dissenting:
In Franklin I, supra, 404 A.2d at 540, we considered the “objects and purposes” of a statutory scheme far less pellucid than the enactment now brought into question. Under D.C.Code § 40-603(k)(3) (1973), there appeared to be a single requirement for repossession of an automobile impounded by the District of Columbia for outstanding traffic violations: the “owner” or “other duly authorized person” was required to deposit collateral in Superior Court to answer for each infraction. We held, first, that this single provision did not create a lien for the unpaid tickets, and second, that because its apparent purpose was to insure the culpable party’s appearance in court, an “innocent” chattel mortgagee was not an “owner” or “duly authorized person” for the purposes of the statute. Franklin I, supra, 404 A.2d at 540. Not considered in Frank-Un I was another statutory provision, D.C. Code § 159(d)(2) (1973) [recodified as D.C. Code § 4 — 160(d)(1) & (2) and D.C.Code § 4-161(e) (1981) ], creating an equally significant requirement for repossession of an automobile impounded by the District of Columbia for outstanding traffic violations — payment of towing and storage fees.1
As the majority correctly notes in the case now at bar, in 1978 the District of Columbia Council amended § 40-603(k)(3). The new enactment [recodified as D.C.Code § 40-703(k)(3) (1981)] brings together the disparate parts of the 1973 provisions and makes clear the dual requirements which are conditions precedent to repossession:
The owner of such impounded or immobilized vehicle, or other duly authorized person, shall be permitted to repossess or to secure the release of the vehicle upon:
(A)(i) The depositing of the collateral required for his appearance in the Superi- or Court of the District of Columbia to answer for each violation; or (ii) depositing the amount of the potential fine and penalty for each infraction ... and
(B) Upon the payment of the fees required by paragraph (4) of this section [impoundment, towing and storage costs],
(emphasis supplied). Consequently, the present statutory scheme clearly creates a lien in favor of the District of Columbia on any automobile impounded for outstanding traffic violations. Paragraph (4) of Section (B) is concerned principally with the payment of storage and towing costs rather than parking tickets. These significant costs are plainly offset by the proceeds from public sale of any automobile impounded by the District in effective traffic administration. D.C.Code § 4 — 161(e) (1981).2 See Franklin I, supra, 404 A.2d at 539 (“essential characteristic” of statutory *452lien is right to enforce lien by sale of involved property). Thus, a lien having been created, appellant’s security interest under article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is merely prior in time to the District’s lien, see D.C.Code § 28:9-103 et seq. (1981), but not prior in right. Article 9 does not, of course, apply to state statutory liens that arise by operation of law. See generally, White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-2 (2d ed. 1980).
Commercial law principles govern construction of the term “owner” “or other duly authorized person.” Under the UCC, upon default by a conditional sales purchaser, the secured party, or chattel mortgagee, has absolute right to possession of the collateral. D.C.Code § 28:9-503 (1981); see Franklin I, supra, 404 A.2d at 540; District of Columbia v. Hamilton National Bank, 76 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C.1950). The chattel mortgagee thereby becomes, in effect, the absolute “owner” or “person authorized to possess” the collateral. Thus, when Edwards defaulted on his loan payments, Franklin Investment Company was vested with an absolute right to possession of the 1974 Ford Mustang II, subject only to the lien of the District of Columbia for towing, impoundment, and storage fees. From this it must follow that under the plain language of D.C.Code § 40-703(k)(3) (1981), Franklin, in order to exercise its right, was required as a condition precedent to pay to the District of Columbia its charges for towing, impoundment and storage. See D.C.Code § 4-161(e)(1) (1981).
Whatever may now be said of Franklin I, the inescapable fact is that the law governing the case at bar clearly creates an enforceable lien on behalf of the District of Columbia superior to that of Franklin Investment Company. While it is true that the chattel mortgagee is entitled to notice only when the vehicle is transferred from the Department of Transportation to the Property Clerk for public sale and no statute specifies the time of such transfer, by no process of legitimate reasoning can it be concluded that it was basically wrong to require chattel mortgagees to assume the risks of possible impoundment, and payment of the charges thereby incurred, as a cost of doing business. Certainly they are in far better position to offset the costs of impoundment than the District of Columbia government, whose taxpayers have no prophylactic recourse.
I respectfully dissent.
. In Franklin I, supra, the chattel mortgagee did not contest these costs, but instead paid them to the police property clerk. Although the opinion does not cite the particular provision under which the fees were paid, examination of the 1973 Code indicates that § 4-159(d)(2) is of relevance.
. This provision comes into effect if the owner fails to claim the vehicle. The automobile is then considered lost or abandoned and publicly auctioned. See Franklin I, supra, 404 A.2d at 538 n. 4.