This is an appeal by the Texarkana Independent School District from a judgment granting a permanent injunction in a class action enjoining the school district from suspending or expelling appellees and all other persons in the same class from the Texas High School at Texarkana, Texas, for past or future violations of regulations *730promulgated by the Board of Trustees concerning disruptive behavior. This suit was brought in the trial court as a class action by the parents as next friends of eight students who were expelled and all others similarly situated. The case was tried before the court without a jury. Seventy-six students had been expelled by the Board of Trustees for the remainder of the Spring Semester of 1971 for alleged disruptive activities at the Senior High School. The Trial Court found basically the following:
1. That the suit was properly brought as a class action;
2. That procedural due process was not followed by school officials in that:
. (a) the students were not given written notice of the charges against them;
(b) the students were not allowed sufficient time to prepare their defense;
(c) the students were not notified of their right of counsel; and
(d) the students were not notified of their right to have a record made of the evidence introduced at the hearing before the Principals.
The Trial Court further found that procedural due process was not followed by the Board of Trustees for each of the preceding reasons plus an additional finding by the Court that the Board of Trustees continued to hear evidence during its deliberations at a time when the students and parents were not present.
The Trial Court found further that the guidelines concerning disruptive activity adopted by the Board of Trustees and furnished to each individual student were vague and indefinite and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore null and void.
The Court granted a permanent injunction against appellants, enjoining them from suspending any students from attendance at Texarkana Senior High School in Texarkana for the balance of the Spring Semester, and from in any way interfering with appellees’ attendance at the school at any time in the future until appellant school district adopted a method of holding and conducting hearings in connection with suspensions or expulsions which furnishes to the student or students involved procedural due process, both before the Principals and the Board of Trustees. The Court set out the following method for holding and conducting the hearings as guides for procedural due process:
“(a) that written notice be given to the' student involved and to his parents in adequate time for them to prepare for the hearing;
(b) that a specific statement of the offense charged against the student be set out in the notice;
(c) that the student shall be informed in the written notice that he has the right to be represented by counsel at all hearings;
(d) that the student be informed in the said written notice that he may make a record at his own expense of the evidence introduced at the hearing, if he desires;
(e) that all testimony received either by the School Principals or by the Board of Trustees shall be introduced in the presence of the student; his parents and counsel, if they desire to be present, with the right of the student, his parents and counsel to cross-examine.”
The appellants were further enjoined from' suspending or expelling students until such time as appellants had adopted positive and definite guidelines for the discipline of students attending schools within the Texarkana Independent School District, and required copies of the guidelines to be furnished to each student with directions that guidelines be read by the student and delivered by the student to his parents.
*731This appeal by the school district and its officials is predicated upon four points of error which are as follows:
“First, that the Court erred in holding that the Appellant did not accord the plaintiffs procedural due process in the investigation and hearing of a matter involving disruptive activities at the school.
“Second, that in the investigation of a disruptive activity in which 212 students of a senior high school were involved in vandalism and in fighting between the black and white races on the school grounds during school hours, procedural due process does not require the fixed, mechanical, legalistic steps outlined by the trial court; and the Court was in error in enjoining the defendants in the future from suspending or expelling any student for misconduct until and unless the defendants have followed a method of procedure in accordance with the listed mechanical and legalistic steps fixed by the Court.
“Third, the Court erred in holding that the guidelines by the school concerning disruptive activities were unconstitutionally vague and indefinite.
“Fourth, the Court erred in granting a class action judgment.”
The facts in this case are complex and lengthy, but basically the Board of Trustees of Texas High School had adopted a statement of policy concerning disruptive activities in October of 1969, following a previous disturbance at the school. Disruptive activities were categorized in the statement of policy as being major disruptive activities and minor disruptive activities. Major disruptive behavior carried a penalty of suspension for the remainder of the semester and failing grades in each of the courses in which the student was enrolled. The first category is defined as follows:
“Major disruptive behavior shall be interpreted to include any activity or action by any student that interferes with the normal routine operation of the school program, such as:
1. Demonstration;
2. Sit-ins;
3. Group violence;
4. Desecration of the American flag.”
Minor disruptive behavior carrying a suspension from school for five days for the first offense and permanent suspension for the second offense was defined as follows :
“Minor disruptive behavior shall be interpreted to include any activity that interferes with routine operation of the school program, such as:
1. Disrespect or disobedience of school personnel;
2. Leaving class without permission;
3. Blocking corridors or hallways;
4. Harassment of students through name calling;
5. Use of vulgar or profane language.”
It was agreed and stipulated that appel-lees had been furnished a copy of appellants’ statement of policy outlined above.
