dissenting.
When an unequivocal constitutional command and concern for the insurance industry collide in this Court, the outcome is no longer in doubt.1 Since 1891, the Texas Constitution has required that “the decision of the [courts of appeals] shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error.” Tex. Const, art. V, § 6. This provision “restrict[s] in express terms, the jurisdiction of the supreme court, and ... confine[s] it to questions of law.” Choate v. San Antonio & A.P. Ry., 91 Tex. 406, 44 S.W. 69, 69 (1898); see Coulson v. Lake LBJ Municipal Utility Dist., 781 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.1989) (acknowledging that this Court has no jurisdiction to undertake factual sufficiency review); Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Deen, 158 Tex. 466, 312 S.W.2d 933, 937-38 (1958) (Supreme Court cannot conduct factual sufficiency review); Wilson v. Wilson 145 Tex. 607, 201 S.W.2d 226, 227 (1947) (“Supreme Court is not invested with the power to determine facts”); see also W. Wendell Hall, Revisiting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 St.Mary’s L.J. 1045, 1139 (1993) (constitutional “provision ... acts as a limitation on the judicial authority of the supreme court and confines its jurisdiction to questions of law.”).
In compliance with the Constitution, this Court, in determining a “no evidence” point, “must consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the jury’s finding, viewed most favorably in support of the finding, and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences.” Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex.1992); see Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965); Cartwright v. Canode, 106 Tex. 502, 171 S.W. 696, 698 (1914). If more than a scintilla of such evidence exists, the claim is sufficient as a matter of law, and any challenges go merely to the weight to be accorded the evidence. Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.1987); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951). Although jurors are empowered to evaluate qualitatively the credibility and weight of some evidence and conclude that it constitutes no evidence, the Texas Constitution precludes this Court from performing that task.
Today’s opinion changes all that by announcing a new rule, previously unknown in a no evidence review:
when a court is reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a bad faith finding, its focus should be on the relationship of the evidence arguably supporting the bad faith finding to the elements of bad faith.
866 S.W.2d at 600. This seemingly innocuous pronouncement is a device by which this Court can circumvent the Constitution to consider the credibility and weight of the evidence, something known until now only by its true name — a factual sufficiency review. Disguising its work as “nothing more than a particularized application of our traditional no evidence review,” the majority cites as its sole authority Pittman v. Baladez, 158 Tex. *603372, 312 S.W.2d 210, 216 (1968), a case which says nothing about legal sufficiency review or evidence of bad faith but concerns only the admissibility of evidence. The sole justification given for this new focus “is [the] necessity] to maintain the distinction between a contract claim on the policy, and a claim of bad faith delay or denial.” 866 S.W.2d at 600. This cryptic comment hardly constitutes even a decent rationalization for this unprecedented disregard of our constitution and over a century of jurisprudence.
I.
The constitutional prohibition against fact-finding by this Court applies, no less than in any other situation, to an insurer’s contention that there is no evidence to support a jury finding of a delay or denial of a claim without reasonable basis. Until today, reasonableness had been recognized as a question of fact to be decided by the fact-finder. See, e.g., Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tex.1972) (citing cases); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Crowe, 857 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ pending). An appellate court should not weigh conflicting evidence in conducting a no evidence review; rather, all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the verdict. The effect of this standard is that an appealing insurer must demonstrate that a reasonable basis for delay or denial is conclusively established in the record. If, upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, reasonable minds could differ as to the reasonableness of the claim’s denial, the no-evidence challenge fails. See Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.1983). This is the approach that courts of appeals have generally followed when determining whether there was no evidence of an insurer’s unreasonableness.2
Substituting its new relevancy analysis for this previously well-established law, the majority arbitrarily and without any explanation declares that evidence Lyons offers to show bad faith is only evidence of coverage. The categorical distinction drawn here between evidence relevant to coverage and evidence relevant to bad faith conflicts with our holding in Aranda v. Ins. Co. of North America, 748 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex.1988), that the insured’s presentation of evidence to the insurer that his claims were covered constituted some evidence that there was no reasonable basis for denial. See also St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Luker, 801 S.W.2d 614, 620 (Tex.App.Texarkana 1991, no writ) (evidence contradicting the insurer’s factual assertion, which formed the basis for its denial of coverage, is sufficient alone to defeat a no evidence challenge to a jury finding that the denial was unreasonable).
