concurring in part and dissenting in part:
An action was filed in the District Court of Maryland against Jeffrey Alan Levitt, an attorney at law, licensed to practice in this State, and. Court Square Investments, Inc., whereby damages were sought for personal injuries received by a person on the premises 3217 Woodland Avenue, Baltimore City, allegedly owned by Levitt and Court Square. Levitt’s appearance was entered for the defendants. Judgment by default was granted as to liability and that judgment was extended upon damages being proved at a hearing on 16 March 1976. An appeal was duly filed by Levitt in the Baltimore City Court.
The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on grounds that the record in the case had not been timely transmitted and that a copy of the transcript of testimony had not been provided to them. At a hearing on this motion before Judge Joseph H. H. Kaplan, it is plain that Levitt lied. This led to disciplinary action by the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland and a plenary hearing before Judge Paul A. Dorf, in accordance with chapter 1100, subtitle BV, of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. The hearing judge found *241from clear and convincing evidence that Levitt had made to Judge Kaplan representations pertaining to his knowledge of the suit, and particularly notice to him of the March 16, 1976 hearing date, and “concerning his interest in the particular property and in Court Square Investments, Inc.,” which were not true. It was manifest that Levitt misrepresented to Judge Kaplan what had taken place in the District Court case. Then before the inquiry panel he told, under oath, an entirely different story, one which appears consistent with the record. However, at the hearing of this grievance before Judge Dorf, he again told, under oath, a story consistent with what he had said to Judge Kaplan but totally inconsistent with what he had said before the inquiry panel.
On his findings of fact that Levitt had falsely denied to Judge Kaplan that he had notice or knowledge of the suit and had any interest in the property involved, Judge Dorf concluded as a matter of law that Levitt had violated three disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 1230, Appendix F, Maryland Rules of Procedure, namely, that a lawyer shall not violate a disciplinary rule, DR 1-102 (A) (1), shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, DR 1-102 (A) (4) and, in his representation of a client, shall not knowingly make a false statement of law or fact, DR 7-102 (A) (5).
The majority apparently accept Judge Dorf s findings of fact and conclusions of law. They declare, and I wholeheartedly agree, that “[w]hen there is in the record, as here, from the lips of the attorney involved, a recorded admission of facts directly contrary to his contentions before the Baltimore City Court judge [Judge Kaplan] and, indeed, before the judge assigned to hear the disciplinary matter, it is frivolous, to put it mildly, to say that there has not been clear and convincing evidence of his violation of the Disciplinary Rules.”
The majority then put Levitt’s prevarications in what I think is-the correct perspective by observations to which I wholeheartedly subscribe. They note that attorneys at law are officers of the court. They state that “[c]ourts have a right to expect their officers to be truthful in their statements *242to the court.” They declare that “[t]he lack of candor demonstrated here is unbefitting a lawyer and it also undermines our system of justice.” They expressly affirm an observation often made by this Court: “[N]o moral character qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor.”
At this point I depart from the majority. Although they assert without equivocation that “ftjhere is clear and convincing evidence that Levitt lied to Judge Kaplan,” they express a belief that Levitt’s “conduct in the context in which it took place does not rise to that ‘involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,’ but is confined to his having ‘[k]nowingly ma[d]e a false statement of ... fact.’ ” In the face of the clear and convincing evidence that Levitt lied to the court, and despite their stated position concerning the necessity for truthfulness and candor in an attorney’s relationship with a court, they minimize the lies here, downgrading them to the status of knowingly making a misstatement of fact so that they do not amount to dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. This I cannot accept.
The majority attempt to justify their view by pointing out
that the matter before [Judge Kaplan] did not in the slightest degree concern whether Levitt or his corporation had or had not been properly served in the proceeding or whether he had knowledge of that proceeding prior to his receipt of notice of the judgment. The judge was concerned solely with a motion on the part of the appellee to dismiss the appeal because of Levitt’s alleged failure to comply with the rules as to an appeal from the District Court to the Baltimore City Court. This motion was considered informally in chambers. It appears that in some way at that conference the extraneous matter of the allegedly improper service of process and the like was brought out.
Although the majority deny any condonation of Levitt’s conduct, they take, what I deem to be a weak stand regarding that conduct. I am not at all willing to consider the lies here *243as no more than misstatements of fact and assume that they played no part in the consideration of the court on the motion to dismiss. Levitt was attempting to reverse a judgment entered against him. It is true that we do not know precisely how the subject of notice of the hearing to assess damages and of the ownership of the property came up, there being no transcript of the proceedings in chambers. But I think that it is inescapable that Levitt brought the matter up to advance his cause. Certainly, Judge Kaplan did not deem Levitt’s conduct extraneous or unimportant or insignificant or irrelevant or immaterial, because after denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, the judge immediately took steps to set the matter concerning Levitt’s interest in the property for a hearing under oath before another judge. That hearing did not materialize only because Levitt paid the judgment.
The majority claim to be “fully cognizant of the fact” that
this Court has consistently adhered to the view, both prior to 1970 (when we reviewed disciplinary actions only on appeal at the instance of the respondent-attorney), Balliet v. Balto. Co. Bar Ass’n, [259 Md. 474, 270 A.2d 465 (1970)]; Fellner v. Bar Ass’n, [213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957)]; In the Matter of Lombard, 242 Md. 202, 218 A.2d 208 (1966); In Re Williams, 180 Md. 689, 23 A.2d 7 (1941); and since that date (when we assumed original and complete jurisdiction over these proceedings), Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, [269 Md. 510, 307 A.2d 677 (1973)]; Bar Ass’n v. Cockrell, 270 Md. 686, 313 A.2d 816 (1974); Maryland St. Bar Ass'n v. Callanan, 271 Md. 554, 318 A.2d 809 (1974), that when a member of the bar is shown to be wilfully dishonest for personal gain by means of fraud, deceit, cheating or like conduct, absent the most compelling extenuating circumstances, ... disbarment followed as a matter of course. [Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 553, 318 A.2d 811 (1974).]
No compelling extenuating circumstances were shown here. Indeed, it appears that Levitt was wilfully dishonest, seeking *244personal gain by means of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. I see no sound basis for this Court to reject Judge Dorf s conclusion that Levitt violated DR 1-102 (A) (4). Levitt has amply demonstrated by his conduct that his word is not to be trusted, that he is not fit to be an officer of the court, and that he is unworthy of continued membership in the Maryland Bar. Suspension is not the proper sanction in the circumstances. He should be disbarred.
Chief Judge Murphy joins in this opinion.