concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s holding, in part I of its opinion, that home improvement transactions fall within the meaning of “consumer goods” or “consumer services”, and meet all of the other elements of the Door-to-Door Sales Act, see Maryland Code (1975, 1990 Repl.Vol.), § 14-301 of the Commercial Law Article and, thus, are included within that Act. Op. at 332-33. On the other hand, I have a somewhat different interpretation of the operation of § 14-303 than the majority’s interpretation, as reflected in part III B. Therefore, while I concur in part I of the opinion, I note my dissent from part III. Given the view I take of § 14-303, I would not reach the issue discussed in part IV, the right of the appellee to prejudgment interest.
The majority is correct, of course, § 14-3031 does not expressly provide that the right to cancel accrues when the buyer is advised of it or prescribe the precise period for which the right to cancel continues when the seller fails to *345inform the buyer of the right. To that extent, then, the majority quite properly observes: “[l]iterally, CL § 14-303 addresses the way in which the right to cancel is exercised.” Op. at 338-39. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that the Legislature did intend for the cooling off period, i.e., the buyer’s right to cancel, to have meaning. Why else would the Legislature painstakingly provide not only for the buyer’s notification but, in addition, the precise form of that notice? Undoubtedly, the Legislature recognized that, without knowledge of the right to cancel, a consumer will not be able meaningfully to exercise it. Until the buyer is told that he or she may cancel, or receives information from another source, the Legislature logically could assume that the right to cancel that it was giving the buyer was nothing more than an empty promise. We do not ascribe to the Legislature an intention that overlooks reality.
I agree with the majority’s reluctance, indeed, refusal, to construe the statute as providing, premised only upon the failure of the seller to provide the buyer with the notice the statute requires, for a perpetual right to cancel on the part of a buyer. The seller’s omission to give notice need not be, however, the only trigger for cancellation. In my opinion, the key question is at what point did the consumer become aware, or should have, that he or she had a right to cancel the contract? A consumer who is aware that he or she has the right to cancel, notwithstanding the seller’s non-compliance with § 14-302, but does not do so in order to increase the benefit he or she will receive as a result of the seller’s performance of the contract, which the consumer intends ultimately to reject, should not be allowed to cancel the contract for even a reasonable time following a formal notification by the seller. That consumer should be deemed consciously to have foregone that right. The purpose of requiring that the consumer be informed of the right to cancel is to ensure that a consumer who otherwise would not have it, has knowledge that, for a certain period of time, he or she may cancel a contract he or she has entered into for any, or even no, reason.
*346The right of cancellation, being part and parcel of a cooling off period, may be exercised, as indicated, for any reason, or for no reason. As the majority recognizes, the cooling off period was engrafted into the law in order to protect the consumer who does not react well to pressure selling. Thus, during the three day period following the sale, that consumer may discuss the matter with relatives and friends or simply reflect upon whether he or she did the right thing. Having reached a decision, the consumer is able, if desired, to reverse the process. Satisfaction, or dissatisfaction, for that matter, with the contract terms or any work that may have been performed during that period is not, at that point, a relevant consideration. Therefore, even when the seller has done everything perfectly, the consumer may still cancel; if the right to cancel exists at all, dissatisfaction either with the deal or the performance cannot be the determining factor, or even one of them, in the assessment of whether, or not, to exercise the right or in determining if cancellation comes too late.
I agree that there are two approaches to take when a buyer fails to comply with § 14-302. I also agree with the majority’s rejection of the first — strictly construing § 14-303 as providing for a three day cooling off period, and no more. As the majority points out, that approach does not give any effect to the legislative intent that the buyer be told of the right of cancellation. Op. at 339-41.
The majority opts for an alternative, allowing the right to run for a reasonable time, presumably from the date of the transaction. What constitutes a reasonable time is, we are told, determined by the totality of the circumstances, including the purpose of the cancellation right and the fact that there was no disclosure of that right by the seller. Op. at 341-42. The majority does not specify, as among the factors to be considered, whether, and as of when, the buyer knew, or should have known, that he or she had a right to cancel the contract.
I believe that the most important factor to be considered in the determination whether the right to cancel was exer*347cised within a reasonable time is the point when the buyer is made aware, or should have known, that the right exists. In my view, therefore, a reasonable time is either three days after the seller complies with the statutory requirement or three days after the consumer acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the right.
