These cases involve the question whether counsel appointed to represent defendant indigents charged with crime are entitled to receive compensation for services and reimbursement for out of pocket expenses. In the Green case the charge was felonious escape and in the Coleman case the charge was first degree murder. In each instance the applications for fees and reimbursement were allowed by the trial court, the court in the Green case directing that the sums be taxed as costs against the State and said sums be allowed and approved by the state auditor and treasurer and in the Coleman case that they be taxed as costs and be paid by the State of Missouri. In both cases the State moved to amend the order and re-tax the costs, which motions were overruled, and in each instance the State has appealed.
In 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, the United States Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution requires the State of Missouri, and other States, to furnish counsel to an indigent accused of crime. This means, in practical effect, that an indigent accused of crime cannot be prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated in Missouri unless he is furnished counsel. The lawyers of Missouri, as officers of the Court, have fulfilled this State obligation, without com*573pensation, since we attained statehood, although other persons essential to the administration of criminal justice (e. g. prosecuting attorneys, assistants to the Attorney General, psychiatrists, et al.) have not been asked to furnish services gratuitously. The question is whether the legal profession must continue to bear this burden alone. The question is one for the judicial department (Art. II, § 1, Const, of Mo., V.A. M.S.) and must be decided by this Court (Art. V, § 1, Const, of Mo.; In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W.2d 672). We consider the following language from State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966), appropriate:
“Although as we said above the assignment of counsel without compensation (except in murder cases) has been the rule in this State since 1795, the burden of those assignments has increased vastly. The increase has been not only in the number of assignments, but also in the demand a criminal case makes upon counsel. A criminal case used to be a fairly simple affair. The issue usually was a pure question of fact — did the defendant commit the crime? Today, with rapidly changing concepts relating to sundry matters, such as confessions, search and seizure, joinder of defendants, right to counsel, etc., the defense of criminal charges consumes far more time than when we came to the bar. To this must be added the impact of the right of the indigent, without cost, to appeal, and to press post-conviction proceedings and as well attacks in the federal courts. Further, the total demand will likely increase, for while criminal proceedings now dominate the stage, in the wings ar.e other matters — minor offenses, juvenile delinquency, and civil commitments, areas in which counsel are now furnished but on a selective basis. We are satisfied the burden is more than the profession alone should shoulder, and hence we are compelled to relieve the profession of it.” (Emphasis ours.)
We recognize, of course, that the legislative power of Missouri government (Art. II, § 1, Const, of Mo.) is vested in the General Assembly (Art. Ill, § 1, Const, of Mo.), and that the General Assembly has never provided for payment of compensation to Missouri lawyers for their representation of indigents in criminal cases and in cases wherein they seek post-conviction relief.
Accordingly, believing that a “permanent solution to the problem presented is an appropriate subject for the legislature” (People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill.2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337, 340), and believing that the General Assembly should have the opportunity to respond to the-position taken today by this Court, we hold and announce:
(1) that the judgments are reversed and remanded with directions to strike the allowance of attorneys’ fees and expenses; and
(2) that this Court, after September 1, 1972, will not compel the attorneys of Missouri to discharge alone “a duty which constitutionally is the burden of the State.” State v. Rush, supra, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 446.
MORGAN, HOLMAN and BARDG-ETT, JJ., concur. SEILER, J., concurs in result in separate concurring opinion filed. FINCH, C. J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed. HENLEY, J., dissents and concurs in separate dissenting opinion of FINCH, C. J.