Appellant, Paul R. Edwards, was convicted by a jury of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse. After waiving jury sentencing, he was sentenced by the trial judge to twenty years’ imprisonment for the sodomy conviction and one year for the sexual abuse conviction, to run concurrently.
Appellant lived with Martha Lowry for nine years. During that time, Martha Low-ry’s grandson, J.L., came to live with her shortly after he was born on July 4, 1984. When J.L. was five, Martha Lowry was no longer physically able to take care of him, so J.L. was placed by CHR, in May 1989, in a foster home. J.L. visited his grandmother without supervision approximately six times between September and November, 1989. Appellant was at the apartment during some of the visits.
Upon returning from his visit on November 21, 1989, J.L., appearing distressed, and without being asked any questions about it, spontaneously told his foster mother, Olene Gutierrez, “Paul hurt my butt.” Ms. Gutierrez observed inflammation and bleeding in J.L.’s rectal area and immediately called a social worker.
J.L. was physically examined some weeks later, on January 4,1990, by a physician, Dr. Gary Kearl, who is on the faculty of the University of Kentucky College of Medicine, engages in family practice, and accepts referrals of children suspected of having been sexually abused. The Department of Social Services made the referral for examination and treatment.
J.L. was also seen on two occasions by Ms. Lisa Barlow-Elliott, a clinical psychologist who does evaluation and therapy for *844alleged child abuse victims at the University of Kentucky Child Abuse Clinic. She testified that J.L. was referred to her by Detective Fran Carr for two purposes: (1) to see if a trained therapist could help him explain what had happened to him, and (2) to evaluate his treatment needs and to make treatment recommendations.
The three issues on appeal arise from the testimony of Dr. Kearl, Ms. Barlow-Elliott, and Ms. Gutierrez. Each witness testified as to statements J.L. had made to them. J.L. was found by the trial court not competent to testify.
Dr. Kearl testified that when he took J.L.’s patient history, he asked J.L. why he was there. Although J.L. was quiet and talked in a whisper, he said he needed a checkup. When Dr. Kearl asked why he needed a checkup, J.L. said his bottom had been hurt. Dr. Kearl then asked him who hurt his bottom, and J.L. said Paul had hurt his bottom. J.L. further explained, when asked how it had happened, that Paul hurt him from behind in his bottom with his private parts. Dr. Kearl noted finding a triangular-shaped tear on J.L.’s perianal skin. Though the wound was not fresh, neither was it fully healed.
Concerning Dr. Kearl’s testimony, appellant recognizes the exception to the hearsay rule that statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment are admissible. However, appellant points out that such statements must be the kind of information which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession. Appellant admits that the portion of J.L.’s statement describing what happened to him was important to Dr. Kearl’s diagnosis and treatment, but argues that the portion of the statement that identifies the abuser was not pertinent to Dr. Kearl’s diagnosis and treatment.
Appellant cited Souder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 730 (1986), which states that the admissibility of information which is important to an effective diagnosis or treatment “does not include information provided as part of a criminal investigation, nor does it usually include information identifying the name of the wrongdoer because normally the name of the wrongdoer is not essential to treatment.” Id. at 735.
The Commonwealth responded that in this case, however, the identity was essential to Dr. Kearl’s diagnosis and treatment. Dr. Kearl testified that he had to know who the abuser was in order to prevent future harm to the child and to prevent the spread of a sexually transmitted disease, chlamydia, for which J.L. tested positive in his rectal area. The Commonwealth cited United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985), which held, “[w]e therefore believe that statements of identity to a physician by a child sexually abused by a family member are of a type physicians reasonably rely on in composing a diagnosis and course of treatment.” Id. at 438.
In Renville, the Court made this exception to the general rule that physicians rarely have reason to rely on statements of identity because of two important aspects involved in the case: (1) the physician was not merely diagnosing and treating the child/patient for physical injuries but psychological injuries as well, and (2) the abuser was a family, household member.
The physician in that ease testified that he was treating the child for her emotional and physical trauma. He also said that the identity of the abuser was extremely important to him in helping the child work through her problems. The identity was also particularly important if the abuser lived with the child, because the abuse would likely continue as long as the child remained in the household with the abuser.
Appellant also attacks Ms. Barlow-Elliott’s testimony as to J.L.’s statements to her on his two office visits. She testified that J.L. blurted out to her, “Paul touched my pee pee, he hurt my butt,” and that this was not in response to any questioning by her. Subsequently, in answer to questions from his therapist, J.L. stated that Paul had touched his “pee pee” with his hands more than once and that Paul’s “pee pee” went inside him and “it hurt.”
In insisting that these statements ought to have been excluded, appellant states *845that “the record clearly reveals” that the psychologist was consulted for purposes of the criminal investigation. This conclusion apparently is drawn from the fact that the victim was referred to Ms. Barlow-Elliott by Detective Frances Carr, who was not only concerned about J.L.’s behavior but also about “how much he could talk about what had happened to him.”
We believe that this is an unfair inference by appellant from the testimony. Even the most hardened cynic would concede that police detectives are human, too, and are on many occasions motivated by a genuine concern for victims of crime, separate and apart from their duty to solve crimes and enforce the law.
In any case, regardless of Ms. Carr’s motivation in the referral, it is abundantly “clear from the record,” and the trial court specifically so found, that Ms. Barlow-Elliott’s purpose in seeing J.L. was to determine what had happened to the child and what therapy or treatment was needed. She stated that the information received from the victim was necessary for her evaluation and treatment of the child and that, based upon the answers given, she could make recommendations as to the treatment appropriate to relieve the symptoms demonstrated by the child.
In the case before us, the trial judge held a hearing in limine more than six months before the trial and heard the testimony of Dr. Kearl, Ms. Barlow-Elliott, Ms. Gutierrez, and the social worker, Joetta Robertson. In his very thorough, well-reasoned Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, the court stated:
It is the conclusion of the Court that the testimony of Dr. Kearl and Ms. Barlow-Elliott is competent whether or not the child James is competent to testify. The Court relies upon the case of Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380 [(1990)] wherein the Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted the provisions of Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) and the case of United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir., 1985). This Court finds that the statements are relevant to the issues before the Court and have substantial reliability. Their probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect.
This Court concludes that the testimony of the foster parent, Olene Gutierrez, is admissible under the “spontaneous statement exception” to the hearsay rule as set out in Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, 8.60(B) (2d.Ed., 1984). See also Souder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 730. [(1986)]
The statements were made by the child to his foster parent immediately upon return from a short visit with his grandmother, during which time the events occurred. The statements were made under the stress of pain from injury and no doubt, with the expectation that the foster parent would “make it well.” The Court can find no reason for fabrication under the circumstances. The statements were made spontaneously and not in response to any question.
We agree with the criteria against which the trial court measured the admissibility of the hearsay statements of J.L. and, moreover, agree with his conclusions as to their probative value.
As further evidence of his objectivity and fairness, we observe that the trial judge sustained the defense motion to exclude the hearsay statements of J.L. made in the presence of Social Worker Robertson several months after the crimes occurred, finding that their potential for prejudice outweighed their probative value.
We are of the opinion that the trial court ruled correctly as to each of the four hearsay statements and committed no error. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court are affirmed.
COMBS, LAMBERT, REYNOLDS and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join in this opinion. STEPHENS, C.J., dissents by separate opinion, in which LEIBSON, J., joins.LEIBSON, J., dissents by separate opinion.