dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Because I think Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 591 A.2d 481 (1991), was incorrectly decided and should be overruled, or at least distinguished from this case, I would hold that Horn’s interception of phone conversations in California did not violate Maryland’s wiretap statutes and I would affirm the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief.1 I also adopt the excellent reasoning of Judge John McAuliffe’s dissent in Mustafa, 323 Md. at 76-79, 591 A.2d at 486-88.
I note, initially, that in the Court’s statutory construction of the Maryland Wiretap Act in Mustafa, no mention was made of what I perceive to have been an important modification of the Act. In Mustafa, the Court opined:
It is plain that the legislative intent in the Maryland Act was to inhibit the disclosure in Maryland courts of the content of communications not intercepted in conformity with the public policy of this State as evidenced by the provisions of its governing law. In other words, the Maryland Act precludes the admission of a communication intercepted, no matter where, under circumstances inconsistent with this State’s substantive law. [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 74-75, 591 A.2d at 485-86. That statement mirrored the language of the statute in 1973, but not the present language. The present language, I would respectfully suggest, requires an actual violation of the Maryland Wiretap Act.
Prior to 1977, the admissibility language stated in relevant part: “Only evidence obtained in conformity with the provisions of this subtitle is admissible.” Md.Code (1974), § 10-406 *96of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (emphasis added). That language was changed in 1977 to read, in relevant part: “[N]o part of the contents of the communication ... may be received in evidence ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this subtitle.” Md.Code (1974, 1998 RepLVol.), § 10-405 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (emphasis added).
This change in the statute was not discussed in Mustafa. As I view the language, the earlier prohibition could be construed (although I would not do so) as an outright prohibition requiring conformance with two-party consent, or whatever the consent standard was, or would be in Maryland. The later language, as I view it, is less prohibitory. It appears to me to state that if the acquiring of the evidence actually violates Maryland law, then the evidence is inadmissible. Under the earlier version, it can reasonably be argued that conformance to certain requirements must be met before the evidence is admissible. A reasonable interpretation of the change in language is that, thereafter, in order to be inadmissible, the recording must have actually violated Maryland law. I see no other logical purpose (presuming there was a logical purpose) for the change. Considering that this legislative history, sparse as it is, was not addressed in Mustafa, I believe the Mustafa Court was incorrect in its construction of the statute in the first instance.
The Supreme Court has stated that “it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command,’ and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case.” Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Adhering to precedent is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right. Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or *97are badly reasoned, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision. [Citations omitted.] [Internal quotation omitted.]
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).
This Court has also noted that, although important, the rule of stare decisis is not an absolute:
[I]t is a well recognized and valuable doctrine that decisions, once made on a question involved in a case before a court, should not thereafter be lightly disturbed or set aside (except by a higher court). This is because it is advisable and necessary that the law should be fixed and established so far as possible, and the people guided in their personal and business dealings by established conclusions, not subject to change because some other judge or judges think differently.
On the other hand, it is sometimes advisable to correct a decision or decisions wrongly made in the first instance, if it is found that the decision is clearly wrong and contrary to other established principles.
Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 186 Md. 406, 417, 47 A.2d 365, 370 (1946); see also Hearst Corp. v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 269 Md. 625, 643-44, 308 A.2d 679, 689 (1973) (“The doctrine of stare decisis, important as it is, is not to be construed as preventing us from changing a rule of law if we are convinced that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life.” (quoting White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966))); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369, 381 (1868) (“Previous decisions of this court should not be disturbed ... unless it is plainly seen that glaring injustice has been done or some egregious blunder committed.”).
Previous decisions governing the interpretation of statutes are generally entitled to greater deference under the doctrine *98of stare decisis; such decisions, however, must always yield to common sense. As the Iowa Supreme Court has noted:
Generally, when a statute receives a certain judicial interpretation and is subsequently reenacted without pertinent change, such interpretation is presumed adopted or approved by the legislature.
But the foregoing presumption is not conclusive. It stands only as one factor among many in determining legislative intent....
Neither does [the presumption] nor the pressures of stare decisis prevent our reconsideration, repair, correction, or abandonment of past judicial pronouncements, especially when error is manifest.
Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Iowa 1978) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Parks v. City of Marshalltown, 440 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1989). The Appellate Court of Illinois has also stated:
The doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring a reviewing court to blindly follow its own precedents. While considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, especially where the legislature is free to change the court’s interpretation of its legislation, a reviewing court should not decline to correct a prior interpretation which it finds erroneous ... and a court may depart from a prior settled rule where it becomes evident that it is prejudicial to the public interest.