The chronology of events pertinent to this case are as follows:
1. On Wednesday morning, February 17, 1971, before classes began, a disturbance started between some of the black students and some of the white students at Texas Senior High School in the student center of the building. The two groups were separated by members of the school administration, but approximately 500 students reassembled outside the building in the outer court area, where name calling and threats between the two groups continued. Principal W. E. McGuire announced over the intercom system that the students should go to class, at which time many stu*732dents started to their classes. However, a large group went to the eastern part of the school grounds, where fighting broke out, teachers were threatened, and cars were damaged by vandalism. When the disturbance could no longer be controlled by the administration, police officers were called to the scene to quell the disruptive activity. The disturbance had started at approximately 8:17 on Wednesday morning, and continued until approximately 8:40 a. m., when the police árrived. The doors to the school were locked about 8:45 a. m., and the classroom teachers were instructed to make a careful check and list all students who were absent from class at the first period. School was dismissed at 11:40 a. m., the same day, and that afternoon the entire staff of the school met to determine which of the absent students had been observed by any teacher or principal in the school building or on the school grounds that morning when the fighting had occurred. Those students who had been observed and identified, and who were not present for the first period class, totalled approximately 212 in number. The next day when those 212 students came to the Principal’s office to get their absence slips in order to be readmitted to school, they were told to assemble in the school auditorium, where the Principal informed the students that they were temporarily suspended from school and that they and their parents would soon be contacted by letter.
2. On Saturday, February 20th, a letter was sent to all of the parents of the students who were absent from class on February 17th, and who had been identified as being present on the campus when the disruptive activity occurred. The letter informed the parents that their child was temporarily suspended from the school in connection with the disruptive activity, and that each parent should call the Principal’s office to make an appointment.
3. On Monday, February 22nd, the parents of the students involved began coming to the Principal’s office at regular intervals. The Principal and two assistant principals began the interviews in their separate rooms. Each child was given an opportunity to tell what he had done on the morning of the disturbance, and each parent was given an opportunity to add anything else that would enlighten the Principal on the activities of his child. The Principal or assistant conducting the hearing made a memorandum in writing of what each person said. This memorandum was read to the child and to the parent at the conclusion of the hearing for corrections or additions. Also, each child was given an opportunity to state in writing his actions concerning his activity on Wednesday morning. The hearings continued daily from Monday, February 25th, 1971. As a result of the hearings, 54 students were readmitted to school following the conclusion of the hearings. One hundred ten of the students were recommended to the Board of Trustees for expulsion for the remainder of the semester; forty-seven of the 212 pupils never appeared at the Principal’s office, nor did they apply for readmission to school.
4. On Thursday, February 25th, 1971, the Superintendent of Schools mailed to the parents of the 110 students a letter stating that the School Board would act on the recommendations of the administration on the expulsion of the children. Each parent was given an opportunity to appear before the Board with his child, and with any additional information, by calling the Superintendent’s office and having his or her name placed on the agenda.
5. On Friday, February 26th, the Trustees started their hearings which were concluded on Sunday, February 28th. At the conclusion of all the hearings, the Board reviewed the evidence as to each individual student involved, and voted on each student separately as to whether he or she was to be suspended for the balance of the semester, or reinstated. A majority vote of the Board was required for expulsion.
At the hearings held before the Board of Trustees, the parents and students were asked if they had any information in addi*733tion to that which they had given the Principal and, if so, such additional information was received. They were also asked if they had any other witnesses or other testimony. Afterwards, the memorandum made by the Principal at the preliminary hearing was read to the parents and to the students who were offered an opportunity to make any corrections or additions in the presence of the School Board. If the student involved had written a letter summarizing his activity in his own words, that was also read to the Board. Thereafter, the Trustees, school administrative officials and the school attorney asked whatever questions they deemed advisable and made notes of the answers of the students and the parents. All parents and students were allowed unlimited time within which to make whatever statement they wanted to make, and to introduce any evidence they desired. No witnesses were heard by the Board other than those in the presence of the student and his parents. Approximately 94 students appeared before the Board of Trustees. The Board reinstated 18 students and ordered 76 expelled.
