dissenting:
The express terms of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL)1 preclude the insured from first recovering first party benefits under a MVFRL Policy in which she is a named insured and thereafter seeking recovery under a No-fault2 policy as a victim. I would reverse the order granting benefits and therefore must dissent.
The MVFRL establishes a priority for the payment of first party benefits. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1713 provides as follows:
*611§ 1713. Source of Benefits.
(a) General rule. — Except as provided in section 1714 (relating to ineligible claimants), a person who suffers injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall recover first party benefits against applicable insurance coverage in the following order of priority:
(1) For a named insured, the policy on which he is the named insured.
(2) For an insured, the policy covering the insured.
(3) For the occupants of an insured motor vehicle, the policy on that motor vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1713(a).
Deloris B. Soles (Appellee) was a named insured under a policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company. She collected first party benefits, pursuant to § 1713(a)(1), from Allstate in the sum of $10,000. Although the MVFRL requires a carrier to make available for purchase first party medical benefits up to at least $100,000, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1715(a)(1), we may fairly assume that Appellee elected to receive the statutory minimum coverage. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1711.
Moreover, the MVFRL clearly prohibits Appellee from looking beyond her own policy for the recovery here sought. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1717 provides:
§ 1717. Stacking of benefits.
First party benefits shall not be increased by stacking the limits of coverage of:
(1) multiple motor vehicles covered under the same policy of insurance; or
(2) multiple motor vehicle policies covering the individual for the same loss.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1717.
It seems crystal clear to this writer that, without more, Appellee is precluded from pursuing benefits under the policy insuring the vehicle in which she was injured.
*612Even if we look to the No-fault policy issued by Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance Company, the result must remain the same. The now-repealed No-fault Act also contains a priority of payment scheme. Section 204 of the Act provides:
§ 204. Source of basic restoration benefits.
(a) Applicable security. — The security for the payment of basic loss benefits applicable to an injury to:
(1) an employee, ... if the accident resulting in injury occurs while the victim or deceased victim is driving or occupying a motor vehicle furnished by such employee’s employer, is the security for the payment of basic loss benefits covering such motor vehicle or, if none, any other security applicable to such victim;
(2) an insured is the security under which the victim or deceased victim is insured;
(3) the driver or other occupant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury who is not an insured is the security covering such vehicle;
(4) an individual who is not an insured or the driver or other occupant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury is the security covering any motor vehicle involved in such accident____
(emphasis added).
Thus, under both the No-fault Act and the MVFRL, Deloris B. Soles claim was appropriately made to Allstate Insurance Company for coverage under the policy issued to her.
The majority argues that since the term “personal injury protection” is not contained within the MVFRL policy issued by Allstate, and since the benefits available under the separate policies differ in amounts, the coverages afforded insureds under these two acts cannot be equated. While I might agree with this conclusion, I find it to be irrelevant to our task on this appeal.
*613The exclusion contained in the policy under which Appellee seeks her second recovery provides:
Exclusions:
This coverage DOES NOT APPLY to bodily injury to:
******
Persons covered by their own auto insurance
(a) any person, except the named insured or any relative, if entitled to Pennsylvania personal injury protection coverage as a self-insured or as a named insured or relative in another insurance policy.
Exclusions in an insurance policy are valid and enforceable when drafted in appropriate fashion. See, Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563 (1983). The exclusion at issue clearly prohibits recovery of no-fault benefits where the otherwise eligible person is a named insured under a policy other than Pennsylvania National’s. This provision is clear, should therefore be enforced, and prohibits plaintiff’s recovery.
Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that the stacking of work loss benefits (another category of first party benefits) is prohibited in the face of plain and unambiguous policy provisions which preclude such stacking. Antanovich v. Allstate Insurance Co., 507 Pa. 68, 488 A.2d 571 (1985).
Viewed under either the MVFRL or the No-fault Act, Appellee's request for stacking of first party benefits should be denied. The order of the trial court should be reversed. Hence, this dissent.
. Act of February 12, 1984, P.L. 26, No. 11, § 3, effective October 1, 1984, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701, et seq.
. Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, § 101 et seq., 40 P.S. § 1009.101 et seq. (repealed 1984).