Mueller v. Board of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 267 Ill.App.3d 726, 732, 205 Ill.Dec. 304, 643 N.E.2d 255, 260-61 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Conway v. Town of Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 676, 680 A.2d 242, 254 (1996) (“Our decision that we should not overrule precedent unless cogent reason and inescapable logic require it has particular force when the precedent involved concerns the interpretation or construction of a statute. There may well be precedent nevertheless that, when challenged and reexamined, mandates that ‘[j]udicial honesty dictates corrective action.’ ” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d *991281, 1283 (Utah 1987) (“As a practical matter, we can and do, on occasion, depart from a prior statutory interpretation.”); Jepson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 89 Wash.2d 394, 407, 573 P.2d 10, 17 (1977) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable to statutory construction when it is decided that earlier interpretations are wanting, faulty, or even wrong.” (citation omitted)).
The Court initially noted in Mustafa, 323 Md. at 73, 591 A.2d at 485, that “[t]he exclusionary provision in § 10-405 of the Maryland [Wiretap] Act precludes the admission of evidence which was not lawfully intercepted.” Our primary holding was that “the Maryland [Wiretap] Act precludes the admission of a communication intercepted, no matter where, under circumstances inconsistent with this State’s substantive law.” Id. at 75, 591 A.2d at 486 (emphasis added). The particular section with which the Court was concerned was section 10-402 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides that any willful interception, endeavor to intercept, any willful disclosure, or endeavor to disclose or any willful use, or endeavor to use, any contents of wire, oral, or electronic communications not obtained in accordance with other provisions of the Maryland Wiretap Act, is unlawful. The Maryland statute defines violations of its requirements as felonies. See id. § 10-402(b).
The “exclusionary” section of the Wiretap Act provides:
§ 10-405. Admissibility of evidence.
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of the communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this subtitle. [Emphasis added.]
Discussion
“[Eavesdropping has grown more simple and yet infinitely more complex in the modern communication age.” People v. Capolongo, 85 N.Y.2d 151, 158, 623 N.Y.S.2d 778, 647 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (1995). As a result, many states have enacted independent wiretapping statutes governing the admissibility *100of such evidence in trials. This has led to a division between states concerning standards of admissibility — some states are stricter than others. A difficult problem has developed concerning the interpretation of an individual state’s wiretapping statute concerning evidence that would have been illegally obtained and, therefore, inadmissible in the forum state, but was obtained legally out-of-state.
The majority trend among our sister states is “the law that controls the legality of an interception is the law of the place wherein the interception takes place.”2 United States v. Gerena, 667 F.Supp. 911, 913 (D.Conn.1987) (quoting United States v. Bennett, 538 F.Supp. 1045, 1047 (D.P.R.1982)); United States v. Geller, 560 F.Supp. 1309, 1317 (E.D.Pa.1983) (discussing Bennett), aff'd sub nom. United States v. DeMaise, 745 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109, 105 S.Ct. 786, 83 L.Ed.2d 780 (1985); see Echols v. State, 484 So.2d 568, 571-72 (Fla.1985) (holding that wiretap interception made in Indiana in compliance with Indiana law, but not with Florida law, was admissible in Florida court), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 241, 93 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986); State v. Bridges, 83 Hawai'i 187, 202, 925 P.2d 357, 372 (1996) (holding that wiretap interception made in California in compliance with California law, but not with Hawaiian law, was admissible in Hawaiian court); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 369, 592 A.2d 572, 588 (App.Div.1991) (holding that wiretap interception legally made in New York under New York law, but not legal under New Jersey law, was admissible in New Jersey court); Frick v. State, 634 P.2d 738, 741 (Okla.Crim.App.1981) (holding that wiretap interception in Virginia, which was in compliance with Virginia law, but not with Oklahoma law, was admissible in Oklahoma court); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 245 Pa.Super. 457, 462, 369 A.2d 493, 494-95 (1976) (holding that wiretap interception made in New Jersey in *101compliance with New Jersey law, but not with Pennsylvania law, was admissible in Pennsylvania court); State v. Mayes, 20 Wash.App. 184, 193, 579 P.2d 999, 1005 (1978) (holding that wiretap interception in California, which was in compliance with California law, but not with Washington law, was admissible in Washington court); 1 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 1.5(c), at 148-50 (3d ed.1996); Richard Tullis & Linda Ludlow, Admissibility of Evidence Seized in Another Jurisdiction: Choice of Law and the Exclusionary Rule, 10 U.S.F. L.Rev. 67, 90 (1975) (“If the search did not take place in the forum jurisdiction, it is apparent that the search cannot become illegal solely because the forum court makes a hypothetical determination that it would have been illegal if it had occurred in the forum.”); see also People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640, 656, 159 Cal.Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738, 748 (1979) (holding that telephone records collected in Pennsylvania in compliance with Pennsylvania law, but not with California law, were admissible in California state court); Capolongo, 85 N.Y.2d at 161, 623 N.Y.S.2d 778, 647 N.E.2d at 1291 (holding that wiretap interception made in Canada in compliance with Canadian law, did not violate New York privacy law); People v. Fidler, 72 Ill.App.3d 924, 926, 29 Ill.Dec. 51, 391 N.E.2d 210, 211 (1979) (holding that wiretap interception in Illinois by federal agents in compliance with federal wiretapping laws, but not with Illinois law, was admissible in Illinois state court); Commonwealth v. Trignani, 334 Pa.Super. 526, 536, 483 A.2d 862, 866-67 (1984) (holding that wiretap interception in Pennsylvania by federal agents in compliance with federal wiretapping laws, but not with Pennsylvania law, was admissible in Pennsylvania state court); cf. D'Antorio v. State, 837 P.2d 727, 731 (Alaska Ct.App.1992) (regarding introduction of evidence in an Alaskan court: “federal law and the law of Ohio apply to the search incident to arrest and the original inventory search ... conducted in Ohio since the police officers who conducted these searches were Ohio police officers and were simply following Ohio law.”); McClellan v. State, 359 So.2d 869, 873 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.) (“[Ejvidence procured in a sister state pursuant to a search valid under of the laws of that state is admissible in the trial of a criminal case in Florida notwith*102standing that the warrant validly issued and executed in the sister state would not have been or was not valid under the laws of Florida; provided the warrant and its execution in the sister state does not offend U.S. Constitutional standards.”), cert. denied, 364 So.2d 892 (Fla.1978); State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Minn.1985) (noting that wiretap interception legally made in Wisconsin, is admissible in a Minnesota court). See generally Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DePaul L.Rev. 837 (1998).3
Given the strong trend of other jurisdictions to apply the wiretap statute of the state where the wiretapping took place, this Court should overturn Mustafa and adopt that sounder application of the law. Cf. United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228, 232 (7th Cir.1995) (“When a number of other circuits reject a position that we have taken, and no other circuit accepts it, the interest in avoiding unnecessary ... conflicts comes into play.... ”); Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“[A] circuit court may reexamine its own established interpretation of a statute if it finds that other circuits have persuasively argued a contrary construction.”), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984, 113 S.Ct. 1579, 123 L.Ed.2d 147 (1993).
This interpretation of the law is in keeping with the tenets of the exclusionary rule and what I believe must have been the intention of the General Assembly. This Court’s interpretation of the law in Mustafa, 323 Md. 65, 591 A.2d 481, is, I respectfully suggest, critically flawed.4 By looking to our *103sister states, I have found what I perceive to be more logical, rational, and practical solutions and propose that we follow their lead with a similar interpretation of Maryland’s wiretap statute. When an interception has been legally obtained in a situs state, it should then be admissible in Maryland regardless of whether the wiretap would have been illegal had the recording been made in Maryland. If we were to do so, we would avoid absurd results.
In statutory construction, absurd results are to be avoided. This Court stated in D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990), that “construction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided.” See also, e.g., Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 418, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999) (“[W]e should construe the statute in a manner that results in an interpretation ‘reasonable and consonant with logic and common sense.’ ” (quoting Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 654, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998))); Edgewater Liquors, Inc. v. Liston, 349 Md. 803, 808, 709 A.2d 1301, 1303 (1998) (“[W]e approach statutory construction from a common sense perspective.”); Lewis, 348 Md. at 662, 705 A.2d at 1135 (“We shall not interpret a statute to produce unusual or extraordinary results, absent the clear legislative intent to enact such a provision.”); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985) (“[Rjules of statutory construction require us to avoid construing a statute in a way which would lead to absurd results.”); Comptroller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 303 Md. 280, 284, 493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985) (“A statute should not be construed by forced or subtle interpretations-”). Mus-tafa ’s holding is precisely what these cases and others seek to prevent — an unusual interpretation of a statute lacking, in my view, substantial logical force, which, in the case now before this Court, results in a great injustice.