6. On March 1st, telegrams were sent to each of the 76 students, notifying them of their expulsion.
7. Suit was filed in the District Court of Bowie County on March 3, 1971, and a temporary restraining order was granted the same day.
8. The case was heard on March 23, on its merits.
9. Judgment granting a permanent injunction was entered on May 25th, 1971.
Appellants’ first and second points of error questioned the Trial Court’s judgment in its holding that appellees were not afforded procedural due process in the investigation, hearing and ultimate expulsion or permanent suspension of 76 students.
Under Sec. 21.301 of the V.T.C.A. Texas Education Code, “The board of trustees of any school district may suspend from the privileges of the schools any pupil found guilty of incorrigible conduct, but such suspension shall not extend beyond the current term of the school.”
The Board of Trustees has the following general powers as set out in Sec. 23.26 of the Texas Education Code:
« * * *
“(b) The trustees shall have the exclusive power to manage and govern the public free schools of the district.
i( * * ⅜£
“(d) The trustees may adopt such rules, regulations and by-laws as they may deem proper.”
While the Board of Trustees has ample authority to suspend or expel students, “it is without authority to suspend a student for any act or conduct, unless, prior thereto, the Board has promulgated a rule, regulation or policy generally covering such act or conduct for which the student is subject to being suspended, or unless the act or conduct constituted incorrigible conduct in violation of this article. (Art. 2904, Vernon’s Ann.Revised Civil Statutes, now Sec. 21.301, Tex.Education Code). Such rule, regulation or policy may be informal, preferably written but may be verbal, as long as it fairly apprises the student of the type of prohibited conduct for which he may be suspended from school.” Opinion of the Attorney General 1969, No. M-395.
It is clear that the Texas Legislature has delegated the authority of managing independent school districts and the disciplining of those students attending school within the district to the Board of Trustees and those persons employed by the Board.
The cases and legal articles concerning Constitutional rights of students are legion. The rules laid down by the courts in these cases concerning the Constitutional rights of students have developed a new line of law which this court chooses to *734brand “institutional law,” which is a combination of administrative law and criminal law. The courts have attempted to preserve the students’ Constitutional rights, while at the same time they have tried to uphold the decisions of school administrative bodies. This is as it should be. Justice Langdon, in Passel v. Fort Worth Independent School District, 453 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1970, wr. ref’d, n. r. e.) quotes Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board of Education, 306 F.Supp. 97 (U.S.Dist.Court, Southern District of Georgia, Dublin Division, Nov. 17, 1969): “Among the things a student is supposed to learn at school (at least, such is my idea) is a sense of discipline. Of course, rules cannot be made by authorities for the sake of making them but they should possess considerable leeway in promulgating regulations for the proper conduct of students. Courts should uphold them where there is any rational basis for the questioned rule. All that is necessary is a reasonable connection of the rule with the proper operation of the schools. By accepting an education at public expense, pupils at the elementary or high school level subject themselves to considerable discretion on the part of school authorities as to the manner in which they deport themselves. Those who run public schools should be the judges in such matters, not the courts. The quicker judges get out of the business of running schools the better. * * * Except in extreme cases the judgment of school officials should be final in applying a regulation to an individual case.”
An eminent scholar, Professor Charles Alan Wright in his article, “The Constitution on the Campus,” (22 Vanderbilt Law Rev. 1027 at pp. 1071, 1072, 1969), states: “There is general agreement that four fundamental safeguards are required in every proceeding that may lead to serious penalty. The student must be advised of the grounds of the charge, he must be informed of the nature of the evidence against him, and he must be given an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, and he must not be punished except on the basis of substantial evidence.” In a case involving suspension, all of these must be present to insure fairness. Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326 F.Supp. 1200 (D.Kan.1971).
