(temporarily assigned), dissenting.
I travel the same path as the majority but reach a different destination. Thus, although I fully join in Points I, II and III of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from the result reached in Points IV and V.
As the majority develops, under the governmental-interest analysis, which defendants acknowledge to be the controlling test for evaluation of the issue before us,1 we must determine whether an actual conflict of laws exists as to a particular issue, and, if so, we must then “identify the governmental policies underlying the law of each state” and determine “how those policies are affected by each state’s contacts to the litigation and to the parties.” Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 248, 510 A.2d 1187 (1986). After *631performing that balance, we must apply the law “of the state with the greatest interest in governing the particular issue.” Ibid.
I agree with the majority that “there is an actual conflict between the laws of the respective states.” Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478, 484, 679 A.2d 106 (1996) (citing Veazey, supra, 103 N.J. at 248, 510 A.2d 1187). As a result, we must inquire as to “the interest that each state has in resolving the specific issue in dispute.” Id. at 485, 679 A.2d 106. This is done by “identifying] the governmental policies underlying the law of each state and how those policies are affected by each state’s contacts to the litigation and the parties.” Ibid, (quoting Veazey, supra, 103 N.J. at 248, 510 A.2d 1187). In that respect, “[i]f a state’s contacts are not related to the policies underlying its law, then the state does not possess an interest in having its law apply.” Veazey, supra, 103 N.J. at 248, 510 A.2d 1187. Finally, New Jersey’s interest “must be compared and weighed against any governmental interest” of the other state “in light of [that state’s] contacts with the litigation and the parties.” Gantes, supra, 145 N.J. at 493, 679 A.2d 106.
As developed by the majority, the Accutane involved in this case was prescribed in Michigan and then taken there by plaintiff, a Michigan resident. However, it was manufactured in, and distributed from, New Jersey, and the very compliance with Federal Food and Drag Administration (“FDA”) processes, which gives rise to an immunity in Michigan, was conducted and completed in New Jersey. Therefore, both states have significant interests worthy of protection: New Jersey, the situs of the manufacturer, in governing its manufacturers for the protection of consumers, and Michigan, where the drag was prescribed and consumed, in promoting the availability of medication at reasonable prices. Moreover, both states also have an interest in considering the impact of litigation on employers and workers as well as the local economy, resulting in Michigan legislation and the New Jersey Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 to -11.2
*632As also fully developed by the majority, Gantes, supra, involved a New Jersey products liability action against a New Jersey manufacturer filed on behalf of a decedent killed in Georgia “when she was struck in the head by a moving part of a shaker machine.” 145 N.J. at 482, 679 A.2d 106. The New Jersey courts assumed, for purposes of summary judgment, “that defendant manufactured the machine in New Jersey.” Ibid. Under Georgia law, the plaintiffs lawsuit was barred by a statute of repose prohibiting commencement of products liability actions more than ten years after the original sale of the product. Id. at 485, 679 A.2d 106. Under New Jersey law, the suit was subject only to our two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Ibid. The issue involved in Gantes was, therefore, whether the Georgia statute of repose or the New Jersey statute of limitations controlled the plaintiffs ability to commence the action.
The Gantes Court held that New Jersey’s statute of limitations, not Georgia’s statute of repose, applied. Id. at 498, 679 A.2d 106. The majority reasoned that New Jersey has a substantial governmental interest in deterring the manufacture of unsafe products in New Jersey. Id. at 489-90, 679 A.2d 106. According to Justice Handler:
This court has recognized generally that a purpose of the tort laws is to encourage reasonable conduct, and, conversely, to discourage conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of injury to others. That deterrent goal of the tort laws is ' effectuated through the recognition of a duty to exercise reasonable care and the imposition of liability for the breach of such a duty. We note also that Georgia has recognized that “courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victims but with admonition of the wrongdoer” and that the “‘prophylactic’ fact of preventing future harm has been quite important in the field of torts.”
The interest in deterrence has been recognized as a relevant factor to be considered in choice-of-law decisions.
The goal of deterrence, acknowledged generally to be part of tort law, is especially important in the field of products-liability law. In Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 193 N.J.Super. 113, 124[, 472 A.2d 577] (1984), aff'd, 103 N.J. 643[, 512 A.2d 466] (1986), the Appellate Division noted that since Henningsen v. *633Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358[, 161 A.2d 69] (1960), this State’s judiciary has been “in the vanguard of the development of a responsive and progressive products liability law” and “has led the country in its ideological commitment to the protection of consumers and concomitant consequence of inducing those who place products into the stream of commerce to act with social responsibility.” Judge Pressler observed in her dissent below: “the development of [products liability law in New Jersey] and the consequent imposition of strict liability on manufacturers has been a powerful force — perhaps the most powerful force — in effecting, over the last two and a half decades, product safety and social responsibility by industry.”
We conclude that this State has a strong interest in encouraging the manufacture and distribution of safe products for the public and, conversely, in deterring the manufacture and distribution of unsafe products within the state. That interest is furthered through the recognition of claims and the imposition of liability based on principles of strict products-liability law.
[Id. at 489-90, 679 A.2d 106 (citations omitted).]
