OPINION
ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ROBERTS, Judge.In its motion for rehearing the State presents three contentions: that the trial court’s fact-finding as to the complainant’s age is unsupported by the record; that there is insufficient evidence in this record to determine whether the petitioner was entitled to relief; and that by granting relief this Court has, for the first time, allowed a successful collateral attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence. We reject all of these contentions.
Concerning the first two contentions, the State argues that since there was no hearing on this petition, and since no evidence was “presented” to the trial court, we cannot grant habeas corpus relief. The State contends very simply that findings of fact must be supported by reviewable evidence in the record so that this Court may determine if the record developed supports the trial court’s findings.
We first observe that this Court is given broad power “upon affidavit or otherwise to ascertain . . . matters of fact” in habeas corpus cases. Art. V, Sec. 5, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Const. (Emphasis added). And Article 11.07 of our Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the trial court may hold a hearing on a habeas corpus petition before entering his findings of fact and conclusions of law; thus, such a hearing is not required.
Construing these constitutional and statutory provisions together, we conclude that the proper standard in such cases as the one before us is whether “the fact-finding procedure there employed was . adequate for reaching reasonably correct results.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316, 83 S.Ct. 745, 759, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963).
Applying this necessarily flexible standard to this case, we think that several factors justify our conclusion that the procedure was adequate in this case.
First, and most important, the trial judge recited that his findings were based on “the files and records in this case and upon the pleadings.” Next, the court found that the complainant was over seventeen years of age at the time of the offense, a fact which was never disputed by the State, though it had ample time to do so. Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioner should be denied relief even though the court entered detailed fact-findings which seemed to warrant relief. We think that this combination of factors lent sufficient credence to the trial court’s findings of fact, especially in light of the well-established rule that “we must indulge every presumption in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and documents in the lower court.” McCloud v. State, 527 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
Nor do we agree with the State’s contention that we are creating a rule which always favors petitioners over the State. This Court frequently denies habeas corpus applications solely upon the findings and conclusions of the trial court, without evi-dentiary support. Moreover, we can easily conceive of situations where relief would be denied on the basis of the findings of fact even though the trial judge recommended granting the relief.
In its final contention the State argues that we are allowing a collateral attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence. This allegation misconstrues the nature of the relief sought.
*546The petitioner in this case is not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; instead, he asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try him.
As we held in our original opinion, this case is controlled by subsection 6(b) of the Savings Provision of our new Penal Code. Under that provision, the trial court was required to dismiss the indictment as soon as it became evident that the conduct alleged was no longer an offense. Once this lack of jurisdiction manifested itself, the sufficiency of the evidence ceased to be relevant, since the indictment should have been dismissed when the evidence was presented showing the complainant to have been over seventeen years of age.1 Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., Ch. 399, pp. 883, 996, Sec. 6(b). See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). Compare Wilson v. State, 520 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Mears v. State, 520 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and Ex Parte Bozeman, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 270, 313 S.W.2d 300 (1958). Contrast Wright v. State, 527 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and Ambers v. State, 527 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). The motion for rehearing is overruled.
. Our holding in this case does not reach the issue of whether the petitioner may be rein-dieted under a different pleading. See Art. 12.05, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., as amended.