A jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County awarded Robert Canery a verdict of $375,000 for injuries he sustained in an accident involving the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). SEPTA filed motions for judgment n. o. v. and for a new trial which were denied. This appeal followed. We affirm the decision of the lower court.
Sometime after midnight on October 16, 1969, the appellee, Robert Canery, was returning home from a visit with his aunt. He proceeded to the North Philadelphia subway station and sat down on a bench to wait for a train. Canery was suffering from a severe headache which was the result of shotgun injury he had received prior to that date. After waiting approximately twenty minutes, Canery heard a train approaching and saw the train light. He walked to within 12 inches of the edge of the platform as the train came out of the tunnel approximately 400 feet away. Canery testified he “passed out,” and the next event he remembers is being in the hospital. Canery suffered a head injury, a blow to the lower back, and severance of part of one foot. Subsequent operations and treatment required the amputation of the toes on the injured foot and several skin grafts.
Walter Harrison, the conductor on a south-bound train that passed through the North Philadelphia Station after the accident, testified that he heard screams and saw a man lying on the platform. He went over to the injured man located on the platform, observed that he had been hit by a train, and then telephoned his dispatcher and the police. When the police arrived, they also found Canery lying on the edge of the platform. The officers saw his wallet and one shoe in the track area below, but no one testified that blood was found near the tracks.
According to the treating physician who testified, Canery’s injured foot was covered with a lot of grease, presumably from the wheel of the train. The doctor concluded the injury to the foot was a “degloving” one whereby the skin was pulled from the bones since the foot was pinched by the subway wheel.
*386Jasper Pressley, the SEPTA motorman who operated the train involved in the accident, testified that he did not observe anyone either on the tracks, in front of the train, or on the platform as he proceeded through the station where Canery was injured. He said he did not hear a scream but was notified by the dispatcher at the end of the line that someone had been injured. The train operated by Pressley was a “work” train that did not stop for passengers. Pressley testified he did not stop or slow up as he passed through the station, but proceeded at a constant speed of 20 miles per hour. The manager in charge of training personnel for SEPTA testified that all motormen are instructed to slow up as they proceed through a station and give a warning signal in case anyone moves dangerously near the train on the platform or falls in front of the train.
Based on these facts, the jury found for the injured plaintiff, Canery. Appellant now asks us to review two main issues: first, whether the lower court erred in denying its motion for judgment n. o. v.; and second, whether a new trial should be granted on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the verdict was excessive, and the court’s charge on wanton misconduct was in error.
I.
In our review of the denial of a motion for judgment n. o. v. it is important to note that such a motion may only be entered
“in a clear case where the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict against him. Stewart v. Chercnicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970). Judgment n. o. v. is inappropriate if the evidence on a material point presented an issue of fact for decision by the jury. This method of attacking the verdict may never be utilized so as to invade the province of the jury, especially where that determination is based partly on questions of conflicting testimony and credibility of witnesses. Brandon v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 417 Pa. 128, 207 A.2d 843 (1965); Axilbund v. *387McAllister, 407 Pa. 46, 180 A.2d 244 (1962). Where such questions were determined by the trier of fact, and if there is reasonable support for the verdict which was rendered, a judgment n. o. v. will not be granted . . ” Eldridge v. Melcher, 226 Pa.Super. 381, 385-86, 313 A.2d 750, 753 (1973).
In arguing for judgment n. o. v., appellant claims that its motorman was attentively operating the work train at a reasonable rate of speed through the station and had no knowledge or reason to know of anyone on or near the tracks. Therefore, the mere happening of an accident does not raise an inference of negligence nor put the motorman’s actions within the category of willful or wanton misconduct. Kmetz v. Lochiatto, 421 Pa. 363, 219 A.2d 588 (1966); Flagiello v. Crilly, 409 Pa. 389, 187 A.2d 289 (1963).
The issue is not as easily disposed of as appellant would suppose. Since Canery testified that he “passed out” prior to the accident, the only other person present at the scene of the accident was the motorman, Pressley, who claims he neither saw nor heard anyone. In such a situation, circumstantial evidence must be used in order to reach a reasonable conclusion. In order for the party with the burden of proof to prevail when relying on circumstantial evidence, the evidence “must be adequate to establish the conclusion sought and must so preponderate in favor of that conclusion as to outweigh in the mind of the fact finder any other evidence and reasonable inferences . . . which are inconsistent . . . ” Smith v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 397 Pa. 134, 139, 153 A.2d 477, 480 (1959); see also Houston v. Canon Bowl, Inc., 443 Pa. 383, 278 A.2d 908 (1971).
