coverage than that required by statute. It certainly does not require insurance companies to provide coverage greater than that mandated by statute. Nor does it display *466a legislative intention to change the public policy embodied in the statutorily mandated minimum liability coverage requirements. The Stearmans have cited no Maryland case that supports such a position.”

381 Md. at 448, 849 A.2d at 546-47.

The majority is simply wrong.

Without citing any authority, the majority states that a provision in an insurance contract between an insurer and a negligent spouse, providing for no recovery by that spouse’s injured spouse above the statutorily mandated amount of insurance “is clearly allowable under the mandatory minimum requirements.” 381 Md. at 452-53, 849 A.2d at 549. On the contrary, that is not at all clear. Indeed, it is the opposite that is clear, that such an exclusion clearly is not allowable Section 19-504 provides that “[e]ach motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in the State shall provide the minimum liability coverage specified in Title 17 of the Transportation Article.” Section 17-103(b) of the Transportation Article, in turn, provides:

“(b) The security required under this subtitle shall provide for at least:
“(1) The payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising from an accident of up to $20,000 for any one person and up to $40,000 for any two or more persons, in addition to interest and costs;
“(2) The payment of claims for property of others damaged or destroyed in an accident of up to $15,000, in addition to interest and costs;
“(3) Unless waived, the benefits described under § 19-505 of the Insurance Article as to basic required primary coverage; and
“(4) The benefits required under § 19-509 of the Insurance Article as to required additional coverage.”

Section 19-502, however, makes clear that more than the minimum coverage may be offered an insured by an insurer, providing:

*467“(b) Neither this subtitle nor Title 17 of the Transportation Article prevents an insurer from issuing, selling, or delivering motor vehicle liability insurance policies that provide liability coverage in excess of the requirements of the Maryland Vehicle Law.”

It is significant that, in addition to the required minimum coverage for bodily injury, § 17-103(b) includes, unless waived, P.I.P. coverage in a basic required primary amount and uninsured motorist coverage. Even more significantly, the General Assembly has expressly provided that those latter coverages may be excluded with respect to particular persons.

Section 19-505(c)(l) states:

“An insurer may exclude from the coverage described in this section benefits for:
* * * *
“(ii) The named insured or a family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured’s household for an injury that occurs while the named insured or family member is occupying an uninsured motor vehicle owned by:
“1. The named insured; or
“2. An immediate family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured’s household.
“(2) In the case of motorcycles, an insurer may:
“(i) Exclude the economic loss benefits described in this section; or
“(ii) Offer the economic loss benefits with deductibles, options, or specific exclusions.”

Similarly, § 19-509(f) permits an insurer to exclude from the required uninsured motorist coverage:

“(1) The named insured or a family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured’s household for an injury that occurs when the named insured or family member is occupying or is struck as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle that is owned by the named insured or an immediate family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured’s household; and
*468“(2) The named insured, a family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured’s household, and any other individual who has other applicable motor vehicle insurance for an injury that occurs when the named insured, family member, or other individual is occupying or is struck as a pedestrian by the insured motor vehicle while the motor vehicle is operated or used by an individual who is excluded from coverage under § 27-606 of this article.”

There is no comparable exclusion provision applicable to the primary liability coverage.

In Jennings, after noting that the General Assembly expressly mandated that all Maryland automobiles be covered by automobile policies containing certain required coverages, 302 Md. at 357-58, 488 A.2d at 168-69, this Court pointed out that the same statutory provisions “expressly authorized specified exclusions from the required coverages.” Id. at 358, 488 A.2d at 169. Mentioning specifically those related to cancellations or non-renewals as a result of driving records or claims experience, codified in former Art. 48A, § 240C-1, and permitted exclusions from P.I.P. and uninsured motorist coverage, as prescribed in Art. 48A, §§ 541(c)(2) and 545, the Court stated the general rule: “generally we will not insert exclusions from the required coverages beyond those expressly set forth by the Legislature.” We relied on DeJarnette v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 299 Md. 708, 725, 475 A.2d 454 (1984); Pennsylvania Nat’l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 156, 159-160, 416 A.2d 734, 738 (1980). In Gartelman, we refused to validate an exclusion for an insured who was injured while occupying a car owned by a named insured, noting that it was not one of the four exclusions expressly provided by the Legislature.

