dissenting:
Because I conclude that the district court should not have decided the merits of this controversy, I dissent from the majority’s decision. I would either dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted or vacate the judgments of the courts below and remand the case with directions that it be dismissed. Alternatively, I would affirm the circuit court’s reversal of the District Court forfeiture order because the District Court order was premised on a patently incorrect application of the exclusionary rule.
On April 18, 1980, Baltimore County police officers executed a search warrant at a cocktail lounge on Pulaski Highway. Gerald Previti was arrested and charged with violating Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 240, by accepting wagers on sporting events. Pursuant to the search warrant, the police seized money in the amount of $3,341.50 from Previti’s person. On August 23, 1980, the charge against Previti was stetted.
*520On June 27, 1981, Previti wrote a letter to the Assistant County Solicitor for Baltimore County, stating that the seized money was not contraband and should be returned to him. The County Attorney sent this letter along with a cover letter that read, "Please set the attached matter in for a hearing on the return of seized money per your usual procedure,” to the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore County. Previti’s letter was treated as an original pleading, and the case was docketed. A show cause order was issued on July 23, 1981, naming Previti as plaintiff and the County as defendant.
Trial was held on October 30, 1981. During the trial, the trial judge ruled that the search warrant leading to Previti’s arrest was invalid. Nevertheless, the judge concluded that he did not have to exclude evidence seized incident to the execution of the search warrant because the "exclusionary rule is a rule which is just set for criminal law.” Based on the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, the trial judge held that the seized money was directly associated with gambling and was contraband. He ordered the money forfeited to Baltimore County.
Previti appealed the forfeiture order to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The circuit court reversed the judgment of the District Court after concluding that no presumption arises from a stet in a forfeiture proceeding and that a conviction is necessary for a forfeiture under Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 264. We granted the County’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
I.
Maryland District Rule 1100 states that "[a]n action shall be commenced by filing with the court a statement of claim.” This rule is supplemented by, inter alia, M.D.R. 103 h which provides in part that "[i]n commencing an action, the plaintiff shall furnish the clerk with one copy of his original pleading for each defendant.” 2 M.D.R. 301 a prescribes the requisite content of a statement of claim as follows:
*521"The plaintiffs statement of claim shall be sufficient if it contains the following:
(i) a concise statement of facts sufficient to inform the defendant of the plaintiffs claim including, in tort actions, the date and place of the alleged tort.
(ii) a demand for judgment for damages or other relief;
(iii) the name and location of the court; the names and addresses of all parties; the address and telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and if none, the telephone number, if any, of the plaintiff; the signature of the plaintiff or his attorney; and any verification required by law or rule.”
Although M.D.R. 300 a provides that the technical requirements of pleading shall not apply in the District Court, the same rule goes on to list "the plaintiffs statement of claim” as one of the mandatory pleadings.3
Moreover, the filing by a plaintiff of an original pleading in court, such as a statement of claim in the District Court or a declaration in a circuit court action at law, is necessary to give the court jurisdiction over the subject matter. Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467, 385 A.2d 80 (1978) (the circuit court "acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter by the filing of a declaration at law ... or a bill *522or petition in equity”); Bertonazzi v. Hillman, Adm’x, 241 Md. 361, 365-366, 216 A.2d 723 (1966). Being jurisdictional, the matter is not subject to waiver by the "parties” and should be addressed by this Court even though not raised by the "parties.” Duffy v. Conaway, 295 Md. 242, 254-255 n. 8, 455 A.2d 955 (1983), and cases there cited.
In this case, Previti sent nothing to a court and demanded nothing of a court. Instead, by letter to a public corporation, he sought satisfaction from the latter. Baltimore County was Previti’s adversary, not his agent, in a dispute which had not reached the courts. Moreover, under Art. 27, § 264 (c), Baltimore County had no right to institute judicial proceedings in the matter, as there had been no criminal conviction. Nevertheless, the majority treats the County’s action, forwarding to the court the letter from Previti to the County, as the filing of a statement of claim by Previti sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. This transcends any reasonable limits upon informality in District Court pleading.