The written notice mailed out by the Superintendent of Schools contained the following in the body of the letter: “The administration is recommending to the school that (name of student) be expelled from school for the remainder of the school term because of his/her part in the disruptive activities at Texas Senior High on February 17, 1971. The school board will act on the recommendations at a special meeting beginning at 7:00 o’clock Friday, February 26, 1971.
“If you wish to appear before the Board with any additional information, please call 792-0831 and have your name placed on the agenda.”
The Trial Court was correct in holding that procedural due process was violated in the giving of written notice of the charges against the students. Since there are no pleadings in such hearings, it is necessary that the student be apprised with some particularity of the offense with which he is charged. It need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal indictment, but it should contain “a statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify ‘discipline.’ ” Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961). “A student cannot be punished on the basis of some ground other than that stated in the written charge.” 22 Vanderbilt Law Review 1027 at page 1072; Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F.Supp. 947-950 (D.S.C.1967); Woody v. Burns, 188 So.2d 56, 57 (Fla.App.1966). We hold that appellants did not notify the student of the specific violation with which he was charged with such particularity as to avoid being in violation of the due process clause of the U. S. Constitution. The student should also be advised of the names of at least the principal witnesses against him *735and the nature of their testimony. State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tenn.1942), and it must be done in some adequate manner; Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F.Supp. 649-651 (W.D.Mo.1967); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, supra, provides that the student must be given “the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each witness testifies.” In Gardenhire v. Chalmers, supra, the court stated: “Gardenhire was never afforded any notice of the grounds of the charge, he was not informed of the witnesses or evidence to be used against him, and he was not afforded an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. In a case involving suspension, all of these must be present to insure fairness.” The person or administrative body charged with the duty of giving the notice to the student must make a good faith effort to deliver the notice to the student, but the right of the student to be heard in his own defense is lost if the student fails to attend at the appointed time, or if he has made it impossible despite diligent effort to give him notice of the hearing. Wright v. Texas Southern University, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.Supp. 228, 233 (S.D.W.Va.1968), affirmed 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968).
We hold further that the student is entitled to a reasonable time within which to prepare for the hearing on a day certain, but this time may be shortened if the student so requests and the school authorities will not be unreasonably inconvenienced, so that the student may spend as little time as possible out of classes. The Trial Court was correct in its pronouncement of the first two guidelines for procedural due process, which were:
“(a) That written notice be given to the student involved and to his parents in adequate time for them to prepare for the hearing;
“(b) That a specific statement of the offense charged against the student be set out in the notice.”
In these requirements, the Trial Court is affirmed.
II.
We cannot agree with the Trial Court in the requirement,
“(c) That the student shall be informed in the written notice that he has the right to be represented by counsel at all hearings.” (Emphasis added)
No doubt, justice would be more effectively and efficiently administered if counsel for the student were present, but the presence of counsel is not mandatory where counsel for the school is not present. Madera v. Board of Education, 386 F.2d 778 (2nd Cir. 1967). However, the student’s right to counsel, should the matter appear to him to be of sufficient gravity to make legal assistance desirable, should receive ungrudging recognition. If, however, the Board of Trustees proceeds through counsel, as it did in this case, at the hearing before the Board, then the student has the right to be represented by counsel of his own choice at his own expense, and in this instance the Board of Trustees shall notify the student in writing that he has a right to be represented by counsel. This shall be true in all preliminary hearings where the school district proceeds through counsel, and particularly when the school intends to expel the student. It is not necessary to notify the student of his right to counsel in preliminary hearings before the superintendent, principal or administrative committee when the school district does not elect to proceed through counsel and does not intend to expel the student. Madera v. Board of Education, supra; Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2nd Cir. 1967).
*736III.
The guideline set out by the Trial Court stating,
“(i) That the student be informed in the said written notice that he may make a record at his own expense of the evidence introduced at the hearing, if he desires,”
while desirable, is not absolutely mandatory. In Due v. Florida A. & M. University, 233 F.Supp. 396 (D.C.M.D.Fla. Tallahassee Div.1963), the court stated:
“A fair reading of the Dixon case shows that it is not necessary to due process requirements that a full scale judicial trial be conducted by a university disciplinary committee with qualified attorneys either present or formally waived as in a felonious charge under the criminal law. There need be no stenographic or mechanical recording of the proceedings. Procedures are subject to refinement and improvement in the never-ending effort to assure, not only fairness, but every semblance of fairness. More specific routines of notice and advisement may be indicated in this regard, but a foisted system of rigid procedure can become so ritualistic, dogmatic, and impractical as to itself be a denial of due process. The touchstones in this area are fairness and reasonableness.”