*604In discounting Lyons’ expert opinion as relevant only for jury consideration of the coverage dispute, the majority necessarily evaluates the credibility, sufficiency and weight of Millers’ experts in order to find that their investigation was serious, adequate and factually constituted a reasonable basis for denial of Lyons’ claim. To the extent that the majority implicitly disparages the testimony of Lyons’ expert as inadequate to overcome the credibility attributed to Millers’ experts, it is engaging in the very type of factual sufficiency review precluded by Article V, section 6 of the Texas Constitution.
II.
An obscure and incomplete summary of the record is presented in today’s opinion:
[t]he evidence offered by Lyons in support of the bad faith finding consisted of Avila’s opinion that the windstorm caused the damage, and her testimony and that of her neighbors that the brick veneer and staircase were visibly damaged after the storm.
866 S.W.2d at 600-601. Although this evidence is acknowledged to be relevant to the validity of Lyons’ coverage claim, the majority declares that neither this nor any other evidence is relevant to Millers’ bad faith:
Lyons offered no evidence that the reports of Millers’ experts were not objectively prepared, or that Millers’ reliance on them was unreasonable, or any other evidence from which a factfinder could infer that Millers acted without a reasonable basis and that it knew or should have known that it lacked a reasonable basis for its actions.
866 S.W.2d at 601. A thorough review of the record reveals that this is just not true.
Corroborating Lyons’ own testimony regarding damage to the house caused by the windstorm, Louie Zivot, a neighbor and former lawyer for H. Ross Perot, testified that the back stairway was damaged by the storm to the point of being too dangerous to use. Until the storm, he also had observed no brick veneer damage. Having been in Lyons’ backyard both the day after this occurrence and several times before it, another neighbor, Mary Hairston, observed damage to the rear wall and the previously functional stairway only after the windstorm. The obvious and highly visible nature of the damage was evidenced by photographs, authenticated as showing the post-storm condition of the house, revealing severe damage to the stairway and to the brick on the rear wall; according to one eyewitness, the brick veneer had separated and pulled away “quite a distance” from the house.
Millers initially denied Lyons claim within a month of its receipt solely on the basis of a three sentence written “report”; its claims adjustor refused to talk to Lyons, even to the point of hanging up when she called with inquiries; and its investigators consciously chose not to interview any independent eyewitnesses until Lyons, almost two years after making her claim, filed suit. Compare State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moran, 809 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (insurer’s failure to interview two eyewitnesses to occurrence relating to coverage is legally and factually sufficient evidence of bad faith).
Condemning it as “cumulative of Ms. Lyons’ own opinion,” the majority excuses completely the insurer’s failure to interview the only eyewitnesses to the aftermath of the windstorm. 866 S.W.2d at 601. What is it about observations whose source is a neighbor that makes them inherently worthless? Nor is any explanation offered as to why the appearance of that “damage [which] was visible after the storm” has no significance. 866 S.W.2d at 601 n. 3. While it could easily be misread as holding that insurance investigators can disbelieve an insured without even bothering to interview witnesses, today’s opinion is actually more narrow. Note three merely represents the method contrived for this particular case to vaporize the life testimony of three Texans in order to justify a preconceived result.
The majority fails to mention other evidence that, when interpreted in a light favorable to the jury’s verdict, shows bad faith on the part of the insurer. Millers continued to refuse any payment on Lyons’ claim even after she produced an engineering report explaining a means, never fully explored by *605the insurer, by which the windstorm had caused at least part of the damage.
Additional evidence was introduced from which the jury could have concluded that the claim was denied after only a perfunctory and incomplete investigation, which purposefully ignored evidence contradicting Millers’ predetermined conclusions. See Simmons, 857 S.W.2d at 133 (some evidence of bad faith when evidence would enable “jury [to] conclude that [insurer] began with its intended outcome and investigated backwards”). The claims adjuster limited the scope of investigation to determining whether damage was caused by a tree downed by the windstorm, rather than considering the effect of a still-standing windblown tree. Apparently the jury at least partially accepted the conclusion of Lyons’ expert that the effect of the storm on the latter tree caused the damage, and implicitly rejected at least part of the testimony of Millers’ expert, an engineer, who had previously testified about two hundred times, and who relied on the insurance industry for eighty percent of his work. Mistakes, regarding location of trees and the stairwell support, contained in the latter expert’s report constituted additional evidence in support of the jury’s conclusion.
