dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority goes too far in holding that a terminated employee who reasonably believes that she is required to return to pick up her paycheck is covered by worker’s compensation. The better rule, and the rule consistent with the holdings of the cases relied upon by the majority, is that in order for a terminated employee to be covered, that employee must have been instructed to return to the employer’s premises in order to receive her pay. The former employee must have been required to pick up the check, and should not be covered by work*616er’s compensation if she decides to go pick up her pay based on hearsay or rumor. If the employee does not request that her check be mailed to her, then it is for her convenience that she decides to return to get it.
My position is consistent with the denial of worker’s compensation for pre-employment injuries. Carnes v. Transport Ins. Co., 615 S.W.2d 909 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.). The denial of worker’s compensation coverage during the pre-employment association which leads to employment is analogous to the denial of coverage during the post-employment association.
Moreover, the only cases cited by the majority support a requirement that the employee be instructed to return to the employers premises. In Johnson v. Toro Co., 331 N.W.2d 243 (Minn.1983), it was customary for employees to receive a turkey as the Christmas bonus. While on a medical leave of absence, Ms. Johnson received a letter inviting her to come to the plant on December 21 in order to receive her turkey. She went to the plant to pick up her turkey and while in the parking lot slipped and was injured. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that she was covered by worker’s compensation. There are two important facts that distinguish Johnson from the instant case. First, Ms. Johnson was still an employee at the time of injury. Second, she was instructed in writing that if she wanted her turkey, she had to come and get it. Johnson does not support the majority opinion.
In Solo Cup Co. v. Pate, 528 P.2d 300 (Okla.1974), the company required employees to work in uniform and furnished them with two uniforms and a locker with key so the employees could comply. Ms. Pate quit, and at the company’s request signed a termination statement. In it she agreed that she would “return all company property in good condition before I receive my last check.” 528 P.2d at 300. The company property was listed as two smocks and one key. On the day she quit, one of the uniforms was at home, so she did not receive her last paycheck. On the usual payday she returned to the company to turn in the uniform which the Oklahoma Supreme Court held “was required for her to receive her last check.” 528 P.2d at 300. While in the manager’s office she tripped and was injured. The court held that she was covered by worker’s compensation. Pate is distinguishable because Ms. Pate was instructed in writing that she had to bring in her uniforms and key in order to receive her pay. Likewise, in Cyrus v. Vierson & Cochran, Inc., 631 P.2d 1349 (Okla.App. 1981), the court held that a former employee who was told by a company spokeswoman that he would have to pick up his final check at the job site was covered by worker’s compensation.
The majority states that “being paid for work done is within the employment relationship and contract.” This statement is overly broad, and is apt to be construed with unintended and incongruous results. At some point when a former employee has not received her pay, the employee-employer relationship is transformed into a debtor-creditor relationship. 1A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 26.30 (1982). Otherwise, a terminated employee who is not required to return, but fails to leave a forwarding address so the check can be mailed, could return for her paycheck six months later, fall, and be covered by worker’s compensation.
I would hold that Bryant’s deposition testimony that her husband had worked in the bakery and had always returned to pick up his pay does not raise a question of fact that she was directed to return to the bakery in order to receive her final check. Indulging every inference in favor of the nonmovant, I find no competent summary judgment evidence that she was instructed that she had to return in order to obtain her pay. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
CAMPBELL, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.