As we have seen, that rule was reiterated in Popa. 352 Md. at 475, 723 A.2d at 11. Moreover, we noted in that case that, “[t]he holding of the State Farm Mut. case, ... has not been applied by this Court to any other automobile insurance policy exclusions or provisions.” This is so, we explained, because:

“Adoption of the broad proposition advanced by West American would permit insurers to load up motor vehicle insur*469anee policies with a multitude of invalid exclusions, thereby limiting coverage in numerous situations to the statutory mínimums instead of the stated coverage limits set forth on the insured’s declaration page. For example, an insured could purchase what he believed was $300,000 liability insurance, pay a premium for $300,000 liability insurance, and, after an accident, discover that he has only $20,000/$40,000 liability insurance because the circumstances fell within one or more of the many invalid exclusions or exceptions in the insurance policy. Persons who paid much more in premiums for coverage in excess of mínimums could, in many circumstances, receive no more than those who only paid for minimum coverages.”

352 Md. at 477, 723 A.2d at 12. We refused to extend the State Farm holding beyond the household exclusion clause which was involved in that case.

State Farm, by its express terms, “professed” to be a very narrow decision — in its first footnote, the Court acknowledged the two components of the household exclusion, pointing out that only one, the insured component, applied, and expressed its holding on that basis. 307 Md. at 633, 516 A.2d at 587. Walther, whose reasoning the majority professes to accept, relied almost entirely, if not wholly, on State Farm. Although the Walther majority recognized this to be so, it was persuaded “to draw the inference that the Court’s opinion [in State Farm v. Nationwide] is more sweeping than the footnote professes it to be,” by the fact that the Court of Appeals rejected certain cases,5 83 Md.App. at 409, 575 A.2d at 341-342. For the same reason, it conclude that “State Farm implicitly approved the household exclusion clause’s application to spouses of insured motor vehicle operators,” id., an inference strengthened, we are told, by “those foreign cases upon which the Court in State Farm relied and ‘aligned’ *470itself.”6 Id. at 410, 575 A.2d at 342. The express exclusion on which the Walther court premised its holding was the one contained in Art. 48A, § 545(c), now § 19-509(1), permitting the insurer to exclude from uninsured motorist coverage “the named insured or members of his family residing in the household when occupying an uninsured motor vehicle that is owned by the named insured or a member of his immediate family residing in his household.”

That provision does not sanction an exclusion from the primary liability coverage, and there is no comparable exclusion expressly provided from that coverage. Therefore, the Walther holding flies in the face of our precedents. Moreover, Walther is also wrong on the breadth of the State Farm decision as well as the public policy question.

State Farm not only professed to be narrow in scope, judging from the way it was crafted, it was, in fact, narrowly drawn. As I explained in dissent in Walther:

“The scope of the opinion, and by necessary implication, its limitations were established very early on. The Court was careful to point out, in the first footnote, what was at issue and, indeed, what was not. As it discussed the eases pro and con, pertinent to the issue presented, and any legislative action bearing on the subject, it was careful to note, usually in a footnote, how it was that they, or the actions, were pertinent to the issue before it. In fact, careful reading of the footnotes, in context, makes obvious that the Court’s entire discussion focused upon the rationale, rather than the factual context, of the various cases and how that rationale related to the issue of the viability of the ‘insured’ aspect of the household exclusion. Thus, we may only assess the Court’s discussion of the cases, both pro and con, in the context of the ‘insured’ aspect of the exclusion. *471Indeed, I believe that State Farm, by its very terms, does not even address the ‘other family members’ segment of the household exclusion. If this were not sufficient, the Court’s holding, as we have seen, explicitly addressed only the “ ‘insured’ segment” of the household exclusion. Consequently, I do not believe that the majority’s very broad reading of State Farm is correct.”
“And, in my opinion, the Court’s limitation of its holding, particularly in view of the careful way in which it did so, is significant. Since they are but different segments of the same issue, it would have been very simple, and, indeed, would have provided clearer guidance, for the Court simply to have addressed the household exclusion in a unitary fashion. And, given the different foci of the cases discussed by the Court, there was every incentive, if the considerations are indeed the same, for the Court to have addressed them together. It did not, however, as we have seen. I believe that it did not because it recognized that there are different considerations applicable to each segment of the exclusion; the ‘other household members’ segment involves different considerations than does the ‘insured’ segment. And within the ‘other household members’ segment, itself, there are sub-segments ... as to each of which there may also be different considerations, depending upon the relationship of the household member to the insured.... ”