The holding of the West Virginia Supreme Court in Nield v. Nield, 126 W. Va. 430, 28 S.E.2d 825 (1944), is quite pertinent. In that case, a former wife receiving child support under a divorce decree sent a notice to her former husband, setting forth her intention of applying for an increase in child support. The former husband apparently forwarded this notice to the court, along with a paper which he designated as a demurrer to the notice, although he did not challenge the sufficiency of the notice as an initial pleading. In reversing an order for an increase in child support, the Supreme Court of West Virginia stated (126 W.Va. at 432, emphasis added):
"The notice served on appellant states a fact and a conclusion: That forty dollars a month was being paid for the children’s support and that the amount was inadequate. The notice was not addressed to the court and contained no prayer for relief. The liberal rule that substance of a pleading filed in a suit rather than its form determines its effect has *523been accepted and applied in this jurisdiction .... Nevertheless the notice served on appellant cannot be considered and treated as a petition or any kind of pleading.” 4
Sears Roebuck and Company v. Glenwal Company, 325 F.Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), summarily aff'd, 442 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1971), is also instructive in the instant case. That case involved a contract dispute between Glenwal and Sears. During the dispute, Glenwal served a demand on Sears for arbitration pursuant to the contract. Sears filed a petition in the Supreme Court of New York seeking a stay of the proposed arbitration. Glenwal removed the proceeding to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Sears, however, moved for a remand, alleging that Glenwal was the plaintiff and therefore was not entitled to remove the case. The court denied Sears’ motion for a remand because of the nature of Glenwal’s notice, saying (325 F.Supp. at 88):
"Glenwal, by serving its demand for arbitration upon Sears — in effect, a notice that Sears comply with its agreement to submit their dispute to arbitration — did not thereby initiate, or become a plaintiff or petitioner to, an arbitration proceeding. To constitute a proceeding, the intervention of a court is required.”
See also Martin v. City of Columbus, 101 Ohio St. 1, 5, 127 N.E. 411 (1920) ("A party plaintiff is the one that initiates the action or proceeding by making its application or filing its petition in a court of competent jurisdiction”).
In my opinion, the District Court acquired no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this controversy.
*524II.
Even if the absence of a statement of claim by a plaintiff were not jurisdictional, and if the District Court technically had subject matter jurisdiction, the court’s exercise of such jurisdiction contravened established legislative policy. As such, it should not be sanctioned by this Court regardless of the "plaintiffs” lack of objection. See Joseph Munson Co. v. Sec. Of State, 294 Md. 160, 169, 448 A.2d 935 (1982) ("certain fundamental questions of policy relating to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction” will be sua sponte addressed by us even though not raised by a party); Sec., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 644-645, 409 A.2d 713 (1979).
As previously mentioned under Art. 27, § 264 (c), Baltimore County was not entitled to institute forfeiture proceedings unless the charges in the criminal case resulted in "a record of conviction being entered against the person or persons so arrested, in connection with which the money, currency or cash may have been so seized....” See Director of Fin. v. Cole, 48 Md.App. 633, 428 A.2d 1227 (1981). The legislative scheme of § 264 bars a trial court from undertaking to decide a forfeiture case instituted by the seizing jurisdiction without a prior conviction.
The majority, by allowing Baltimore County in effect to instigate a forfeiture action as was done in the present case, has ignored the legislative policy embodied in Art. 27, § 264 (c). Furthermore today’s decision shows seizing jurisdictions how this legislative policy may be easily circumvented in the future.
Instead of reaching the merits, I would either order that the judgments of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and the District Court be vacated and that the purported action be dismissed, or dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
*525III.
If it were appropriate to reach the merits of this controversy, I would affirm the circuit court’s reversal of the District Court’s forfeiture order, although on different grounds than those relied upon by the circuit court.
In the District Court, counsel for Previti argued that the search warrant in this case was invalid, that the warrant was therefore inadmissible, and that the evidence seized as a result of the search warrant should be excluded. After hearing testimony, the trial judge held that the warrant was invalid. Although the judge refused to allow the warrant in as evidence, he permitted the detectives to testify as to the seized items because "the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings.” Previti’s counsel specifically objected to this ruling.
In Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was applicable to civil forfeiture proceedings. That case involved state proceedings to forfeit an automobile because it allegedly had been used to transport illegal liquor. The State sought to prove the illegal use through evidence taken from the car during an unconstitutional search.5 In reversing the forfeiture order, the Court distinguished between derivative contraband and contraband per se, the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime, 380 U.S. at 699. The Court noted that "the return of the automobile to the owner would not subject him to any possible criminal penalties for possession or frustrate any public policy concerning automobiles, as automobiles.” Ibid.