In the context of the statute of limitations issue, the Court also articulated why deterrence is a sufficient reason to hold New Jersey manufacturers under the ambit of New Jersey law:
In light of this State’s commitment to protection of the public against the manufacture and distribution of unsafe products and the strong governmental interest in deterrence against such practices, it does not seem “pointless” to apply this State’s statute of limitations to resident manufacturers, even if the suit would be barred against foreign manufacturers. The difference in result is grounded in the distinctive policy concerns that each state has in making its domestic manufacturers amenable to suits. A governmental interest based on a policy of deterrence that seeks to discourage domestic manufacturers from the manufacture and distribution of unsafe products through the allowance of a products-liability action is not unnecessarily burdensome nor is it discriminatory or baseless.
[Id. at 491, 679 A.2d 106.]
Thus, although the decedent in Gantes was not a New Jersey resident and the injury did not occur in New Jersey, this Court permitted her administrator to proceed with the lawsuit against the New Jersey manufacturer in light of New Jersey’s interest in deterring the manufacture and distribution of unsafe products within the State. The very same principle applies in this ease directed to the adequacy of the product’s warnings.
I recognize that Gantes is distinguishable because, unlike the unregulated defendant in that case, the manufacture and distribution of prescription drugs are extensively regulated by the FDA. However, our Legislature, unlike the Legislature of Michigan, has determined that FDA regulation and approval is not per se *634sufficient to deter pharmaceutical companies from providing inadequate warnings or to preclude lawsuits. Only “a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate.” N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4.
Although our Legislature has precluded punitive damages by virtue of FDA approvals,3 it has determined not to preclude all actions based on inadequate warnings. See N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4, -5. Therefore, neither the preclusion of punitive damages nor the FDA approval of the warning substantially lessens New Jersey’s interest in consumer protection. Unlike Michigan, our Legislature has not completely precluded this type of action. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 24-25, 734 A.2d 1245 (1999). Accordingly, I believe the Gantes approach is warranted and controls the disposition of this case. In fact, it seems to me that our Legislature permits recovery, notwithstanding FDA approvals, in the exceptional circumstances in which the presumption can be overcome, because those situations involve matters in which deterrence is needed the most. Michigan’s legitimate interests cannot be said to outweigh the need to deter conduct in this State that our Legislature, as a matter of sound public policy, seeks to prevent.
Certainly, as the majority develops, Michigan has significant interests in furthering its legislative design. However, those interests in protecting consumers with respect to prescription costs and availability (and even more broadly with respect to tort reform) are remote and outweighed in a New Jersey forum when the Michigan resident brings his or her suit in New Jersey against a New Jersey manufacturer,4 particularly because he or she is *635subject to the “rebuttable” presumption of the warning or label’s adequacy.
Accordingly, I would affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Wecker’s opinion for the Appellate Division, as supplemented herein.
Finally, I note there is now pending in the Michigan Senate two bills passed by the Michigan House of Representatives which would enact a rebuttable presumption similar to our own with retroactive applicability. See H.B. 4044-4045, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2007). It would seem jurisprudentially sound to wait a reasonable period of time in which to see what happens in the Michigan Senate with respect to the proposed legislation in order to evaluate if the actual conflict is resolved and to avoid a split decision on an issue of such significance as the one now being decided.
Justice LONG joins in this opinion. *636For reversal and remandment — Justices LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS and Judge LEFELT — 5. Concurring in part/dissenting in part — Justice LONG and Judge STERN — 2.Whether the result would be different under another test or analysis need not be considered in this case. See Earl M. Maltz, Do Modem Theories of Conflict of Laws Work? The New Jersey Experience, 36 Rutgers L.J. 527, 534-48 (2005).
For purposes of this opinion, I assume the reasons behind the Michigan legislation are as broad as stated by the Appellate Division dissent. See Rowe v. *632Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 383 N.J.Super. 442, 467-70, 892 A.2d 694 (App.Div. 2006) (Wefing, J., dissenting).
There is an exception "where the product manufacturer knowingly withheld or misrepresented information required to be submitted under the agency’s regulations, which information was material and relevant to the harm in question!]----” N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-5(c). Michigan has a similar exception to its immunity statute. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5).
It seems clear that Michigan courts would apply Michigan law to this case, resulting in the 1ype of "forum shopping" that attracts plaintiff to New Jersey. *635See Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 454 Mich. 274, 562 N.W.2d 466, 471-72 (1997). However, whenever an action is commenced in New Jersey involving a tort or injury that occurred out-of-state, a choice of law analysis is required with respect to the relevant issue that gives rise to an "actual conflict." As such, "forum shopping” does not necessarily equate with recovery under New Jersey law. Furthermore, the ability to litigate in this State flows from jurisdiction over the defendant and notions of due process, not choice of law principles that will be contested in the course of the litigation. In any event, as stated in Gantes, supra,
[i]n this case, plaintiff does not seek to use New Jersey’s court system to litigate a dispute that has only a slight link to New Jersey and where the only plausible reason to select this State is because it is a hospitable forum. This action is materially connected to New Jersey by the fact that the allegedly defective product was manufactured in and then shipped from this State by the defendant-manufacturer.
[145 N.J. at 492, 679 A.2d 106.]
Moreover, as the Michigan legislation appears to be unique, see Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 6, we need not fear the filing of an onslaught of Accutane product liability cases here.