OPINION
MURPHY, Justice.Relator asks that we issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent, the Honorable Daniel M. Downey, to vacate his order of August 14, 1989, reinstating cause no. 89-07576, and to return to relator the sum of $435,000.00 plus interest earned since the seizure. On October 5, 1989, we granted leave to file petition for writ of mandamus. We now conditionally grant the writ.
On February 22, 1989, the State of Texas instituted seizure and intended forfeiture proceedings in the 165th Judicial District Court of Harris County under cause no. 89-07576, styled The State of Texas v. $435,000.00. Relator filed an answer on March 10, 1989, and on April 18, 1989, respondent issued a docket control order setting a trial date of May 7, 1990. Relator filed a motion to dismiss on April 24, 1989, claiming that dismissal was mandatory under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4476-15, § 5.07(a) which requires a trial court to set a hearing within thirty days of the filing of an answer. On May 1, 1989, a visiting judge granted relator’s motion and ordered the case dismissed. On May 26, 1989, the state filed a motion for rehearing. At the oral hearing held on June 12, 1989, respondent stated it was his policy to review the actions of visiting judges; however, respondent did not conclusively rule on the motion at that time. On August 14, 1989, respondent signed an order reinstating the case.
Relator seeks a writ of mandamus on three grounds: (1) the August 14, 1989 order reinstating the case was void because the motion for rehearing was unverified and the trial court had no jurisdiction; (2) the August 14, 1989 order was invalid as it violated art. 4476-15, § 5.07(a); and (3) the August 14, 1989 order was invalid as it violated art. 4476-15, § 5.082. Because we agree that the August 14, 1989 order violated § 5.07(a), we do not address relator’s challenge to the order under § 5.082.
Relator first claims that the order reinstating the case was void under Rule 165a because the motion for rehearing was unverified and the trial court had no jurisdiction. We disagree with relator’s contention that Rule 165a is applicable to the facts of this case. Rule 165a sets out the procedures for dismissals for want of prosecution. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 165a (Vernon Supp.1990). Because the dismissal in this case was not for want of prosecution, but was based on the time limit set out in Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 4476-15, § 5.07(a), we find Rule 165a inapplicable here. Instead, we believe the state’s motion for rehearing and the order reinstating the case are governed by Rule 329b concerning motions for new trial and motions to correct, modify, or reform a judgment.
Under Rule 329b, a motion for new trial is timely if filed within thirty days after the judgment was signed. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(a) (Vernon Supp.1990). In the instant case, *826the order dismissing the case was signed on May 1, 1989, and the motion for rehearing was filed on May 26, 1989. Thus, the motion was filed within the thirty day time period and was timely filed.
This rule further provides that a motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law if a written order addressing the motion is not signed within seventy-five days after the judgment was signed. Tex. R.Civ.P. 329b(c) (Vernon Supp.1990). The order dismissing this case was signed on May 1, 1989. Since no order on the motion for rehearing was signed prior to or on July 15, 1989, the seventy-fifth day following the entry of the dismissal order, the motion was overruled by operation of law.
Rule 329b(e), however, gives the trial court plenary power to rule on a timely filed motion for thirty days after the motion has been overruled by operation of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(e) (Vernon Supp. 1990). In the instant case, the motion for rehearing was overruled after the lapse of seventy-five days, or after July 15, 1989. The court then had plenary power to act on this motion for another thirty days. According to our calculations, the thirtieth day, and the last day on which the court had plenary power, was August 14, 1989. Since respondent signed the order reinstating the case on August 14, 1989, while he had plenary power, we find that the trial court had jurisdiction at the time respondent acted on the state’s motion for rehearing. Thus, we find no support for relator’s procedural challenge to respondent’s August 14, 1989 order.
Relator next contends the August 14, 1989 order was invalid because it violated Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4476-15, § 5.07(a). We note at the outset that art. 4476-15, § 5.07(a) was repealed effective September 1, 1989 and that the procedures governing forfeiture hearings are now set out in Tex.CRIM.Proc.Code Ann. § 59.05 (Vernon Supp.1990). Because the instant proceeding was initiated prior to the repeal of § 5.07(a), we must address relator’s contention in light of the statutory language in effect at that time.
Prior to repeal, § 5.07 set out the guidelines for a forfeiture hearing and sub-part (a) provided the following time requirement for setting a hearing:
If an answer is filed, a time for hearing on forfeiture shall be set within 30 days of filing the answer and notice of the hearing shall be sent to all parties.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4476-15, § 5.07(a) (Vernon Supp.1989) (repealed effective September 1, 1989). In construing this statutory language, the courts of appeals disagree as to whether this thirty-day time period is mandatory or directory. In State v. Boren, 654 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex.App.—Waco 1983, no writ), the Waco court held that the thirty-day time period for setting a forfeiture hearing was merely directory and not mandatory. Conversely, the Port Worth and Beaumont courts of appeals have held that a trial court must set a forfeiture hearing within the thirty-day period following the filing of an answer. State v. $4097 in U.S. Currency, 773 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Clark v. State, 693 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1985, no writ). Because we disagree with the Boren construction of this statutory language, we follow the holdings in State v. $4097 and Clark that the thirty-day period for setting a forfeiture hearing after the filing of an answer is a mandatory requirement. See State v. $4097, 773 S.W.2d at 675; Clark, 693 S.W.2d at 24.
In the instant case, relator filed an answer on March 10, 1989. The trial court did not issue the docket control order setting a trial date until April 18, 1989, thirty-eight days after the relator filed her answer. Because the trial court and the state failed to set a hearing within the prescribed thirty-day period, we find that the visiting trial judge correctly dismissed this proceeding. See State v. $4097, 773 S.W.2d at 675; Clark, 693 S.W.2d at 24. Consequently, we conclude that the order of reinstatement signed by the respondent was void as a matter of law because it violated the mandatory provision in section 5.07(a) requiring the setting of a hearing within thirty days after the filing of an answer.
*827We conditionally grant relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. This writ of mandamus will issue only if respondent fails to vacate his August 14, 1989 order of reinstatement, and if he fails to reinstate the May 1, 1989 order dismissing this cause and ordering the return to relator of money seized.