In the case at bar, the property seized was money. Money is derivative contraband: its possession, without more, is lawful. To prove that forfeiture was warranted, the only *526evidence that the County introduced was obtained by virtue of the unconstitutional search. Under Plymouth Sedan, that evidence should have been suppressed. Finally, the return of the money would not frustrate public policy. According to Professor LaFave:
"the fact remains, which has been deemed determinative by most courts,13 that gambling money is more like the auto in Plymouth Sedan than the narcotics in [United States v.] Jeffers [342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951)] because it is 'not intrinsically illegal in character.’ In support of applying the exclusionary rule where the forfeiture concerns such items as gambling moneys, it could be argued that the ability to deprive gamblers of their ill-gotten gains notwithstanding the unconstitutional means used to find the money or determine its character would actually encourage violations of the Fourth Amendment.
1 W. LaFave, Search And Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 1.5 at 86 (1978) (some footnotes omitted).
Although Previti on numerous occasions below challenged the court’s ruling that the exclusionary rule does not apply to a civil forfeiture proceeding, he did not file a cross petition for a writ of certiorari raising this issue. Moreover, the issue was not directly raised in Baltimore County’s petition for a writ of certiorari, although the question presented in that petition is premised upon the trial court’s finding "that the money is contraband,” and this finding was dependent upon *527the trial court’s holding that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable.
Under Rule 813 a, this Court "ordinarily” will not decide questions not encompassed in the petition or a cross petition for certiorari. Rule 813 a is analogous to Rule 885, under which this Court’s scope of review is "ordinarily” limited to questions raised and decided in the trial court. As both rules employ the term "ordinarily,” they both permit exceptions. Consequently, we have on a few occasions decided cases on issues other than those raised in the certiorari petition or a cross petition. See, e.g., Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 161, 433 A.2d 1150 (1981); Scott v. State, 289 Md. 647, 651, 426 A.2d 923 (1981); Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 406 A.2d 415 (1979). See also State v. Raithel, 285 Md. 478, 483-484, 404 A.2d 264 (1979). Similarly, we have reviewed cases on issues not raised in the trial court. See, e.g., Scott v. State, supra; Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132, 368 A.2d 1019 (1977); Bartholomey v. State, 260 Md. 504, 273 A.2d 164 (1971) vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 938, 92 S.Ct. 2870, 33 L.Ed.2d 759 (1972); Martin G. Imbach, Inc. v. Deegan, 208 Md. 115, 117 A.2d 864 (1955).
In the trial court, Previti’s counsel raised the applicability of the exclusionary rule at least fifteen times by interposing objections. Moreover, the applicability of the exclusionary rule to forfeiture proceedings is a clear-cut issue of law. Obviously, as a matter of law, the County is not entitled to retain the money based on the evidence presented. Under the circumstances of this case, I would exercise our discretion to excuse Previti’s failure to raise the exclusionary rule issue in a cross petition, and I would affirm the circuit court decision ordering the return of Previti’s money because the money was seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant.
Judge Davidson has authorized me to state that she concurs in Part III of this dissent and would affirm the Circuit Court’s order for the reasons set forth in Part III.
. Hereafter the Maryland District Rules will be referred to as "M.D.R.”
. Original pleading is defined in M.D.R. 5 as follows:
*521"n. Original Pleading.
'Original pleading’ with respect to any defendant means the first pleading filed in an action against such defendant, including a third (or subsequent) party claim under M.D.R. 315 (Third Party Practice).”
. M.D.R. 300 a states:
"a. Pleadings Allowed.
Technical requirements of pleading shall not apply. Pleadings shall be limited to the plaintiffs statement of claim, the defendant’s notice of intention to defend, counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims, notices to defend against third-party claims, and motions.”
. The notice in Nield was filed in the existing divorce action over which the trial court had statutory jurisdiction (126 W.Va. at 432-433), and presumably for this reason the West Virginia Supreme Court observed that the "question here involved does not relate to the jurisdiction of the court, but to the manner in which jurisdiction was attempted to be exercised.” (Id. at 433). The court treated the issue as a matter to be dealt with by the Supreme Court sua sponte even though not raised by the parties.
. The State had conceded that it "could not establish an illegal use without using the evidence resulting from the search which fwajs challenged as having been in violation of the Constitution.” Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965).
Silbert v. United States, 289 F.Supp. 318 (D.Md. 1968); United States v. $125,882 in U.S. Currency, 286 F.Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); People v. Zimmerman, 44 Ill.App.3d 601, 358 N.E.2d 715 (1976); People v. Mota, 27 Ill.App.3d 982, 327 N.E.2d 419 (1975); State v. Sherry, 46 N.J. 172, 215 A.2d 536 (1965); Reyes v. Rosetti, 47 Misc.2d 517, 262 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1965).”