The application of Mustafa’s holding to the case sub judice leads to this result: a telephone conversation received in California by a California resident, and legally recorded there, from a resident of the State of Michigan who is only temporarily in the State of Maryland under a contract with the *104California resident to murder the California resident’s disabled son and estranged wife (both of whom are Maryland residents), may not be admitted as evidence in Maryland. As a result, a Michigan murderer hired by a California co-conspirator is to have his conviction for murdering three Maryland residents reversed.
In all due respect, I am unable to describe the result of Mustafa’s application in this case as anything other than absurd — or an equivalent description. If the intention of the Legislature in passing this legislation was to protect the privacy of Maryland residents, I fail completely to perceive how the victims’ privacy has been, or is being, protected. They are the only Maryland residents involved. Regrettably, they have been murdered. The ultimate invasion of privacy has already been visited on them by the murderer whose conviction is being reversed. In my view, it is difficult to believe that the General Assembly, in its wildest dreams, ever intended such a result. The result appears to be extreme, if not bizarre.
Moreover, the language of the Maryland Wiretap Act is clear and unambiguous, and needs no further construction. There is no indication that the interception of the twenty-two second conversation was illegal under California law and it apparently is legal under federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), CaLPenal Code §§ 632, 633.5 (West 1999). Therefore, when Horn recorded the conversation at issue here it was not unlawful where made and was not a violation of Maryland Law. He had not violated any Maryland statute. He could not have been independently prosecuted in Maryland for a violation of the Maryland statute, unless this Court is going to hold that it has the power to declare such actions done in other states, even in other countries, to constitute Maryland criminal offenses.5 Moreover, the disclo*105sure of the recording in California, after it had been seized by a California officer pursuant to a valid California warrant, did not violate any Maryland law, or any California law, as far as the record establishes. There has been absolutely no violation of the Maryland Act and, accordingly, I fail to perceive why the evidence must be excluded pursuant to an exclusionary provision that excludes evidence only if obtained in violation of the statute. Additionally, we should look to the purpose of our wiretapping exclusionary rule. As we have previously stated, “[t]he purpose of these exclusionary rules is ‘to deter law enforcement officers from violating privacy rights by ensuring that the courts do not become partners in illegal police conduct.’ ” Mustafa, 323 Md. at 73, 591 A.2d at 485 (quoting Sanders v. State, 57 Md.App. 156, 167, 469 A.2d 476, 482, cert. denied, 299 Md. 656, 474 A.2d 1345 (1984)). There has been absolutely no illegal police conduct in this case.
The Hawaii Supreme Court provides a practical approach to interpreting wiretap statutes. In Bridges, 83 Hawai'i 187, 925 P.2d 357, the Honolulu Police Department worked in concert with the La Habra, California, Police Department in conducting a sting operation on a criminal drug ring that was based in California, but conducting drug transactions in Hawaii. The police investigation resulted in numerous taped recordings of the defendants discussing the drug transactions to undercover police. The recordings were taken in California in compliance with California law. However, the law concerning wiretapping is stricter in Hawaii, and if the recordings had been made in Hawaii, they would not have been in compliance with Hawaii’s more stringent requirements.
Bridges argued that because the recordings were not obtained in compliance with Hawaii’s wiretapping statute, the taped evidence should be suppressed. The Hawaiian Supreme Court disagreed in a well-reasoned opinion, and noted that the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule were to (1) promote judicial integrity; (2) protect individual privacy; and (3) deter *106illegal police conduct, none of which would be served by excluding the wiretap evidence in that case. See id. at 195, 925 P.2d at 365. I propose a similar rationale.
Judicial Integrity
“The ‘judicial integrity’ purpose of the exclusionary rule is essentially that the courts should not place their imprimatur on evidence that was illegally obtained by allowing it to be admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution.” Id. at 196, 925 P.2d at 366. The question before us, therefore, is whether the evidence was obtained illegally. As I indicated, supra, “the law that controls the legality of an interception is the law of the place wherein the interception takes place.” Gerena, 667 F.Supp. at 913 (quoting Bennett, 538 F.Supp. at 1047). Generally, whether the given conduct is legal is governed by the laws of the jurisdiction in which that conduct was performed. In the case sub judice, the telephone conversations were taped in California, a state which allows wiretap interception with one-party consent in respect to the admissibility of evidence in criminal prosecutions.6 Thus, the evidence in this case was obtained in compliance with California law. Under the general rule of lex loci actus,7 the admission of this taped evidence obtained in California would not possibly cause a loss of judicial integrity in a Maryland courtroom. To contend otherwise is, I respectfully suggest, not rational.
