dissenting.
The principal opinion contains a scholarly analysis of the numerous cases discussing the various problems presented by our “borrowing statute,” § 516.190, RSMo 1986. Just as the majority and the dissenting opinions in the court of appeals, the Court realizes that the trial judge’s conclusion is inconsistent with Dorris v. McClanahan, 725 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. banc 1987). So it cuts the Gordian Knot by overruling that case. I adhere to the views expressed in my concurring opinion in that case, 725 S.W.2d at 873, and in my jointure in the majority opinion. The Dorris holding represents a reasonable resolution of competing statutory considerations and enunciates sound policy. I would not so quickly cast it aside.
The principal opinion finds a “better reasoned” rule in the dissenting opinion in Dorris, authored by then Judge Robertson and joined in by Judges Welliver and Donnelly. 725 S.W.2d at 874. With respect, I do not perceive the superior reasoning now any more than I did then. Reasoning is not necessarily superior simply because it is symmetrical. Prior to Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. banc 1969) an easy symmetry prevailed in choice of law problems in tort cases, but the Court there, in a case which has received general approval and much favorable comment, concluded that a more individualized approach was desirable. Dorris is consistent with that line of authority, and the present holding is not.
*874It makes no difference that Dorris was decided by a plurality opinion. The Court rejects it in favor of a holding which did not commend itself to a majority of the sitting judges. A judge makes problems for present and future colleagues by announcing a vote of “concur in result,” especially when the Court is otherwise evenly divided, but the present opinion does not turn on nuances. It rather totally rejects the majority position in Dorris. I do not sense the need for overruling so recent a precedent.
I accept the conclusion of the principal opinion that the substantive law of Tennessee governs. The appellant does not persuade me that suit could be brought under the Missouri wrongful death act, which is said to establish a new cause of action with a “built-in” or “substantive” statute of limitations of three years. As the principal opinion points out, Tennessee’s approach to the wrongful death problem is to allow common law damage suits for negligence to be maintained even though the person suffering injury through negligence has died. This is manifestly a transitory claim which could be sued on in the Missouri courts.
According to the petition the infant plaintiff became a resident of Missouri the moment his mother died. As Dorris points out, he necessarily had to look to the law of Missouri for the protection of his proper legal interests. Nobody anywhere else cared about him. At this point the state of Missouri acquired a vital interest in protecting his welfare and his sources of support. In seeking to protect the interest of persons in his position the legislature adopted § 516.170, RSMo 1986, providing for the tolling of statutes of limitation during minority.
For the majority it is sufficient that the action could not now be maintained in Tennessee. So, it is said, the “borrowing statute,” § 516.190, precludes the maintenance of the action in Missouri. I agree with Judge Shrum of the court of appeals that “the language of § 516.170 ... overrides § 516.190_” Our problem is not one of conventional conflict of laws analysis. It rather is a problem of harmonizing the Missouri statute of limitations, §§ 516.010-516.370, by deciding whether to apply the tolling provision or the borrowing statute. When there is room for construction, policy considerations are of prime importance.
Strahler v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. banc 1986), emphasizes our statutory policy of protecting the rights of minors, who are unable to protect themselves. I dissented in Strahler because of the constitutional disabilities the holding imposed on the legislature, but my views did not prevail. The legislature has declared that infants are incapable of protecting their own legal rights, and that their rights cannot adequately be protected by parents, guardians, or other intermediaries. Thus, a minor’s fight to sue is not lost because of the inattention or neglect of his legal or natural guardians. If the principal opinion is correct, then the legislature’s concern about protecting minors’ rights does not extend to a situation in which a minor residing in Missouri may be entitled to indemnity for the death of his parent in an accident in another state.
The only reason suggested is that suggested by Judge Robertson in Dorris v. McClanahan, 725 S.W.2d 870, 875 (Mo. banc 1987), that “it is a generally accepted rule that when borrowing the statute of limitations of a foreign state, the applicable tolling provision of that state is borrowed as well.” The authority cited is scant, and the proposition, in my view, is too broadly stated. The case principally relied on, Devine v. Rook, 314 S.W.2d 932 (Mo.App.1958), did not deal with an infant’s claim. It held simply that the borrowing statute would not bar a claim if the borrowed statute of limitations was tolled by the law of the enacting state.
It is one thing to say that an adult claimant who has a choice should not be allowed to shop for a forum with a longer statute of limitations when for some reason suit has not been brought within the limitation period of the state in which the claim accrued. It is quite another to say that an infant, who by the express presumption of *875the law is not capable of forum shopping, is to be treated as a forum shopper.
I realize that, by my analysis, the infant could wait until majority before any statute of limitations would be run. This does not disturb me if the only alternative is a complete bar to recovery. The reliance interest is minimal on the part of those who might be liable for a tort which has already occurred.
For the reasons stated, I would follow Dorris v. McClanahan, rather than overruling it. I would reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.