Based on the circumstantial evidence presented in this case, the parties argue that the accident could have occurred in one of two ways: first, Canery could have passed out on the platform and been hit by the moving train while on the platform. If the accident occurred in this way, the duty appellant owed Canery was that of a business visitor. A showing of negligence, or lack of due care, would then be *388sufficient to find appellant liable. Second, appellee could have passed out and fallen on the tracks. The standard owed Canery in that instance is only that due a trespasser and the motorman could only be liable if there was a finding of willful or wanton misconduct. Evans v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440 (1955).1
We conclude that the weight of the evidence supports the theory that the accident occurred while Canery was on the platform. Harrison, the conductor on the train that passed through the station after the accident, and the police undeniably saw appellee on the platform. This is highly credible evidence on the part of these two participants as related to their efforts to assist Canery. The doctor who gave his conclusion as to where appellee was at the time of the accident did not observe him at the scene but merely drew his conclusion from the nature of the foot injury. However, Canery’s head, back, and other parts of his body were also affected by the impact. Thus, the evidence on which the jury could base its verdict clearly supports the facts that Canery was on the platform when the accident occurred.
In keeping with this conclusion, the correct legal theory upon which the case should proceed is that of negligence. The evidence preponderates in favor of the appellee to the extent that the jury could have inferred negligence on the part of the SEPTA motorman. In the case before us, the manager of training for SEPTA testified that all motormen are to sound a warning signal and slow down as they pass through a station. Pressley’s testimony of his actions was in direct contradiction to these instructions. The motorman testified that he neither sounded a warning signal nor reduced his speed when traveling through the North Phila*389delphia Station, but proceeded at a reasonable rate of 20 miles per hour. Appellant argues that 20 m. p. h. is a reasonably safe speed at which to proceed through a station and therefore it was not necessary to reduce speed. The failure to reduce speed in the face of its danger to the life or limb of another is no excuse against the charge of negligence. There was no speedometer on the train involved in the accident, and therefore the alleged speed of the train was based on Pressley’s judgment and veracity. The credibility of this testimony was for the jury to determine, and the jury could have reasonably inferred a breach of the duty of due care in Pressley’s failure to reduce speed or sound a warning signal.
Appellant’s major argument is that the motorman did not see Canery even though he was attentively operating the train. However, a wrongdoer may not avoid liability by saying he did not see what was plainly visible to him. In Kmetz v. Lochiatto, supra, defendant, the driver of an automobile, testified he did not see the plaintiff. The court said, “The jury could find that the defendant’s statement that he did not see the plaintiff before the accident, could, in itself, constitute evidence of negligence against him.” 421 Pa. at 365, 219 A.2d at 589. The defendant in Kmetz gave no explanation of why he didn’t see the plaintiff in front of his car on a well lit street when all the circumstantial evidence demonstrated that his car had hit the plaintiff. Similar language was used in Frisina v. Dailey, 395 Pa. 280, 282, 150 A.2d 348, 849 (1959) when the court stated:
“A motorist, who says that he did not see a pedestrian so directly in his path that he engages him head on, places himself in the dock of accountability from which he is not released until he satisfactorily explains why his eyesight failed to tell him what was clearly visible, why his muscular reactions failed to respond to what should have been an instinctive urge to avoid doing injury to others, and what caused the lapse in the unceasing vigilance required and expected of every motorist.”
*390This same standard is applied in railway cases. In Peden v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 324 Pa. 444, 188 A. 586 (1936), plaintiffs were struck by a freight train while walking in a spur track. The evidence showed no bell had been rung nor other warning given. The train’s speed was only 5 m. p. h., but the train traveled its full length over plaintiffs’ bodies before stopping. The fireman on the train testified he was watching ahead as far as he could see and did not see plaintiffs. The court affirmed judgment for the plaintiffs, saying:
“The jury did not have to accept (the fireman’s) statement that he did not see the boys, because it is a well settled principle of law based on ordinary human experience that ‘one cannot be heard to say that he looked and did not see when the facts show he must have seen.’ ” (Citations omitted.) 324 Pa. at 447, 188 A. at 588.
In Peden, as in the case before us, the question is not whether the motorman was negligent in not looking because the testimony indicates he was attentively operating the train and had a clear view of the track and platform. The factual issue is whether, having looked, he actually saw what was before him. 324 Pa. at 448, 188 A. 586. The court concluded, as we do here, that the jury could have found from the evidence presented, that the motorman saw what was before him or was so dangerously close to the edge of the platform.
In the case before us, the jury was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the circumstances presented. Kmetz v. Lochiatto, supra; Frisina v. Dailey, supra; Peden v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., supra. Otherwise any tortfeasor who testifies he was looking in the direction of the victim could escape liability merely by asserting he did not see the victim. Based on the facts of the case and the above cited case law, the jury’s verdict finding for appellee is supported by the evidence. An inference of negligence on the part of the motorman is more than possible under these circumstances and the motion for judgment n. o. v. was properly denied by the lower court.
*391II.
