concurring and dissenting:
Assuming that the present challenge to PEPCO’s asset sale has not become moot (as the sale was not stayed and has already taken place),1 I join the opinion of the majority except for Part III.B. In that Part, which addresses Moore Energy’s argument that the Public Service Commission erroneously disregarded the requirements of the federal Small Business Act (the “SBA”), I think that the majority goes astray and oversteps the proper limits on our review of Commission decisions.
Moore Energy contends on appeal that the Commission should not have approved the settlement for the sale of PEPCO’s assets without insisting on a provision requiring the purchaser to have a subcontracting plan compliant with the SBA. The short answer to this contention is that Moore Energy did not raise it before the Commission. As that body therefore had no occasion to address the claim, this court errs in considering it on appeal. “In the absence of exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will refuse to consider contentions not presented before the administrative agency at the appropriate time.... [Contentions not urged at the administrative level may not form the basis for overturning the decision on review.” Good*310man v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm’n, 573 A.2d 1293, 1301 (D.C.1990) (citations omitted). Accord, Jewell v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters Ret. & Relief Bd., 738 A.2d 1228, 1231 (D.C.1999). No exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from this rule are present here.
Moore Energy did argue to the Commission that it had failed to give due consideration to the interests of small and disadvantaged minority business enterprises by: (1) not requiring PEPCO to sell one of its generating plants to Moore Energy “or other District of Columbia interest (i.e., the District of Columbia Government)”; and (2) not requiring prospective buyers “to bring minority partners with them to the table.” Moore Energy has abandoned these contentions. See ante at 309 n. 7. In more general terms, Moore Energy complained to the Commission that it should have required the asset sale to “be in compliance with” Section 8(d) of the SBA; and that it should have required “an enforceable small disadvantaged business plan” instead of accepting PEPCO’s agreement to a voluntary Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”).
In my view the Commission responded adequately to the contentions that Moore Energy actually submitted to it. The Commission correctly explained that Section 8(d) of the SBA promotes the participation of disadvantaged small business concerns in “contracts let by any Federal Agency,” 15 U.S.C. § 637(d), and hence does not apply to an asset sale by PEPCO, which is not a federal agency.2 In addition, the Commission correctly pointed out that under the settlement it approved, Moore Energy would be “able to bid, without restriction, on the sale of the PEPCO assets, possibly in conjunction or partnership with other bidders.” Finally, the Commission defended its acceptance of an MOU as follows:
The Commission has long encouraged minority and D.C.-based business development by D.C. utilities through MOUs. The Commission acknowledges that the MOU is a voluntary agreement of principles. It is the Commission’s expectation, however, that PEPCO will abide by the principles in the MOU as it conducts the auction for its generation assets. In this regard, the Commission acknowledges PEPCO’s assertion that it will draw on the extensive network of contacts that the Company has developed and advise interested small and disadvantaged, minority and protected class businesses of the generation asset divestiture.
The Commission thus took seriously the goal of fostering the opportunities available to small, disadvantaged and minority-owned businesses. The Commission made a considered decision, within the scope of its discretion, to rely on PEPCO’s commitments to abide by an MOU. The Commission did not “disregard” the interests of the protected class businesses, ante at 308-09.
Appellate review of a decision of the Public Service Commission “is normally exhausted when we have determined that the Commission has respected procedural requirements, has made findings based on substantial evidence, and has applied the correct legal standards to its substantive deliberations.” Office of People’s Counsel v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 571 A.2d 206, 209 (D.C.1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See D.C.Code § 34-606 *311(2000). In none of these respects did the Commission make any error that the majority opinion identifies or that I can see. In particular, Moore Energy and the majority have not cited any law or legal principle that required the Commission to impose greater restrictions than it did in order to benefit small and disadvantaged business enterprises. “[SJimply proposing a valid alternative to the actions taken by the Commission is not enough.” Bell Atlantic—Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 655 A.2d 1231, 1233 (D.C.1995) (citation omitted). I therefore see no legal basis for requiring the Commission to explain its decision further on a remand. I would affirm.
. The question of mootness may be examined on remand.
. Although PEPCO is concededly subject to the SBA when it contracts with a federal agency, as we recognized in Jordan v. Public Service Commission, 622 A.2d 1106, 1107 (D.C.1993), that was not the situation here.