83 Md.App. at 413-14, 575 A.2d at 343-44 (Bell, J. dissenting). I might have mentioned expressly, what is certainly implicit in the foregoing, that it is one thing to allow an insured to contract away his or her rights, even when the Legislature has not specifically spoken on the subject, and quite another when, by so doing, he or she adversely affects the rights of third party strangers, as to which the legislative has expressly spoken.

In reality, in the absence of inter-spousal immunity, the nature of the relationship between spouses, for purposes of litigation, is not that of related persons; rather it is one of stranger to stranger:

*472“The abolition of inter-spousal immunity has meaning only if one spouse is able to maintain an action against the other and, more importantly, recover from that spouse to the same extent that a stranger could. No problem is presented when insurance is not involved; the injured spouse, as would the stranger, looks solely to the negligent spouse for compensation. Where, however, the act of negligence is covered by insurance, a somewhat different situation exists. Ordinarily, as is the situation sub judice, the policy of insurance will provide for the payment “for all damages an insured is legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury....” Thus, in that scenario, a successful unrelated litigant is entitled to recover from the insurer all of his or her damages up to the face amount of the policy. After Boblitz, an injured spouse was able to recover to the same extent. Under the majority decision, upholding the validity of the household exclusion as to the excess insurance above the minimum required, however, an injured spouse coming within the negligent spouse’s policy coverage, who, in all respects save relationship to the insured, is in the same situation as a stranger, may recover only the minimum required coverage. This result, while paying lip service to Boblitz’s abolition of interspousal immunity, substitutes a more subtle form of immunity, which has the effect of undermining Boblitz.

Id. at 416-17, 575 A.2d at 345 (Bell, J. dissenting). This reasoning is equally apposite to the case sub judice.

The Walther majority and, because it agrees with the rationale of that case, see 381 Md. at 452, 849 A.2d at 548, the majority in this case, find support for their position in the facts that “[njothing in Boblitz purports to declare that the minimum coverage mandated by Transp. Art. § 17 — 103(b)(1) does not apply to an insured’s spouse,” 83 Md.App. at 410, 575 A.2d at 342, and that the uninsured motorist provision permits an insurer to insert an household exclusion in an insurance policy, in connection with an uninsured motor vehicle. They find comfort also in the insurer’s right to limit its liability and to impose such conditions, by contract, that it wishes so long *473as it does not “[contravene] a statutory inhibition or the state’s public policy.” Id. at 411, 575 A.2d at 342. As to those arguments:

“The majority is, of course, correct, Boblitz does not purport to declare that the minimum coverage mandated by § 17-103(b)(1) does not apply to an insured’s spouse, but neither does it purport to declare that it does apply. The majority’s reliance on Art. 48A § 545(c) is simply irrelevant; it permits such an exclusion with respect to an uninsured motor vehicle, not, as here, an insured one. Nor does the majority’s reliance upon the insurer’s right to limit its liability have validity.
“To hold the household exclusion totally invalid insofar as husband and wife is concerned does no violence, whatsoever, to the right of an insurer to contract with its insured, consistent with public policy. In this case, public policy favors permitting one spouse to sue the other for negligence and to recover for injuries caused by that spouse’s negligence. That public policy is contravened when the insured, by contracting with the insurer, can limit his or her spouse’s recovery. This is so because, in effect, such a contract, at least partially, abrogates the Court’s prior abolition of inter-spousal immunity. To be sure, such a holding would, and does, as the majority says, interfere with the insurer’s right to contract; however, it does so consistent with, and in the same sense that the requirement of mandatory minimum insurance coverage does. As such, it goes only as far as the law permits and no further.”

