dissenting.
In several respects, I do not agree with the majority’s opinion in this case. First, while the court correctly affirms Annette’s first degree felony murder conviction, I cannot concur with some of the majority’s reasoning. Furthermore, the majority’s conclusion that Annette’s death sentence withstands proportionality review under the Maryland Death Penalty Statute, Art. 27, § 413(e)(4), is erroneous. Finally, the majority errs in holding that the commission of rape, robbery, arson, or other specified crimes, as a principal in the second degree, constitutes an aggravating circumstance under § 413(d)(10). I would vacate Annette’s death sentence and remand for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment.
I.
With regard to affirmance of Annette’s conviction for first degree felony murder, the majority relies on Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982), to sustain the trial court’s exclusion of an expert opinion that Annette lacked the requisite intent. The majority cites Johnson for the proposition that “diminished capacity is not a defense,” and then holds that, in light of this proposition, the trial court did not err.
I continue to adhere to the view expressed in my dissenting opinion in Johnson, 292 Md. at 446, 439 A.2d 542, that *381“evidence of . . . mental condition ... [is] admissible for the purpose of showing the absence of certain elements of first degree murder and of the other specific intent crimes ... . ” This is not, however, the principle which is dispositive of this issue. Rather, the controlling rule is that an expert cannot express his opinion as to whether the defendant did or did not intend the wrong allegedly committed. Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59, 62 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912, 81 S.Ct. 275, 5 L.Ed.2d 226 (1960); State v. Donahue, 141 Conn. 656, 109 A.2d 364, 368-369 (1954), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 349 U.S. 926, 75 S.Ct. 775, 99 L.Ed. 1257 (1955); Koester v. Commonwealth, 449 S.W.2d 213, 215-216 (Ky.1969); State v. Mitter, 285 S.E.2d 376, 379-380 (W.Va. 1981).
As the trial judge allowed evidence bearing on mental capacity, and refused only opinion evidence on the ultimate issue of intent, his evidentiary ruling was proper.1
II.
Even though Annette’s conviction for felony murder should be upheld, the death sentence imposed should be set *382aside. Because the death penalty is “excessive” and “disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant,” § 413(e)(4), the death sentence should be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment.
In order to conduct a thorough proportionality review, the Court must consider all the facts and circumstances underlying the defendant’s case. In Annette’s case, the relevant facts are as follows. First, the jury was unable to find Annette guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, but rather convicted her only of felony murder. Second, as the trial judge recognized, Annette was not the primary instigator of the criminal activity. Rather, there was evidence to show that she acted under the influence of and was dominated by her husband, Bernard Lee Stebbing. In addition, Annette was diagnosed as having a personality disorder and borderline intelligence. She was only 19 years of age when she committed the crime and had never previously been convicted of a crime of violence. Finally, while Annette was found to be a principal in the first degree to murder, she was only an aider and abettor with regard to at least two of the underlying felonies which were found to be aggravating circumstances under § 413(d).
This Court has defined the inventory of similar cases to be considered for proportionality review as those cases in which the State sought the death penalty, along with any other similar murder cases presented by the defendant. See Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 116, 472 A.2d 953 (1984); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 610, 468 A.2d 45 (1983); Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432, 464-466, 468 A.2d 1 (1983). While the case of Annette’s husband, Bernard, is not technically “similar” because he was not a principal in the first degree to murder and thus was not eligible for the death penalty, see Art. 27, § 413(e)(1), his case is not entirely irrelevant for purposes of proportionality review. Rather, the relationship of Annette and her husband to each other,, and to the *383criminal activity in which they were involved, is particularly significant when comparing Annette’s case to other cases in which the defendant was eligible for the death penalty. Of primary importance is the fact that Bernard Lee Stebbing was the chief perpetrator of the criminal enterprise which resulted in the death of the victim. Bernard, who was considered by the trial judge to be “equally if not more involved” in the crime, was given a sentence of life imprisonment. Annette, on the other hand, was sentenced to die.