This analysis ties into the determination of what is the appropriate scope of Maryland’s wiretap statute. With all due respect, I believe it is nonsensical for this Court to grant this statute such extraterritorial application. Nowhere in the wording of this statute does it say that a wiretapped conversation, legally obtained in another state, will be inadmissible in a Maryland court. Given the general wording of the statute *107addressed only to violations of the Maryland statute, this court should hold that it was the General Assembly’s intent to prohibit only wiretap evidence that was obtained illegally. If the evidence was obtained in another state, in compliance with that state’s wiretapping laws, there has been no violation of any state’s law, including Maryland’s. Under those circumstances, where there has been no illegal conduct and the Maryland statute has not been violated, the evidence should be admissible in a Maryland court. That the evidence would have been illegally obtained and inadmissible under the Maryland wiretapping statute had it been taped in Maryland, should not be enough to exclude the evidence when it was not taped in Maryland. Therefore, evidence should be admissible if it is lawfully obtained in the state of interception — which it was in the case sub judiee.
The evidence at issue was obtained in compliance with California law and no relevant Maryland statute applies extra-territorially to govern the legality of the acquiring of that wiretap evidence. The interception of the conversation was not illegal and, therefore, no police agency anywhere, particularly no Maryland police entity, is profiting from any unlawful conduct. I suggest that admitting the taped conversation in the case sub judiee would not compromise the integrity of the courts. The majority’s interpretation of the statute in Musta-fa simply went too far. In this case, no statute of any jurisdiction was violated.
Individual Privacy
Clearly, an essential purpose behind Maryland’s wiretapping statute is the protection of individual privacy. As the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has said:
In challenging the- Government’s surveillance operations, the defendants seek the preservation of their civil liberties and the vindication of their rights in the event of any violation. Within this context, the scope of the defendants’ rights, as they might expect to exercise them on a day-to-day basis, is to be found within the realm of [the situs’s circuit] jurispru*108dence. Ordinarily, it would be the courts of that jurisdiction that would protect the defendants’ interests and provide a civil remedy for any redressable wrong.... [A] defendant, in challenging the legality of any given electronic surveillance activity, would generally expect to look to the laws of the jurisdiction where the surveillance occurred to protect his or her privacy rights....
Gerena, 667 F.Supp. at 917; see also Bridges, 83 Hawai'i at 199, 925 P.2d at 369.
When considering its holding in Trignani, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took a logical stance in considering the privacy of its individual citizens:
In reaching our decision, we have carefully considered the negative implications of wiretapping and we are aware of its potential encroachment upon our citizens’ cherished right to privacy. While the constitutional rights of all citizens must be zealously guarded, we believe that a delicate balance between those rights and effective law enforcement can be maintained. Clearly, our Legislature did not intend that we have an anti-wiretap law to safeguard communications among criminal networks; it was concerned with intrusions on the right of privacy of law-abiding citizens.
Trignawi, 334 Pa.Super. at 536, 483 A.2d at 867.
It, in my view, could not have been the intention of the Legislature to provide protection to a person whose only tie to Maryland is that he committed the contract murders of Maryland residents (a handicapped child, and that child’s mother and nurse).
Two-party consent provides unwarranted protection. Participant taping should be allowed, especially where the tape captures evidence of substantial harm to one of the participants, as in Inciarrano [v. State, 447 So.2d 386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984), rerid, 473 So.2d 1272 (Fla.1985) ][8] and *109LaSane.[9]
Bast, supra, at 911.
Perry was not a resident of Maryland. His sole purpose for being in state was to commit a contract murder. Surely, it was not the intent of the Legislature to extend the scope of the wiretapping statute to protect the privacy of nonresident contract murderers. The interception in question was conducted in California. Neither Perry’s nor Horn’s Maryland expectations of privacy were impaired under the facts of this case as the right should be limited to the laws of the location where the interception took place. Perry called Horn in California. He knew his conversation was being received in California. He knew or should have known that if his conversation was going to be intercepted or taped, it could be done in California. Thus, he knew, or should have known, that his expectation as to his right to privacy might be controlled by the laws of the jurisdiction to which he placed his calls— California. See Blair, 25 Cal.3d at 656, 159 Cal.Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d at 748; Engel, 249 N.J.Super. at 369, 592 A.2d at 588. In the instant case, the evidence at issue was obtained in California, in compliance with California law. Therefore, admitting evidence in this case would not offend the individual privacy rationale of Maryland’s oral communication interception exclusionary rule.