Id. at 418, 575 A.2d at 346 (Bell, J. dissenting).

In this case, the insured and the insurer contracted for the insured to provide coverage in excess of the minimum amount statutorily required to be carried. At the same time, they purported to exclude from that coverage a category of risk that the General Assembly did not expressly authorize to be excluded, members of the insured’s household, including, therefore, the insured’s spouse, who, by virtue of the abolition of inter-spousal immunity in negligence cases, like a stranger to the insured, is under no restrictions with respect to the *474amount that may be recovered. I would hold that the attempted exclusion is void. Accordingly, I dissent.

Judge BATTAGLIA joins in the views herein expressed.

. Other required coverages include, unless waived, medical, hospital, disability and funeral benefits ("P.I.P.") up to $2,500, covering insureds and their families, as well as specified classes of other persons, regardless of fault, Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 17-103(b)(3) of the Transportation Article; Maryland Code (1995, 2002 Repl. Vol.) § 19-505(a) of the Insurance Article, and uninsured motorist coverage, § 19-509 of the Insurance Article. Any permitted waiver of the PIP or uninsured motorist coverage must be accomplished pursuant to § 19-506 and § 19-510 respectively, of the Insurance Article.

. This Court has since completely abolished inter-spousal immunity. Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003) (abrogating inter-spousal immunity in intentional tort cases).

. The Court of Special Appeals has addressed the precise issue of "whether, in the light of the Court of Appeals decision in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983), declaring invalid interspousal immunity, the circuit court erred ‘in determining that the limit of liability for insurance coverage for claims by household members’ is the amount ‘required by the Maryland Financial Responsibility Law.’ ” Walther v. Allstate Insurance Company, 83 Md.App. 405, 406, 575 A.2d 339, 340 (1990). That court held, again precisely, "that the household exclusionary clause sanctioned by Md. Ann.Code art. 48A, § 545 [presently § 19-509(f) of the Insurance Article] applies to the named insured and all members of his, her, or their household to the extent that the policy coverage exceeds the statutory minimum,” that "a household exclusion limits the amount a household member may recover to the sum mandated by the Matyland Financial Responsibility Law.” Id. at 411-12, 575 A.2d at 342-43. In that case, Mrs. Walther was injured while getting out of the automobile that Mr. Walther insured and was driving.

. The limitation was deliberate, as footnote 1, in which the Court defined the nature of the ‘‘household exclusion,” makes clear:

‘‘The ‘household exclusion’ before us in this case involves two distinct components. One is the exclusion of the insured. The second is the exclusion of family members residing in the insured's household. The facts before us implicate only the first of these components.”

State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide Mut., 307 Md. 631, 633 n. 1, 516 A.2d 586, 586 n. 1 (1986). See footnote 4, in which the Court, while explaining why Meyer v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Company, 689 P.2d 585 (Colo.1984) (en banc), a case which dealt with intrafamily immunity, rather than inter-spousal immunity, was not persuasive, pointed out that, “Since the case before us deals only with the ‘insured’ portion of the ‘household exclusion,’ ... the intra-family immunity concerns that were considered by the Colorado court have no pertinence here.” 307 Md. at 640 n. 4, 516 A.2d at 590 n. 4. See also footnote 7, 307 Md. at 642, 516 A.2d at 591.

. Estep v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 105, 703 P.2d 882 (1985); Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D.1975); Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1984).

. Dewitt v. Young, 229 Kan. 474, 625 P.2d 478 (1981); Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. v. Parker, 282 S.C. 546, 320 S.E.2d 458 (1984); Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky.1981); Arceneaux v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 113 Ariz. 216, 550 P.2d 87 (1976); Estate of Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 93 Nev. 348, 566 P.2d 81 (1977).