(dissenting).
Believing that the court has erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court, I respectfully dissent.
We face again the recurring question of a jury verdict fixing liability on a defendant but denying to plaintiffs any damages for alleged personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision. See, e. g., Bittick v. Ward, 448 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.), and Dupree v. Blackmon, 481 S.W.2d 216 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.). The opinions in the two prior cases were written by Justice Stephenson and, in each instance, the finding of “none” in answer to the damage issue was set aside because such answers were contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence; and, the same rationale is followed in the instant case. Since the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to pass upon such points,* the refusal of the writ “no reversible error” is readily explainable. In Dupree v. Blackmon, supra (481 S.W.2d at 220-221), I expressed my views on the question and I have not receded from this concept.
The four plaintiffs were “rear-ended” by defendant’s car, taken to a hospital in Orange for medical examination, and released without treatment. None sought medical advice until some weeks later when all were referred to Dr. Popejoy by their lawyer. His examination as to three of the plaintiffs revealed a single objective symptom — muscle spasm — which he attributed to the history of the accident. As to the fourth plaintiff — Edwin Bazzano — there were no objective symptoms, simply subjective complaints of pain. As to Edwin Bazzano, the jury had the right and privilege of rejecting his claim, notwithstanding the support of the testifying physician which he brought. See the second “rule” which I invoked in Dupree v. Blackmon, supra. (481 S.W.2d at 221). Yet, he, too, gets another bite at the apple.
Nor am I persuaded by the jury’s allowance of past medical expenses as bearing upon the main damage issue. It is obvious that the jury attempted to award the plaintiffs the sums expended in the initial medical examinations to determine if they were injured — not for treatment for injuries which they subsequently claimed to have received.
At least as to Edwin Bazzano, the court has substituted its finding that Bazzano is entitled to damages for a negative finding by the jury. In so doing, the court has weighed the evidence and passed upon the credibility of the witnesses (which were neither seen nor heard by this court but by the jury) and determined that the negative answer of the trier of the facts is contrary to the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence. This is, I submit, an impermissible finding by an intermediate appellate court in this State. In doing so, the majority has created a conflict between this opinion and Hulsey v. Drake, 457 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1970, writ ref’d n. r. e.), and Royal v. Cameron, 382 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1964, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
After all, in seeking a recovery, plaintiffs labored under the burden of adducing evidence sufficient to convince the trier of the facts that each sustained injuries in the collision which produced damages measured in money. Texas & Pacific Railway Com*653pany v. Van Zandt, 159 Tex. 178, 317 S.W.2d 528 (1958). Indeed, such an issue may be dispositive of the case. Baldeschwilder v. Bonham, Tex., 529 S.W.2d 770 (1975).
The jury’s answer “none to the damage issue in each instance simply meant that the plaintiffs, each having the burden of proving the amount of the monetary damage, failed to discharge such burden. C. & R. Transport, Inc. v. Campbell, 406 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.1966). The sole and only base for an award of damage to either plaintiff was his own testimony supported by the opinion evidence of the doctor to whom his lawyer had sent him for examination. The jury was not required to find for such plaintiff based upon such testimony. It could, and apparently did, reject such testimony. In so doing, the jury did not exceed the normal fact-finding function entrusted to it.
Tippett v. Brannon, 493 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.1973). See also the long list of cases with similar holdings cited in 4 Tex.Jur.2d, Rev. Part 2, § 778 at 254-256 (1974).