dissenting.
Today the court’s majority has run a bulldozer over every roadblock, both procedural and substantive. It serves personal impulse and not the law of the land. I therefore dissent.
*255It is the people who have the sole power to change or modify the plain language of the constitution, not this court. See Tex. Const. art. XVII, § 1; Cramer v. Sheppard, 140 Tex. 271, 167 S.W.2d 147, 154 (1942). Until the people change it, the constitution itself remains the supreme law of the land. Cramer, 167 S.W.2d at 154. This court cannot by its own edict change the constitution, and it certainly cannot do so by mere dicta.
In construing the constitution, we certainly consider the intent of the people who adopted it. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.1989). However, because of the difficulties inherent in determining the intent of voters long ago, “we rely heavily on the literal text.” Id. And we must presume that the language used in the constitution was carefully selected. Cramer, 167 S.W.2d at 152.
The court makes no such presumption in this case, but on the contrary, presumes that the constitutional drafters used bad grammar. In fact, the court does not concern itself at all with the literal text of the provision except by way of a single footnote deriding the “technical” rules of grammar.
However technical it may be, language is the means by which we communicate our thoughts and ideas. Educated people try to use language correctly in order to convey their message more precisely. Berating the “technical” rules of grammar serves only to betray the court’s real complaint which is that the language itself does not say what the court wishes it did. To circumvent this problem, the court essentially rewrites the constitution to say what it thinks our constitutional founders would have said if only they had not been such poor grammarians.
As a substitute for what the constitution actually says, the court purports to apply the true intent of the drafters. Thus, despite what the drafters actually said, the court concludes they meant to say something different. And from whence does the court derive this divine knowledge of the drafters’ true intent? From the very language that the drafters rejected. From the language they refused to adopt.
As proof of the drafters’ intent, the court cites numerous examples of proposals that were made to the constitutional convention’s committee on the judiciary. Yet these proposals were nothing more than that — mere proposals. When delegates John Reagan, P.R. Scott, C.B. Kilgore and Marion Martin proposed their alternative, they expressly stated that they were doing so because they were unable to agree to the judiciary article as it was presently written. Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Texas 413 (Oct. 20, 1875). The version they proposed, which was eventually accepted by the whole convention and ratified as part of the constitution, reads as follows:
No [person] shall be eligible to the office of Chief Justice or Associate Justice of the Supreme Court unless he be, at the time of his election, a citizen of the United States and of this State, and unless he shall have attained the age of thirty years, and shall have been a practicing lawyer, or a judge of a court in this State, or such lawyer and judge together, at least seven years.
The court baldly states that this provision “combined” the eligibility requirements so as to make the “at the time of election” language modify all three, but this is not so. The provision actually separates the requirements and includes the “at the time of election” phrase only in the first “unless” clause.
After several amendments, the provision still maintains its basic structure and now reads as follows:
No person shall be eligible to serve in the office of Chief Justice or Justice of the Supreme Court unless the person is licensed to practice law in this state and is, at the time of election, a citizen of the United States and of this state, and has attained the age of thirty-five years, and has been a practicing lawyer, or a lawyer and judge of a court of record together at least ten years.
The main clause makes clear that the primary focus of the provision is to set forth *256the requirements for a person to be “eligible to serve.” Four subordinate clauses are then used to describe those requirements. Looking at the exact language of the provision again, one need only insert parenthetical numbers to make obvious the four separate clauses which constitute the four requirements for eligibility “to serve:”
No person shall be eligible to serve in the office of Chief Justice or Justice of the Supreme Court unless (1) the person is licensed to practice law in this state, and (2) is, at the time of election, a citizen of the United States and of this state, and (3) has attained the age of thirty-five years, and (4) has been a practicing lawyer, or a lawyer and judge of a court of record together at least ten years.
The “at the time of election” phrase is part of the second requirement only.1 If the drafters had intended the “at the time of election” language to modify other requirements, there are certainly other ways they could have written it. However, they chose not to adopt other proposals, and the text they did adopt is this.
If I thought it would make some difference, I would certainly lend any member of the court my Harbrace College Handbook for instruction in the English language. Alternatively, I could recommend to them a tutorial session with some good high school English teachers. However, I see little point in belaboring the rules of grammar because, in any event, the court seems to view the constitution’s actual text as a mere technicality.
This is constitutional manipulation at its worst. The court ignores the text and reaches back into the historical record for something — anything—to support the con-elusion it wants to reach, and in doing so, it relies on the very proposals that the constitutional drafters ultimately rejected. And what of the people who adopted the constitution? We have long made clear that, in matters of constitutional construction, it is the intent of the drafters and ratifiers that we seek. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394-395; Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 150 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1912). The constitution derives its force, not from the drafters alone, but from the people who consent to be governed by it. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394. One reason for relying so heavily on the literal text is because this is the language that the voters themselves ratified.
