dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe that St. Paul had a duty to defend the Edinburg Consolidated Independent School District after its trustees were dismissed from the suit. Without question, the District is the named insured under the policy. I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that *613the insurance policy “undisputedly” insures only the trustees.
The record reflects that St. Paul, in response to interrogatory number four, stated that the District is the named insured under the policy. Based on St. Paul’s response, the District supplemented its summary judgment motion. St. Paul then supplemented interrogatory four, stating that the insureds are those persons scheduled under Plan C.
I am aware that under Tex.R.Civ.Proc. 168, interrogatories are not to be viewed as judicial admissions and may be refuted even by the party supplying answers thereto. However, the probative effect of a party’s replies to interrogatories is to be determined by their character as admissible evidence. As evidence, the replies may embody admissions of fact and have the same effect. Ford Motor Credit Co., v. Draper, 401 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex.Civ.App. —Texarkana 1966, no writ).
In Thomas v. International Insurance Co., 527 S.W.2d 813, 819-20 (Tex.Civ.App. —Waco 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the appeals court held that a plaintiff should be permitted to impeach the defendant’s changed answers to interrogatories by a showing- of the former answers, as well as the purported basis for changing the answers, just as impeachment would be proper for any other prior inconsistent statement. Based on this rule, once a party files its answers to interrogatories with the trial court, subsequent changes to these answers do not remove the original answers from consideration by the trier of fact. A superseded interrogatory of a party opponent is certainly some evidence of a disputed fact issue which would prevent the entry of a summary judgment. See Thomas, 527 S.W.2d at 819-20. In the instant case, St. Paul’s original answer to interrogatory four is some evidence that the District is the named insured under the policy.
There is another basis for defeating the summary judgment rendered herein. Texas law clearly indicates that school districts and their trustees are one and the same entity. In Texas, school districts are “local public corporations of the same general character as municipal corporations. Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351, 40 S.W.2d 20, 26 (1931); Watts v. Double Oak Independent School District, 377 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1964, no writ). Although Texas school districts are subject to direct statutory control by our legislature, the legislature may delegate and does delegate much of the control of the school districts to the local trustees. See University Interscholastic League v. Midwestern University, 152 Tex. 124, 255 S.W.2d 177 (1953); Alanreed Independent School District v. McLean Independent School District, 354 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In other words, a school district speaks through the collective mouths of its trustees. The Texas legislature has provided that a school district’s trustees “shall constitute a body corporate and in the name of the school district, may ... sue and be sued_” Tex.Educ.Code Ann. Sec. 23.-26(a) (Vernon 1987).
By virtue of the fact that a school district's board of trustees may sue or be sued in the school district’s name, then a suit against the school district would be equal to a suit against the trustees in their official capacities. This being the case, it follows that a suit filed against the trustees in their official capacities would be equal to a suit against the school district.
In the instant case, the Floreses filed an amended complaint, naming as defendants the District and its trustees in their official capacities. When the Floreses dismissed the trustees in their official capacities, I believe that St. Paul had a duty to continue the defense of the District. It is axiomatic under such circumstances that the named insured (school board members) and the District are identical, the distinction in names for the purpose of a lawsuit being of no consequence. Where ambiguity exists regarding the identity of the named insured, a Texas insurance policy will be strictly construed in favor the person claiming to be the insured. See Puckett v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex.1984). It makes no common sense, and I see no practical reason why *614the District should have to maintain two insurance policies, one for itself and one for its board members. Both are subject to liability as a proper case may arise.
I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in favor of the Edinburg Consolidated Independent School District.