Concurring Opinion by
Senior Judge Kalish:I concur in the result only.
Section 440 of The Pennsylvania Workmens Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, PL. 736, as amended, 77 PS. §996, provides two methods of computation of costs, including attorneys fees: (1) where liability is unreasonably contested and decided favorably for the claimant, and (2) in contested cases involving petitions to modify compensation awards where the *452contested issue is resolved in favor of the claimant, the claimant shall be awarded reasonable costs. It is to be noted that there is no provision in the second section of this provision that the modification petition be an unreasonable one, only that a contest of the original award be unreasonable.
In Weidner v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 497 Pa. 516, 442 A.2d 242 (1982), the referee had foiled to award counsel fees in his initial decision, and the claimant specifically appealed this issue. Our court on appeal remanded, holding that the contest was unreasonable and counsel fees were proper. Upon remand, the referee awarded counsel fees, and it was the employers insurance carrier which appealed. Upon reaching our Supreme Court, it was held that where there has been an unreasonable contest advanced by the employer, an award of attorneys fees is proper for the work the attorney did in securing the initial award, i.e., where the attorney was acting on the claimants behalf. Weidner at 522, 442 A.2d at 245.
In Weidner, the court said that section 440 of the Act, 77 P.S. §996, shows a “legislative intent of protecting claimant against unreasonable contests of a claimants initial or continuing right to the benefits of the act” (emphasis added). Weidner at 521, 442 A.2d at 244. Thus, payment is not barred for all costs by those who incurred them on behalf of a claimant, including reasonable fees to claimants counsel. To reach a different result would be to discourage lawyers from engaging in the modification proceedings in which the only benefit to the claimant may be a nonmonetary award.
Petitioner had a right to engage counsel to pursue the modification issue on his behalf, even though such representation extended beyond the initial referees hearing. As the Supreme Court indicated in Weidner, the intent of section 440 of the Act, 77 P. S. §996, was to *453protect a claimant against an unreasonable contest of a claimants initial claim of liability and to protect the continuing right to the benefits of the Act, once such right is established and sought to be modified. If petitioner did not act, the attorney would still be entitled to his fee, and petitioner, rather than respondent, would have to pay it.
Once the contested right of liability is sought to be modified and is resolved in favor of a claimant, the claimant is entitled to an award of costs and attorneys fees. When respondent withdrew its petition to modify, that issue was terminated and since there was no change in the original award, the resolution was favorable to petitioner. Petitioner is therefore entitled to reasonable costs as set forth in section 440 of the Act, 77 PS. §996.