The court has never previously considered the question involved here, and Purcell v. Lindsey, 158 Tex. 541, 314 S.W.2d 283 (1958) is certainly not disposi-tive. It involved a lawyer, Graham Purcell, who was seeking to become a candidate for the Court of Criminal Appeals in the 1958 general election to take office on January 1, 1959. Purcell had been licensed in August 1949. The issue was whether the 1891 constitutional provision which specifically required only seven years of practice for the Court of Criminal Appeals had been superseded by a 1945 amendment which required ten years of practice. This court ruled that the 1945 amendment applied and therefore held that Purcell was ineligible. In doing so, the court stated that a judge must have been a practicing lawyer for “at least ten years prior to the date of his election.” 314 S.W.2d at 286.
This language from Purcell is what the court today cites as authority for effective*257ly changing the constitution. And yet, in Purcell, the court never even considered the issue now presented; its language is simply loose writing and pure dicta. Purcell would have been ineligible regardless of how one reads the “at the time of election” language; he would not have been a practicing lawyer for ten years even by January 1, 1959. Therefore, the question of whether the constitution requires ten years at the time of election or ten years at the time of service was simply not before the court.
Similarly, each court of appeals decision cited by the majority is one in which the issue here did not present itself. No Texas court has ever been faced with construing this constitutional language in the context of a judge who would be eligible at the time service begins but not eligible at the time of the election.
The only analogous Texas case involved a candidate’s eligibility to hold the office of state representative. Rose v. White, 536 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, orig. proceeding). Under a similar constitutional provision, a candidate was required to be twenty-one years old. The court ruled that, even though the candidate would not be twenty-one by election day, he was still eligible because he would be twenty-one by the day service in office would begin.
This court has repeatedly recognized that constitutional provisions restricting the right to hold public office should be strictly construed against ineligibility. Brown v. Meyer, 787 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.1990); Willis v. Potts, 377 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex.1964). Therefore, even if there were some ambiguity in the meaning of the constitutional provision, it should properly be construed so as to permit McCorkle’s eligibility as a candidate. Nevertheless, the court concludes that McCorkle is ineligible and simply refuses to apply this established rule of strict construction. Of course, given that it has already chosen to ignore the actual text, to ignore the presumption of carefully chosen language, and to focus on the proposals rejected by the drafters, it should not be surprising that the court makes this mistake as well. All roadblocks aside, the court is bound for its destination.
Finally, after having shoved aside every substantive roadblock, the court encounters a procedural chasm. It cannot as a matter of law order the relief requested by the relators. The relators sought a writ of mandamus from this court in order to have McCorkle’s name removed from the ballot. However, because we are within sixty-two days of the primary election, McCorkle’s name must remain on the ballot. Tex.Elec.Code § 172.058. Yet, rather than simply stopping at this additional roadblock, the court commences a long and tortured journey through the Election Code in search of some statutory vehicle for reaching its destination. Interestingly, the provisions on which the court relies were not cited by the relators in their briefs.
What the court does is to mix up and combine sections 141.032 and 145.003 of the Election Code. In doing so, it equates the section 141.032(c) mandate to “reject an application” with a duty to declare a candidate ineligible under section 145.003. Yet, such a duty does not exist in section 145.-003, and the statutory scheme makes clear that the rejecting of an application and the declaring of ineligibility are two entirely separate pieces in the electoral process. Section 145.003(a) expressly states that “a candidate may be declared ineligible only as provided by this section.” Thus, section 141.032 has nothing to do with declaring ineligibility.
Of course, the majority has good reason for trying to muddle these two provisions. This court can issue a writ of mandamus only when the relator has a clear right to the relief sought such as when a public official refuses to perform a ministerial act or violates a duty imposed by law. See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.1985); Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex.1975); King v. Payne, 156 Tex. 105, 292 S.W.2d 331 (1956). Nowhere does section 145.003 impose a duty to declare ineligibility. Therefore, section 145.003 cannot provide the court with authority for issuing a writ of mandamus. To circumvent this prob*258lem, the court reaches to the “shall reject” language of section 141.032(e) so that it can have some mandatory language as a foundation for the writ of mandamus. Yet, under the Election Code, it is too late for Meyer to reject McCorkle’s application for a place on the ballot. The court then says that Meyer “must declare McCorkle ineligible.” However, ineligibility is governed solely by section 145.003 and under this section Meyer has no mandatory duty to declare ineligibility. Therefore, this court cannot legitimately order anything done in connection with this matter at this time.
PHILLIPS, C.J., and COOK and HECHT, JJ., join in this dissent.
. The framers and ratifiers were clearly justified in requiring some qualifications to be satisfied at the date of election and others by the date of taking office. For example, the United States Constitution requires:
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 3, cl. 3. A similar requirement obtains for members of the House of Representatives. U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 2, cl. 2.
Thus residency is required as of the date of election, but age can be satisfied thereafter. In recent times, Senator Joseph Biden was only twenty-nine when elected, but attained the requisite age before his term began. P. O’Connor, Members of Congress Since 1789 22 (1977). Also, Senator Rush D. Holt was elected when he was only twenty-nine, and the Senate refused to declare his election invalid on the ground of age. Congressional Quarterly, Guide to the Congress of the United States 302 (1971).