OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
McCORMICK, Judge.We granted the State’s motion for rehearing to reconsider our previous holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that the knife employed by appellant during the robbery was a deadly weapon.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 29.03(a)(2), makes robbery under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 29.02, aggravated if the defendant “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon.” Appellant, William Tisdale, was indicted by an Ector County grand jury for the aggravated robbery of Janet Presley, the indictment alleging that he “use[d] and exhibited] a deadly weapon, namely, a knife,
The evidence at trial reflected that, in the course of robbing Janet Presley, appellant exhibited a loekblade knife which appears in the record in a photograph, together with a ruler from which these measurements are drawn. The blade of the knife when fully opened and in a locked position has an overall length of two and five-eighths inches from the broken off tip end of the blade to the rounded off portion of the handle. The overall length of the open knife is seven inches. It is obvious from viewing the knife that the blade was originally longer in length but appears to have been broken off at the tip.
*114When Presley saw appellant’s knife, she “just threw up [her] hands and backed off and let [appellant] take the money.” Presley also testified:
“Q. * * * [W]ere you frightened when you saw the knife?
“A. Very much, yeah.
“Q. Did you feel threatened?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. Were you in fear of imminent bodily harm?
“A. Yeah.
“Q. Were you in fear of death?1 “A. Yeah.
“Q. That wouldn’t be hard to understand, would it?
“A. Well, nobody has ever pulled a knife on me before, it was pretty scary.
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“Q. Would it be implicit, do you feel like he would have to swing the knife around or come at you with it to feel threatened, or did you feel threatened when he held it up to front of you? “A. I felt threatened then.
“Q. Threatened of fear of death or serious bodily injury. ?
“A. Yeah, I figured he could have — as a matter of fact, I thought he would have.”
On original submission, a majority held:
“No threat of serious bodily injury, express or implied, was made by appellant. Appellant made no gesture with the knife which would indicate that he was about to use same. The evidence merely reflects that appellant had a knife in his right hand (Citations omitted). To hold that the evidence is sufficient to show deadly weapon is tantamount to elevating a knife to the status of a deadly weapon, per se.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), states that, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, the reviewing court must ask and answer the question “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) And it is plain from Part IV of the Jackson opinion that a trier of facts is entitled to draw reasonable inferences and conclusions from the direct and circumstantial evidence.
This Court has adopted the Jackson test. See, e.g., Houston v. State, 663 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); and Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). Thus, the sole issue presented in the case at bar is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the knife exhibited by appellant was a “deadly weapon.”
The underlying thrust of the original opinion seems to be that, because a knife is not statutorily defined as a deadly weapon under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.07(a)(ll), a holding that appellant’s knife was a deadly weapon would be “tantamount to elevating a knife to the status of a deadly weapon, per se.” It is one thing to hold that a knife is a deadly weapon per se, but it is quite another thing to say that, where one person uses or exhibits a knife during the course of a robbery in order to threaten or place another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the knife was a deadly weapon in the manner of its use or intended use.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.07(a)(ll)(B), provides:
“Deadly weapon means:
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“(B) anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.”
*115The evidence presented shows that appellant’s “use” of the knife was by showing it to his victim. This is established by direct evidence. Appellant had entered the grocery store and carried several items to the cashier. When Presley opened the cash register, appellant placed his left hand over the cash tray. Presley grabbed his hand and said, “No,” to which appellant replied, “Yes,” and produced the knife here in question. Presley backed up and appellant took the money from the cash tray.
Appellant was within reach of Presley and, as noted swpra, she was in fear of death and serious bodily injury and thought appellant would have caused same. In other words, the jury was fully warranted in concluding from Presley’s testimony that appellant intended to use the knife to cause her serious bodily injury or death. Contrary to the original opinion, appellant’s actions were perceived by Presley as an implied threat, and the finder of fact could properly find likewise.
The majority originally cited Davidson v. State, 602 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), as authority for reversing appellant’s conviction. Davidson, however, when compared with the totality of the circumstances here presented, can be distinguished. In Davidson, the knife allegedly used to commit the offense was never found nor admitted into evidence. Further, Davidson was never closer to the alleged victim, John Coleman, than five or six feet. The evidence showed that Davidson was observed shoplifting and upon leaving the store was confronted by Coleman and two other store employees. Davidson turned on Coleman with an open knife in his hand and said, “If you come any closer, I’m going to cut you.”
Coleman pulled a box cutter from his pocket to defend himself if necessary but Davidson turned and ran. Coleman testified the knife blade was two and one-half to three inches long and that he was placed in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.
Unlike the present case, Davidson revolved around an apparent shoplifting, with the defendant displaying the knife only after being confronted outside the store. In the instant case, appellant entered the store, walked around until all other customers had left, and immediately produced his knife prior to committing the theft. Additionally, appellant actually came in physical contact with Presley and held the knife within arm’s reach of the victim’s face and torso, whereas in Davidson, the defendant was never closer to Coleman than five or six feet. Lastly, the knife used in the instant case was produced before the jury, whereas in Davidson, the weapon was never recovered.
The evidence found lacking in Davidson was the defendant’s intent to use the knife, which was apparently demonstrated by the fact he displayed the knife only after being confronted and then immediately fled the scene without ever advancing toward his alleged victim.
The actions of appellant in advancing on Presley and displaying the knife open in his hand are sufficient to show his intent to use the weapon and distinguish this case from Davidson.
We conclude that, under the facts presented in this record, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the knife used by appellant was a deadly weapon.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted and the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
THOMAS G. DAVIS, TEAGUE and MILLER, JJ., dissent.. Emphasis supplied.