In the alternative, appellant requests that we grant a new trial, first, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The granting or refusal of a new trial is clearly a matter of the trial judge’s discretion and his decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. A new trial should not be granted on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence “ ‘where the evidence is conflicting and the jury might have found for either party . . .’ Carroll v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 436, 445-6, 84 A.2d 505 (1951). A new trial should be awarded on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.” (Citations omitted.) Burrell v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 438 Pa. 286, 289, 265 A.2d 516, 518 (1970).
Appellant points out the many conflicts in the testimony at trial in an attempt to establish that the accident could not have occurred as Canery and his witnesses testified. As has already been discussed in Part I of this opinion, there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have based its verdict in favor of the injured Canery and therefore its verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
Next, appellant requests that we grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict of $375,000 was excessive. Once again, the duty of assessing damages is one given to the jury and their verdict will not be disturbed unless it appears an award resulted from “caprice, prejudice, partiality, corruption, or some other improper influence.” Tonik v. Apex Garages, 442 Pa. 373, 378, 275 A.2d 296, 299 (1971).
In the case before us, appellee’s medical expenses totaled $21,189 which covered six hospital stays. There was medical testimony introduced that there would be further medical expenses throughout appellee’s life due to the degloving injury to the foot that occurred in this accident. *392Several skin graft attempts were unsuccessful and more would be attempted. Appellee’s foot continued to become infected and had to be drained periodically.
Canery’s past lost earning amounted to $63,098. An actuary projected his future lost wages to be between $187,907 if he worked to age 60 and $207,444 if he worked until age 65. These figures were based on the fact that Canery was able to do some work, but in a very limited capacity. He held only a tenth grade education and could not perform any tasks that required standing more than fifteen minutes. Nor could he let his foot dangle for long periods of time due to circulatory problems.
The treating physician testified that there was much physical pain involved in the degloving injury to the foot and that such discomfort would continue. Due to appellee’s young age of twenty-three at the time of the accident, the complications involved, and the additional head, ankle, rib, and back injuries sustained in the accident, the lower court concluded that an award between $83,269 and $102,806 for pain and suffering was not excessive.
Appellant did not call any medical witnesses to contradict the medical testimony at trial. As its sole argument, for excessiveness, it cites certain cases that have not awarded verdicts quite as high for similar injuries.2 However, as pointed out in Spangler v. Helm’s N.Y.-Pgh. M. Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959), each case must be determined on its own facts. Mr. Canery is entitled to recover for his loss of enjoyment in activities in which he had previously participated but could no longer pursue, Lebesco v. SEPTA, 251 Pa.Super. 415, 423, 380 A.2d 848, 852 (1977), as well as for the other elements of pain and suffering, lost wages, and medical expenses incurred incident to the accident. Only when the damages are “flagrantly outrageous and extravagant” may the court intervene and draw the line, for “they *393have no standard by which to ascertain the excess.” Spangler, 396 Pa. at 489, 153 A.2d at 493. Based on the seriousness of the injuries sustained, their continuing element, appellee’s young age and limited ability to work, we conclude the damages awarded were not excessive.
Finally, appellant requests we grant a new trial on the basis that the trial court erred in its charge on wanton misconduct by failing to include appellant’s requested point.3 Since we have held that the weight of the evidence supports the fact that appellee was on the platform when he was injured and therefore a negligence legal theory is the correct one to be applied in this case, any alleged error in the charge on wanton misconduct would be harmless.
Decision of the lower court dismissing appellant’s motions for judgment n. o. v. and for new trial is affirmed.
SPAETH, J., files a concurring opinion. LIPEZ, J., files a dissenting opinion.. “[W]illful misconduct [is] a reckless disregard for the trespasser’s safety after actual knowledge of his peril . . . Wanton misconduct . . . ‘means that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character, in disregard of the risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow. It usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences. . . . Prosser, Torts § 33 at 151 (2d Ed. 1955).’ ” Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. at 573, 212 A.2d at 443.
. See, e. g., Taylor v. Paul O. Abbe, Inc., 380 F.Supp. 601 (E.D.Pa. 1974); Lockett v. General Electric, 376 F.Supp. 1201 (E.D.Pa. 1974); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.Supp. 753 (E.D.Pa.1971); Welsh v. Kleiderer, 440 Pa. 47, 269 A.2d 746 (1970).
. Appellant requested the trial judge to charge the following: “If you "find that plaintiff was on the tracks, and that the operator of the train was merely inattentive, not paying attention, or inadvertent, then your verdict must be in favor of defendant.” Appellant relied on Corona v. Pittsburgh Railway Co., 418 Pa. 136, 143, 209 A.2d 425 (1965) for this point. Taken as a whole, the trial judge’s charge on wanton misconduct was in compliance with the major cases that set forth the principle. Evans v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., supra; Moss v. Reading, 418 Pa. 598, 212 A.2d 226 (1965); Frederick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit, 337 Pa. 136, 10 A.2d 576 (1940).