Today’s opinion never indicates why these facts do not constitute some evidence that Millers’ failure to tender timely at least a portion of the estimated repair costs for the damage was without reasonable basis. Compare Crowe, 857 S.W.2d at 649 (whether insurer had reasonable basis to deny claim is not determined solely by what insurer knew but by what it could have known through a reasonably thorough investigation); Thomas, 825 S.W.2d at 144 (testimony of insurer’s expert identifying defects in insured’s investigative report is some evidence of breach of good faith and fair dealing); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simmons, 857 S.W.2d 126, 133-35 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1993, writ pending) (insurer’s duty of good faith includes an “obligation to conduct a fair, objective, thorough and systematic investigation^] turning] over every leaf ..., considering] the positive along with the negative, and indulging] its policy holder with the benefit of the doubt.”); Moody, 788 S.W.2d at 607 (“duty of good faith and fair dealing is breached when there is no reasonable basis for denial of a claim or delay in payment or a failure by the insurer to determine whether there is any reasonable basis for the denial or the delay.”). But even if this Dallas jury failed to evaluate this evidence correctly, and even if the result achieved here by this new factual sufficiency review were correct, a great wrong has, nevertheless, been committed today with the breach of a clear constitutional command limiting our jurisdiction. The court of appeals overturned the jury finding of bad faith by holding there was no evidence of bad faith. I would reverse on that point and remand for consideration of Millers’ factual sufficiency point of error, which was never considered by that court.
III.
When disagreeing with a jury verdict— particularly a jury verdict adverse to an insurance company — the majority increasingly substitutes its own preferences in place of the deliberations of a constitutionally empaneled jury composed of twelve members of the local community. Today’s opinion continues this steady erosion of our right to trial by jury. See, e.g., May v. United Services Ass’n of America, 844 S.W.2d 666, 675 (Tex.1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting).3 Disregarding a basic constitutional restraint on our judiciary, the majority arbitrarily extinguishes evidence presented by a policyholder and relied upon by the jury through a brief, cryptic and unprecedented declaration that such evidence is no longer relevant. In truth, it is our *606Texas Constitution that the majority, through its covert factual sufficiency review, has pronounced irrelevant.
. Today's opinion is but one example of the Court’s recent indifference to precedent and its commitment to wholesale revision of Texas law. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 1993 WL 483479 *9 (Tex.1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting); C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 1993 WL 483450 *18 (Tex.1993) (Doggett J., dissenting); Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Lee, 1993 WL 433292, 37 Tex. Sup.Ct.J. 67, 75 (Tex. October 17, 1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Ruiz v. Conoco, 868 S.W.2d 752, 760 (1993) (Hightower, J., dissenting on rehearing); National Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex.1993, orig. proceeding); Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 n. 10 (Tex.1993); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (Tex.1993); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 841-42 (Tex.1992, orig. proceeding); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 520 n. 37 (Tex.1992); *603Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Tex.1991).
. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simmons, 857 S.W.2d 126, 132-36 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1993, writ pending) (court conducting no evidence review should not "second guess fact-finders unless only one inference could be drawn from the evidence”); Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 825 S.W.2d 135, 143 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992) (testimony of insured’s expert witness as to inadequacy of insurer’s investigation constituted some evidence of no reasonable basis), judgment set aside pursuant to settlement agreement, 843 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.1993); Wm. H. McGee & Co. v. Schick, 792 S.W.2d 513, 521-22 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1990) (considering only the evidence supporting the finding), judgment set aside pursuant to settlement agreement, 843 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.1992); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Rakkar, 838 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (following Kindred, deficiencies in insurance investigator's report as well as factual dispute as to insurer’s actual reliance on that report are some evidence of no reasonable basis); Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Davila, 805 S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (in "no evidence” review of jury finding of no reasonable basis, "we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that tend to support the jury findings, and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary"); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590, 596 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied) (considering only evidence of no reasonable basis viewed in light most favorable to jury verdict); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Luker, 801 S.W.2d 614, 620 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ) (conducting legal sufficiency review of jury finding of bad faith, "the court considers only the evidence tending to support the finding, giving effect to all reasonable inferences therefrom, and disregarding all contrary and conflicting evidence”); Allied Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Moody, 788 S.W.2d 601, 607 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (some evidence of no reasonable basis). But cf., e.g., State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Polasek, 847 S.W.2d 279, 283-87 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (reversing on legal sufficiency grounds jury finding of no reasonable basis because there was undisputed evidence of a reasonable basis).
. See also C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 1993 WL 483450 *18 (Tex.1993) (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting); General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 1993 WL 483479 *9 (Tex.1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Texas Ass'n Businesses v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 459-67 (Tex.1993).(Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 609-10, 616 (Tex.1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Leleaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 55-56 (Tex.1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Crim Truck & Tractor v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 599 (Tex.1992) (Mauzy, J., dissenting): Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 491 (Tex.1991) (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex.1990) (Doggett, J., dissenting).