In this case, the majority is impressed by the trial court’s findings of fact. On the basis of those findings, and the circumstances already mentioned, it determined, as a matter of law, that the appellant did not exercise her right to cancel within a reasonable time. Critical to the trial court’s findings of fact seems to be the fact that the appellant had not expressed dissatisfaction with the seller’s performance. The excerpt from the trial court’s oral opinion is illustrative:
[E]ven as late as the argument a few minutes ago I’m still trying to figure out what it is [Ms. Crystal] wants to satisfy her. And I don’t know. And if I don’t know then I can hardly say to Mr. Callahan, “You obviously didn’t do what you were supposed to do.” It may be obvious to her, but it is not to me then I can hardly say to Mr. Callahan, “You should have known what she wanted.”
Still later, the trial court discussed the appellant’s conduct in connection with the work being done by the seller as being the opposite of “dissatisfaction”.
I cannot agree that the failure of the appellant to complain about, or indicate dissatisfaction with, the work being done is an adequate predicate for the court’s determination that her cancellation of the contract came too late. In my opinion, as I have said, the critical factor to be considered is the extent to which the buyer knows, or should know, that he or she has the right to cancel the contract. That the buyer is also dissatisfied with the work that has been done is beside the point; certainly, the right to cancel ought not be conditioned on the buyer being dissatisfied with the seller’s work.
The evidence in this record does not reveal when the appellant learned that she had a right to cancel the contract; *348all the record reflects is that, at some point, she learned of the Door to Door Sales Act and that she formally cancelled her contract approximately one year after being sued on the contract. Had the trial judge found that the appellant knew of the right to cancel before she was sued or at some time more than three days before she gave notice of cancellation and there was evidence in the record to support that finding, then I would have no quarrel with the bottom line result in this case. Since, however, that issue was not addressed, not to mention determined, and, so, on this record, cannot be resolved without appellate fact finding, I would reverse and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. A remand is appropriate also because we have today, for the first time, announced the test to be applied when measuring what constitutes a “reasonable time.” I agree with the factors the majority identifies. There are also other factors to be considered. When all relevant factors are considered, I do not believe that the determination in this case should have been made as a matter of law. Whether, in this case, the appellant acted timely to cancel the contract should be decided by the trial court in light of the applicable factors. The trial court, of course, never did that; it had no opportunity to apply this new test. It should be allowed to do so.
In addition to the factors mentioned by the majority, the court should consider, as I have mentioned, any evidence tending to show that the buyer knew of the cancellation right and when that knowledge was acquired. Should there be no such evidence, the court must consider whether there is any evidence tending to establish that the buyer should have known of the right. In that regard, factors bearing on the issue include the amount of time that has elapsed between the transaction and the buyer’s notice of cancellation; whether and, if so, as of when, the buyer obtained legal representation; whether and, if so, how much, work has been done pursuant to the contract; and whether there is evidence that the seller attempted to suppress informa*349tion concerning the right shed light on the buyer’s knowledge of the right to cancel should also be considered.2
Fairness, as the majority points out, is also a factor to be considered in determining whether the buyer cancelled the contract within a reasonable time. Fairness may not be viewed in isolation, however. It must be considered as just one factor in the totality of the circumstances. A seller who willfully suppresses information concerning the buyer’s right to cancel, thus, assuring the buyer’s ignorance on the point, should not benefit from that action, even if means that the seller may lose a great deal as a result of a late cancellation. Moreover, where the law imposes duties and responsibilities on a party, an omission by the party on whom such duties and responsibilities are imposed must be considered strongly against that party. On the other side of the ledger, of course, is, as indicated above, how much the buyer knows, or should know. It is not enough to say that, because the buyer will benefit from a particular transaction and, concomitantly, the seller will lose, the result is unfair. To take that posture would be to disregard in large measure the legislative intent in seeking to protect consumers. Accord Citaramanis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 165, 613 A.2d 964, 975 (1992) (Bell, J. dissenting).
ELDRIDGE and CHASANOW, JJ., join in these views.
. That section provides:
If the seller violates any provision of section 14-302 of this subtitle, the buyer may cancel the door-to-door sale by notifying the seller in any manner and by any means of his intention to cancel.
. Robert Manso, who was the appellee's foreman when the subject contract was performed, testified, at trial, as to what he told the appellant:
I told her if she wasn’t happy with the job that was done that her only recourse was to either talk to the Home Improvement Commission or hire herself a lawyer to get something fixed or adjusted or speak with Mr. Callahan to try and straighten it out which she said she did and could not do. Between them, I told her those were her only other recourses.