IV.
The fifth guideline of the Trial Court states:
“(e) That all testimony received either by the school principals or by the Board of Trustees shall be introduced in the presence of the student, his parents and counsel, if they desire to be present, with the right of the student, his parents and counsel to cross-examine.”
In a number of cases, students have been allowed to confront the witnesses against them, and to cross-examine these witnesses, but this is not ordinarily a matter of right. Jones v. State Board of Education, 279 F.Supp. 190-194 (M.D.Tenn.1968); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, supra. In Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, supra, Judge Rives wrote:
“This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such a hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college’s educational atmosphere and impractical to carry out.”
While this case dealt with colleges, it is no less applicable to elementary and high schools. Other courts have agreed that confrontation need not be permitted as a matter of right. Wong v. Hayakawa, No. 50983 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 24, 1969); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822-826 (1942). However, see 22 Vanderbilt Law Review 1027-1076, supra, in which Professor Wright states:
“Professor Clark Byse has taken a more discriminating view which I find convincing. This is that there is no right routinely to confrontation, but that confrontation and cross-examination may be required where they are the conditions of enlightened action. Thus, in many cases and with regard to many witnesses, the tribunal is free to accept affidavits and to refuse confrontation. But, if the case resolves itself into a problem of credibility and a tribunal must choose to believe either the accused or his accuser, cross-examination is the condition of enlightened action and is therefore required in the interest of fairness and reasonableness.”
We hold that the right to cross-examination and confrontation is not mandatory, but may be desirable in those circumstances involving the credibility of witnesses. It is important to note, however, that Boards of Trustees do not have *737subpoena power, nor do they have power to administer oaths.
V.
There can be no doubt that the school administration and the Board of Trustees had a very difficult problem which demanded prompt and decisive action. This was the second time this particular school had been plagued with violence and rioting, and the school officials were all doing their best to preserve law and order and, at the same time, to get the school back into operation as soon as possible. One of the important questions in this case is whether or not a student may be temporarily suspended without a hearing. We hold that a school superintendent, or principal in the absence of the superintendent, may temporarily suspend a student for» five school days, or such other reasonable time as the circumstances may demand, without a preliminary hearing where there is a clear and present danger to the students’ physical or emotional safety and well-being, or for reasons relating to the safety and well-being of students, faculty and school property. 2 Texas Tech.Univ. Law Review 271, 275, Brakebill- — “Suspension of Student Pending Disciplinary Hearing” (1971); Stricklin v. Regents, 297 F.Supp. 416-420 (W.D.Wis.1969); Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F.Supp. 562, 568-570 (W.D.Wis.1968); Buck v. Carter, 308 F.Supp. 1246 (D.C.Wis.); Scoggin v. Lincoln University, 291 F.Supp. 161, 172 (W. D.Mo.1968); Vermillion v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907). Interim suspension presupposes a prompt hearing. Marzette v. McPhee, supra; Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F.Supp. 174, 178 (M.D.Tenn.1961). A student on request must be given a preliminary hearing to determine the propriety of his interim suspension. Stricklin v. Regents, supra. We feel that the right to prompt temporary suspension is necessary to the curbing of violence and rioting when it occurs on the campus. However, a preliminary hearing is required before a student can be temporarily suspended where no danger is involved, such as cases of alleged cheating by a student.
In cases in which the student is temporarily suspended before a preliminary hearing, it is incumbent upon the school authorities to promptly furnish the student with written notice of the charges against him, as previously outlined in this opinion.
The student may waive preliminary hearing when it is required and accept the temporary suspension or permanent suspension. For the protection of the school, it would seem advisable to have the waiver in writing and signed by both the student and at least one of his parents, or his guardian.
VI.
