concurring. I join in the opinion of Justice Hays but write to emphasize an additional point. The two families in this case lived together and were clearly terrorized by Jarrett’s actions. In a real sense, it was an abused household. The appellant assaulted the family members sexually and physically and shot Earl Easom in the foot and Mary Jarrett in the arm. The facts are murky as to when this happened (it may have been eight years previously) or whether it occurred in one incident or two. With each day we are confronted with new cases of battered children, battered spouses, and battered families. In cases where the battered child syndrome is at issue, the courts have typically allowed a full recapitulation of the parent-child relationship. See United States v. Harris, 661 F.2d 138 (10th Cir. 1981) (evidence of repeated incident relevant to prove child abuse); State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983) (complete story required to show defendant’s pattern of behavior toward a child). The Utah Supreme Court was correct in Tanner when it said:
Where the presence of the battered child syndrome is shown in the child and the defendant is the child’s caretaker, logic and the interest of justice demand as complete a story as possible concerning the crime and the surrounding circumstances.
675 P.2d at 548. This also holds true with respect to the criminal defense of battered woman syndrome where, typically, a history of the battery is presented to the jury followed by an expert’s evaluation. See generally “Assisting the Jury in Understanding Victimization: Expert Psychological Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome,” 25 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 277 (1992). In Thompson v. State, 306 Ark. 193, 813 S.W.2d 249 (1991), we referred to the necessity of foundation testimony of historic battering as essential to a battered-woman-syndrome defense.
Moreover, this court has accepted evidence of violent behavior towards persons other than the victim in assessing whether to transfer the case of a juvenile charged with rape to juvenile court. Slay v. State, 309 Ark. 507, 832 S.W.2d 217 (1992). And we have held a number of times that we will allow testimony of similar sexual acts with children if it tends to show a proclivity to the same behavior. See, e.g., Fry v. State, 309 Ark. 316, 829 S.W.2d 415 (1992); George v. State, 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W.2d 792 (1991).
The same rationale applies to the battered family. Evidence of violent behavior toward the family members, whether sexual or physical, is distinctly relevant. Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) permits evidence of past wrongs for purposes “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.” (Emphasis added.) At the very least, the evidence of the shootings is admissible under Rule 404(b) as a pattern of violent behavior toward Earl Easom and Mary Jarrett.
But, in truth, the correct analysis should be under Rule 403 because the prior shootings are so clearly relevant. The issue then becomes whether the relevancy is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Admissibility of this evidence was not unfair to this appellant but, rather, it established why and how he controlled the household.
For these reasons and for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion, I concur.