Never before under Maryland’s current death penalty statute has a subservient actor to criminal activity resulting in murder been sentenced to death, where the dominant figure in the criminal scheme received a lesser sentence. For example, in the case of Lawrence Johnson (Charles County Criminal Case No. 82-78), the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment after his conviction for both first degree rape and murder as a principal in the first degree. An important factor in the sentencing determination was that the Johnson’s co-defendant, who masterminded the criminal enterprise, was given a sentence of life imprisonment. In the case of Glenn Sturgis, the defendant was given life imprisonment as a result of a deadlocked jury. Nevertheless, the court stated that even if the court had conducted sentencing, death would probably not have been imposed because Sturgis’s co-defendant, who was considered to be equally guilty, had received a life sentence as a result of a plea. The treatment accorded the other actors in the criminal enterprise was also a factor in the case of Robert Lee Myers. In Myers the trial judge sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment after finding as mitigating circumstances the fact that one of Myers’s co-defendants was given a life sentence and the other was granted immunity from prosecution. Unlike in Johnson and Sturgis, the defendant in Myers was the dominant actor in the criminal scheme.
In Annette’s case, the trial judge, upon finding that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the statutory *384aggravating circumstances,2 sentenced Annette to death. In so doing the trial judge acknowledged the potential significance of Bernard’s life sentence in light of his participation in the criminal scheme. He stated:
“Your husband, Bernard Stebbing, was convicted in Wicomico County and received a life imprisonment. Perhaps appropriately so, the death penalty was not before the Court; and to that extent, since I consider him equally if not more involved, . . . there could be a disparity in the findings of this Court That has nothing to do with the case. This Court bases its judgment on what was before it alone.” (emphasis added).
Unlike the trial court, this Court, for the purposes of proportionality review, is obliged to look beyond the facts of the instant case and consider other cases in relation to the one at hand. In my opinion, the fact that Annette’s husband received a life sentence for his dominant role in the crimes, is a major obstacle to a finding that Annette’s death sentence is proportionate to the sentences in similar eligible cases.
Moreover, apart from the fact that the dominant perpetrator of the criminal enterprise received a life sentence, Annette’s death sentence is still disproportionate to the sentences imposed in other sex-related murder cases. The majority finds nine cases to be comparable to Annette’s case for purposes of its proportionality review. Of those nine, two resulted in the imposition of a death sentence by the court or jury. As those cases, State v. David Thomas Maziarz and State v. James Russell Trimble, have yet to be reviewed by this Court, they are not particularly relevant to the proportionality determination.
In the other seven cases noted by the majority, the sentencing authority imposed life imprisonment. The defendants in those cases were between the ages of eighteen and thirty-six. Annette was nineteen years of age when she *385committed the crime. She was diagnosed by her doctors as having a borderline personality disorder, and she has a recorded history of learning disabilities. In all of the cases reviewed by the majority, the defendants committed the murder and rape or attempted rape of their victims as principals in the first degree. Annette was a principal in the first degree to murder but a principal in the second degree to the rape and the sexual offense.
In three of the seven cases where life imprisonment was imposed, the defendants Elvis Horton, John Kevin Johnson, and Howard Hines, had criminal records involving prior “crimes of violence” or other serious crimes. Both Horton and Hines had previously been convicted of rape or assault with intent to rape, along with several crimes involving the use of a deadly weapon. In addition, Johnson was found to have bragged about his killing to five witnesses, and then attempted to contract for several of their murders. Annette has not previously been convicted of a crime of violence. Unlike the seven cases considered by the majority, in the present case it is unclear precisely what events precipitated the victim’s death. Furthermore, the jury was unable to find that Annette willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, murdered the victim; the jury found only felony murder.
The crimes committed by Annette and her husband were horrible, and I do not intend to minimize that fact. Nevertheless, the horrible nature of the criminal enterprise is not the statutory basis for our review of the death penalty. Instead, the question is whether the death sentence is disproportionate to the sentences imposed in similar cases. Comparing this case to similar cases, all involving sentences of life imprisonment, compels the conclusion that the death sentence here is disproportionate.
III.
Even if the majority were correct in holding that Annette’s death sentence is not disproportionate to that im*386posed in similar cases, Annette’s case should nevertheless be remanded to the trial court for further consideration of the sentence. A defendant is only eligible for the death penalty where at least one of several statutory aggravating factors is found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, Tichnell v. State, supra, 287 Md. at 729, 415 A.2d 830. In the present case, the jury found Annette guilty of rape, sexual offense and robbery, and the trial judge apparently relied on all three felonies as aggravating circumstances, pursuant to § 413(d)(10).3 Annette was a second degree principal with respect to at least two of these crimes. Despite Annette’s status as a second degree principal to these crimes, the majority concludes that they were aggravating circumstances under § 413(d)(10). I disagree.