*110Deterrence of Illegal Police Conduct
“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement officers from violating the constitutional rights of citizens by removing the incentive for disregarding such rights.” Fidler, 72 Ill.App.3d at 926, 29 Ill.Dec. 51, 391 N.E.2d at 211; see Mustafa, 323 Md. at 73, 591 A.2d at 485; see also Blair, 25 Cal.3d at 655, 159 Cal.Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d at 748; Engel, 249 N.J.Super. at 368, 592 A.2d at 587; Capolongo, 85 N.Y.2d at 164, 623 N.Y.S.2d 778, 647 N.E.2d at 1293 (“[O]ne State’s laws have no deterrent effect on conduct of governmental agents of another jurisdiction.”). As the Supreme Court of Hawaii has summarized:
“Deterrence” refers to our expectation that after evidence is suppressed based on particular police conduct in one case, in the future, police officers will refrain from that type of conduct and will instead act in a manner that would not lead to suppression of evidence....
Most authorities recognize that suppression of evidence in the forum state will have little, if any, deterrent effect on agents of the situs state conducting investigations within the situs state....
The lack of any deterrent effect is particularly apparent when the manner in which the evidence was obtained did not violate situs law but would have violated forum law had the evidence been obtained in the forum state.
Bridges, 83 Hawai'i at 199, 925 P.2d at 369.
There are numerous jurisdictions that have followed an interpretation of admissibility of out-of-state wiretap evidence in the fashion I propose. Our neighboring state of Pennsylvania was first confronted with this issue in Bennett, 245 Pa.Super. 457, 369 A.2d 493. In that case, the Superior Court of New Jersey authorized a wiretap on a telephone located in the state of New Jersey as part as a drug investigation. The surveillance of this telephone was conducted entirely in New Jersey; however, the incoming calls, which discussed illegal drug transactions, were received from Pennsylvania. Based on this information, Pennsylvania police secured a search *111warrant for the location where the incoming calls were made. The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that
[i]t is, of course, obvious that the courts of this Commonwealth have absolutely no power to control the activities of a sister state or to punish conduct occurring within that sister state. The legislature of New Jersey has determined that wiretapping, in appropriate circumstances and for proper cause shown, will be permitted within its borders. Thus, the information involved in the appeal before us was obtained by the New Jersey Police under a legal authorization. A conclusion that denies the exchange of information between law enforcement agencies of our Commonwealth and those of our sister states cannot be justified. The overriding public policy must ... favor the interest of the public by fostering its protection through the detection and apprehension of those who persist in defying our laws. This is particularly true in the case of major interstate drug dealers whose activities wreck the lives of so many people in this country today. We certainly must extend to all people the protection of constitutional safeguards, but to extend such protection, on the instant facts, would be an unwarranted extension allowing procedure to emerge victorious over justice.
Id. at 460-61, 369 A.2d at 494. The same can be said with regard to tapes legally obtained in California used in a Maryland court in a case of contract murder by a Michigan resident. Suppressing such evidence does not promote the reasoning behind the deterrence factor.
In Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, a case strikingly similar to the case sub judice, the Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled on the admissibility of wiretaps obtained out-of-state in a “killing for insurance” scheme. The court stated, as to taped conversations, that “where the seizure of evidence was valid under the law of the place where the search occurred but where it would be regarded as unlawful if it had occurred in the forum state[,] .. . the forum state should not suppress it” Id. at 736-37.
*112Another factually similar contract murder case was decided by the Supreme Court of Florida in Echols v. State, 484 So.2d 568 (Fla.1985). In that case, the defendant was contracted by Alex Dragovich to murder Waldamar Baskovich to get control of the victim’s estate. The murder occurred in Clearwater, Florida; however, a bulk of the investigation took place in Gary, Indiana. In Indiana, a police informant wore a wire with a small hidden tape recorder and questioned Echols about the murder in Florida. Echols boastfully responded that he had participated in the murder. When Florida prosecutors attempted to use the taped conversation against Echols, he argued that although the tape would be admissible under Indiana law, Florida law, the law of the forum, should apply, which would render the tape inadmissible. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed and held that:
Florida’s interests are [not] served by excluding relevant evidence which was lawfully obtained in Indiana in conformity with the United States Constitution and Indiana law. The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future official police misconduct. We do not believe exclusion of the evidence would have any discernable effect on police officers of other states who conduct investigations in accordance with the laws of their state and of the United States Constitution. Further, we do not believe that the interest of Florida is served by imperially attempting to require that out-of-state police officials follow Florida law, and not the law of the situs, when they are requested to cooperate with Florida officials in investigating crimes committed in Florida.
Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Perry was a resident of Detroit, Michigan; Horn was then residing in Los Angeles, California. There was substantial, albeit circumstantial, evidence that the conspiracy to murder Horn’s son and -wife was conceived in substantial part while the co-conspirators were in Michigan and California. While in Michigan, Horn complained to a cousin, who was a Mend of Perry’s, about his problems with his relationship with Mildred Horn. The cousin told him of Perry and assisted Horn in *113contacting Perry. After the murders, the cousin in Michigan continued to facilitate the relationship between Perry and Horn. Before and after the murders, there were numerous telephone calls between pay phones near where Perry was living in Michigan to Horn’s phone in California, and from pay phones in California to Perry in Michigan. Additionally, $6,000 believed to be payment, or partial payment, for the murders was transferred under a fictitious name from Los Angeles, where Horn was then staying, to Perry’s girlfriend in Michigan.
Presuming that California’s conspiracy laws are similar to Maryland’s, the application of Mustafa’s holding to the case at bar could result, should California choose to try Horn for conspiracy to commit murder, in the recording being admissible in the state where the conspiracy to commit the crime was made and where the recording was lawfully made, but not in the jurisdiction where the murders were actually committed. I respectfully suggest that such a result would also be absurd.
Under Mustafa, a criminal conspirator in Illinois, who has never been in Maryland, who records, without the co-conspirator’s knowledge, a telephone conversation from the co-conspirator in California, who also has never been in Maryland, violates the Maryland Wiretap Act at the time the recording is made. This is because the exclusionary clause relied on in Mustafa excludes only evidence obtained and/or disclosed in violation of the Maryland statute, and the Court held in Mustafa that acts committed elsewhere violate the Maryland statute for exclusionary purposes. To me, this makes little sense and, as this case evidences, is unsound in practice and, as I view it, incongruous.
Under Mustafa, a recording of a communication from Cape Canaveral, made by an astronaut standing on the surface of the moon, recorded without NASA’s consent, would not be admissible in Maryland’s courts because it would violate the Maryland Act if the parties had been in Maryland. Because violations of the Maryland Act are felonies, is the astronaut a *114felon? I hasten to indicate that I consider this example to be absurd; but that is the point.
The Maryland Wiretap Act also contains civil liability provisions similar to the criminal liability provisions. Section 10-410 provides in relevant part:
(a) Civil liability. — Any person whose ... communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this subtitle shall have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use the communications, and be entitled to recover from any person:
(1) Actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher;
(2) Punitive damages; and
(3) A reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred. [Second emphasis added.]
If Mustafa’s holding were to be extended to these civil penalty provisions,10 persons in other states and countries receiving and recording calls made from Maryland, could be subjected to civil liability in Maryland courts, even though their state’s statutes permit the recording upon the receiving party’s consent. In my view, that, too, would be absurd.
Under Mustafa, conversations between callers in different states, each of which has the one-party consent standard, if recorded in a state where it is legal to do so, from a state in which it was legal to do so, would still not be admissible in Maryland courts. If the parties thereafter moved into Maryland, could the one whose conversation had, without his consent, been legally recorded elsewhere, initiate a civil suit under the Maryland statute and Mustafa’s extra-territorial extension of Maryland’s jurisdiction? I believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to regulate the recordings of such *115messages when the recording is done in this State, not elsewhere in the universe.
Moreover, what wrong does this type of extraterritorial application of the exclusionary rule address? In a case such as this, no agent of this State has done anything wrong. If the exclusion of the evidence is designed to “punish” the State, for what is the State being punished? It has not done anything wrong. Is the purpose to teach a lesson to the police and residents of California? We should have no interest in California’s treatment of such recordings. Moreover, their actions were legal. In this case, Horn is not the opposing party that sought the admission of the recording. Obviously, we are not punishing him. What purpose does the extension of Mustafa serve? To whom are we teaching a lesson? Certainly not Horn. Certainly not California. Certainly not the police involved in the case.
The answer to all of these questions apparently is Mustafa. I believe in the importance of precedent and stare decisis; but, where adherence to the holdings of prior cases leads to the reversal of the convictions of a Michigan contract killer who has murdered three Maryland residents, including the California co-conspirator’s own disabled child, because the co-conspirator legally recorded a telephone message in California, the price of the precedent is too great for my adherence. Mustafa should be overruled.
If not overruled, it should be distinguished. While the Maryland police officer supervising the paid informant in Mustafa asserted that he did not know that the informant was taping the calls in the District of Columbia where it was legal to do so, the informant was, nonetheless, actively participating as an agent of the officers in attempting to have a drug transaction take place in Maryland. The State had agreed to pay $2,500 to the informant if the informant would set up the drug buy. The informant enticed Mustafa’s co-defendant, Andarge Asfaw, into helping set up a drug transaction. The attempts to set up the transaction took place by phone between the informant’s Washington residence and Prince *116George’s County. The informant taped the calls, which was legal in the District.