The Trial Court erred in holding that the guidelines adopted by the school concerning disruptive activities were unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. There is a very narrow gap, and a great danger of confusion, between the notion of a guideline void for overbreadth and a guideline valid on its face, though it might be unconstitutionally applied. In this case the guidelines were unconstitutionally applied to some of the students. There were students who were only spectators who were expelled for the remainder of the school semester. It is obvious that they were not guilty of major disruptive activity. Their suspension should have been for only five days, as outlined by the minor disruptive activity of leaving class without permission. There can be no discipline imposed except on the basis of substantial evidence of a violation of one or more specific rules or policies of the school. Jones v. State Board of Education, 279 F.Supp. 190, 200 (M.D.Tenn.1968); Scoggin v. Lincoln University, supra.
David Campbell and Craig Lewis should not have been expelled from school for the balance of the Spring Semester, because they did not participate in any major dis*738ruptive activity. The evidence shows they were only spectators. All students who were mere spectators and failed to return to school for their first period class should have been suspended under the minor disruptive penalty for leaving class without permission. We hold the guidelines and statement of policy relative to conduct of students in this case are not so vague and indefinite as to be unconstitutional. Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 307 F.Supp. 1328, 1343-1347 (D.C.1969). Appellants’ Third Point of Error is sustained.
VII.
Appellants’ Fourth Point of Error is that the court erred in granting a class action judgment. We hold that a class action was authorized by Rule 42(a) (3), Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, supra. The pertinent parts of the rule are as follows:
“(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is,
* * * * * *
“(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.”
Obviously, each student could have brought a separate action in this controversy, but the court could have consolidated all of the cases for one hearing. The better practice seems to be to allow all of those persons similarly situated to proceed in one suit. This type of class action is commonly called a “Spurious” class action. McDonald Texas Civil Practice, Sec. 3.341.
“Joinder of the parties is neither necessary nor indispensable. The spurious class action is a permissive joinder device. Even before the adoption of the rules, the Texas Courts had allowed a spurious class action. Such an action stands as an invitation to others affected to join in the battle and an admonition to the Court to proceed with proper circumspection in creating a precedent which may actually affect non-parties, even if not legally res judicata as to them. Beyond this * * * it can not make the case of the claimed representative stronger, or give them rights they would not have of their own strength, or affect legally the rights or obligations of those who do not intervene.”
All-American Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247 at 248 (C.A.2d 1954). While common relief may be sought in such class action, it is not necessary that the Court grant common relief. The 47 students who were notified that they could appear at the principal’s office and before the Board of Trustees, but made no appearance, would have waived their rights to be heard, except for the fact that they were permanently suspended from school without being given notice of the reason for their suspension with such particularity as would afford them due process under the United States Constitution. If these 47 students had been given a proper notice but later failbd to appear before the Board of Trustees at the appointed time, they would have waived their rights to appear and could have received no injunctive relief through the class action. Wright v. Texas Southern University, supra; Scott v. Alabama State Board of Education, 300 F.Supp. 163 (D.C.Ala.); Buck v. Carter, supra. All of the 76 students were similarly situated because they had all been suspended without proper notice and they had a common question of law concerning whether the notice given to them met the notice required by the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
“The fact that each member is subject to the same specific sort of deprivation of *739constitutional rights as the representative parties is enough.”
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, supra. Appellants’ Fourth Point of Error is overruled.
This Court is compelled to point out that the school authorities had available to them other courses of action and other remedies in this matter. Section 21.302 of the Texas Education Code provides for action against the student in the Juvenile Court when the student is “insubordinate, disorderly, vicious, or immoral in conduct, or who persistently violates the reasonable rules and regulations of the school * * Further, Article 295a of the Vernon’s Ann.Texas Penal Code defines disruptive activities on the campus and provides the penalties for such conduct. See also Article 295b, Texas Penal Code; and now Article 295c just enacted by the 62nd Legislature in Chapter 258 (1971). There were other violations of the Penal Code of Texas which would have justified criminal actions against the more vicious students.
The judgment of the Trial Court will be modified by the deletion of its Paragraph III ordering the adoption of new guidelines for the discipline of students attending Texarkana Independent School District, and as further modified herein the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.