Under the plain language of the statute, if a crime listed in § 413(d)(10) is the sole aggravating circumstance relied upon, the sentencing authority may only consider imposition of the death penalty if the defendant is a principal in the first degree to both the murder and the underlying aggravating crime. Since Annette was only convicted of rape and sexual assault as a principal in the second degree, these crimes can not properly serve as aggravating factors under § 413(d)(10). Moreover, since the trial record does not indicate whether Annette was found guilty of robbery as a *387principal in the first or second degree, it is uncertain whether she is even eligible for the death penalty. Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of this issue.4
As stated above, the plain language of § 413 compels the conclusion that one must be a principal in the first degree to one of the crimes listed in § 413(d)(10) for that crime to constitute an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, absent an indication that the statutory terminology was intended to take on a special meaning, the Court must give effect to the plain and ordinary sense of words chosen; there is no need to look further or consider rules of statutory construction. See Ryder Truck Lines v. Kennedy, 296 Md. 528, 535-536, 463 A.2d 850 (1983); Blum v. Blum, 295 Md. 135, 140, 453 A.2d 824 (1983); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 93, 400 A.2d 1091 (1979), and cases cited therein.
Aggravating circumstance number ten, rélied on in this case, is that “the defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery, arson, rape or sexual offense in the first degree.” The word “defendant” at the beginning of the sentence is the subject of the phrase “committed the murder” as well as the phrase “while committing or attempting to commit robbery, arson, rape or sexual offense in the first degree.” Section 413(e) provides that, except for the purposes of subsection (d)(7), the terms “defendant” and “person” as used in the section “include only a principal in the first degree.”5 Accordingly, each *388time the word “defendant” or “person” appears in the section we are to replace it with the phrase “principal in the first degree.” Substituting this definition wherever the word “defendant” is implicated in § 413(d)(10), the tenth aggravating factor is necessarily limited to that situation where a party commits murder as a first degree principal while also committing one of the enumerated crimes as a first degree principal.
Nowhere in § 413(e) is the definition of “defendant” or “person” limited to a first degree principal to murder only. Had the Legislature intended such a result, it could either simply have said so, or have included this limitation in § 412 or § 413(a) where the general prerequisites for death penalty eligibility are specified. The Legislature did neither of these things. Instead, it positioned the definition of “defendant” or “person” at the end of § 413, and stated that all references to “persons” or “defendants” in § 413 “include only” those who are first degree principals with respect to all crimes enumerated in the section.
It is especially significant that where the Legislature saw fit to make an exception to this definition of “defendant,” it expressly did so, as evidenced by the exclusion of subsection (d)(7) from the general definition. The fact that the Legislature expressly provided for an exception suggests that no others were intended. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 156, 416 A.2d 734 (1980).
*389Furthermore, there is nothing in the legislative history to contradict this construction. The 1977 Senate version of Maryland’s Death Penalty Statute, S.B. 374, which received an unfavorable report from the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, 1 Maryland Senate Journal 861-62 (1977), did not contain a definition of “defendant” or “person” for the purposes of § 413. Instead, the 1977 version defined only the term “committed,” and then only for the purpose of § 413(d). The term “committed,” as used in that subsection of the 1977 bill, meant “aided, abetted, or counseled.” Thus, under the 1977 draft, one who aided or abetted in a murder while also aiding or abetting a completed or attempted robbery, arson, rape, or other enumerated offense, would satisfy that aggravating circumstance of § 413(d).
The current death penalty statute (which also originated as S.B. 374), as first presented to the Legislature in 1978, did not include a definition of “committed.” According to the Maryland Attorney General, further amendment was desire-able to clarify the Legislature’s intent in omitting this definition.6 Thus, in its final form, the statute included a definition of the terms “defendant” and “person” which restricted their meaning to principals in the first degree. There is no suggestion that the Legislature intended to restrict the first degree principal requirement to commission of the murder only. To the contrary, this change reflects the Legislature’s desire to substitute the phrase “principal in the first degree” for the words “defendant” or “person” wherever they appear in the text of § 413.