The person taping the calls in Mustafa was acting at the general direction of the Maryland officers. At least to some significant extent, the informant, in respect to the specific investigation, was acting as an agent of the police, although the informant was not within the physical jurisdiction of this State.11 Mustafa, therefore, involved extraterritorial Maryland police action, in direct support of a Maryland police investigation. At least an argument could be made in Musta-fa that a Maryland police officer was being penalized, being taught to keep better control over his paid informant. In the case sub judice, the recording was not made as a part of a police investigation. It was made, not by an informant, but, by a co-conspirator to murder, and the recording itself did not result from the payment of Maryland funds and was legally made in California. Assuming that the purpose of the act is to deter surreptitious recordings, who is being deterred by the exclusion of this evidence? Not the police. Not Horn. Not Perry. He is getting away with murder.
I understand the majority’s adherence, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to Mustafa’s extraterritorial extension of the Maryland statute’s application. As I perceive it, however, it is an example of bad cases making bad law. Now, if co-conspirators record their conversations, unknown to each other and to the authorities, no part of those conversations, if discovered, will be admissible in Maryland, even if no part of the conversations occurred in Maryland and if the recording of them elsewhere was legal. I see no justification for the application of the extreme Mustafa rule in this case.
. Because the majority opinion is based on the assumption that the recording at issue was inadmissible pursuant to Mustafa, and I disagree with that assumption, I shall only address that matter. If the evidence was admissible, the other matters — waiver, failure to seek suppression, willfulness, inadvertence — would basically be moot.
. I am not concerned in this discussion whether a particular state’s statute is one party or all party consenual, but that the taping elsewhere while legal there by that state’s standards, would have been illegal if done in the forum's state. The real issue is not consensual/nonconsenual but legal/illegal.
. My research indicates that there are ten states, including Maryland, that require consent of all parties to an intercepted telephone communication. They include Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania. In addition, California and Washington require such consents in civil cases. At least Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Washington have been presented with the same issue that exists in this case. Those four states have adopted a position consistent with the dissent.
. At the very least, however, the facts of the case sub judice can be distinguished from Mustafa.
. There may be instances where certain types of offenses committed elsewhere may have effects in this state, and thus may, under certain limited circumstances, constitute offenses of Maryland’s criminal laws. *105Murder, and I would suggest, wiretap statutes, generally are not of that nature.
. The California statute requires two-party consent for intercepted conversations in civil trails but has a less strict standard for criminal trials. See Cal.Penal Code § 633.5; Bast, supra, at 927 app. B.
. Lex loci actus is defined as "[t]he law of the place where the act was done.” Black’s Law Dictionary 911 (6th ed.1990).
. "In 1982, a Florida business man, Michael Anthony Phillips, taped his conversation with his business associate, Anthony Paul Inciarrano in Phillips's office. The tape contained their conversation, the sounds
*109of a gun firing and Phillips groaning and falling to the floor. The tape was the only evidence against Inciarrano. Although Inciarrano acknowledged it was his voice on the tape, he moved to suppress the tape because the taping was illegal; Florida requires all parties to consent to the recording and penalizes an unconsented-to recording as a third-degree felony.”
Bast, supra, at 838 (footnotes omitted). Under the majority’s holding, and under Mustafa, that recording would not be admissible in Maryland even though it was ruled admissible in Florida.
. Police found a tape inside murder victim Kathleen Weinstein’s pocket in 1996. The tape contained a taped forty-six minute conversation with one of her students Michael LaSane, which led to his arrest for her murder. The taped conversation was legal under New Jersey's wiretapping statute, which requires only one person to consent. Bast, supra, at 837-38. Under the majority’s holding and under Mustafa, that recording would not be inadmissible in Maryland.
. Both the civil provision and the criminal provision are based on the key phrase "in violation of this subtitle.” Accordingly, the Mustafa rationale might apply equally in civil cases.
. The Mustafa Court noted that had the informant acted at the "prior direction” of the officer that interception would have been exempted from the Act’s prohibitions: "[Wjhere a police informant ... does not act under the prior direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer when intercepting a communication, the provisions of § 10-402(c)(2) do not legalize the disclosure of that communication in a Maryland court.” Mustafa, 323 Md. at 70, 591 A.2d at 483.