The majority, in ignoring the plain language of the statute, suggests that because the aggravating circumstances include both consummated and attempted felonies, and since attempted felonies are misdemeanors which, at common law, are not divided into first degree and second degree principals, the Legislature could not have intended to make the *390distinction between degrees of principals in relation to § 413(d)(10). This conclusion is simply not sound. First, as the majority points out, an attempt is a common law misdemeanor, an offense which traditionally is of a less serious nature. By including certain attempts as aggravating circumstances for purposes of the death penalty, the Legislature has already altered the less serious treatment given to attempts at common law. Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent the Legislature from distinguishing between those aiding and abetting an attempted felony and those attempting to actually perpetrate the felony but failing prior to completion. This is precisely what the Legislature resolved to do by limiting the scope of the term “defendant” in § 413(d)(10) to an actor who committed both murder and a completed or attempted felony as a principal in the first degree.7
Judge COLE has authorized me to state that he concurs with the views expressed herein. Judge DAVIDSON has authorized me to state that she concurs with the views expressed in Part I of this dissenting opinion.
. Some of the majority’s conclusions with respect to Annette’s “conviction” for robbery are also doubtful. It is difficult to agree that, as to Dena’s clothes, Annette committed robbery, because it is unclear whether a felonious taking in fact occurred. The majority disposes of this issue by citing the general rule that, in order to establish a felonious taking, it is not necessary that the taker gain pecuniary advantage. Canton Bank v. Am. Bonding Co., 111 Md. 41, 45, 73 A. 684 (1909). While this rule is certainly viable, it is questionable whether it was ever intended to reach a situation such as the one at hand. Clearly, a felonious taking occurs where a person takes property for temporary use and then disregards it, or takes property for the purpose of giving or selling it to another. See Hadder v. State, 238 Md. 341, 354-356, 209 A.2d 70 (1965). It is less certain, however, that a felonious taking exists where clothes are stripped from a body during the course of a rape, and then discarded shortly thereafter to conceal evidence of crime. But cf. People v. Green, 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468 (1980). To embrace this approach, as the majority has done today, is to acknowledge that almost every cover-up of evidence of a crime is a robbery. I am not convinced that common law robbery was ever intended to extend this far.
. See note 6, infra.
. Section 413(d)(10) covers the only aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial judge. That portion of the Maryland Death Penalty Statute provides as follows:
“(d) Consideration of aggravating circumstances. — In determining the sentence, the court or jury, as the case may be, shall first consider whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, any of the following aggravating circumstances exist:
“(10) The defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery, arson, or rape or sexual offense in the first degree.”
Furthermore, § 413(f) provides:
“(f) Finding that no aggravating circumstances exist. — If the court or jury does not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall state that conclusion in writing, and the sentence shall be imprisonment for life.”
. If Annette is a second degree principal to the robbery, then no crime has been committed which can serve as an aggravating factor under § 413(d)(10), and Annette is not eligible for the death penalty. Should a determination be made that she was a first degree principal to robbery, § 413(d)(10) is satisfied, and she may be eligible for the death penalty. In the latter situation, a new sentencing hearing should still be given so that the sentencing authority can consider and give proper weight to the fact that the only aggravating factor is robbery, and not rape, sexual offense, and robbery.
. Section 413(e) reads in part as follows:
*388“(e) Definitions. — As used in this section, the following terms have the meanings indicated unless a contrary meaning is clearly intended from the context in which the term appears:
(1) The terms ‘defendant’ and ‘person,’ except as those terms appear in subsection (d)(7), include only a principal in the first degree.”
Subsection (d)(7), which is excepted from the first degree principal requirement of § 413(e)(1), provides that it is an aggravating circumstance for one to contract for the murder of another. The seventh aggravating factor reads as follows:
“(7) The defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration.”
. See Letter from Attorney General Francis B. Burch to Acting Governor Blair Lee III, dated January 24, 1978, contained in the file of the Department of Legislative Reference.
. Even if § 413 were not limited to principals in the first degree, the fact that Annette was a principal in the second degree to both the rape and sexual offense should, at the very least, have been taken into account when the trial judge weighed the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circumstances. There is no indication as to the degree of weight given to each aggravating and mitigating factor found by the trial judge. It is clear, however, that the trial judge was required to consider the quality of each factor, and not simply to aggregate the factors. See Hargrave v. State, 366 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 239, 62 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (“The statute does not comprehend a mere tabulation of aggravating versus mitigating circumstances to arrive at a net sum. It requires a weighing of those circumstances.”) Certainly, in looking at the aggravating factors, the trial judge should have considered that Annette aided or abetted in the rape and sexual offense, and did not commit these crimes as a principal in the first degree.