dissenting.
I submit that the arbitrator and the majority here have erred in concluding that it was necessary to prove that Smith operated the bus while under the influence of alcohol in order to discharge him. In my view it would be sufficient grounds for discharge if Smith consumed alcoholic *395beverages while on duty or just prior to going on duty. The undisputed presence of a strong odor of alcohol on Smith’s breath supports a rational inference that one or the other was the case here.
The majority opinion refers to National Labor R. Board v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 128 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.1942). I find it of interest that the court there said:
“The public interest, as well as that of the employer, requires of any one entrusted with the lives and safety of the travelling public that he conduct himself in a manner in keeping with his responsibilities.” 128 F.2d at 203. It likewise is of interest that the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety regulation mentioned by the majority in connection with Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.1983), prohibits drinking intoxicating liquor while on duty or within four hours prior thereto. I deem what the court said there as relevant here:
“In a nation where motorists practically live on the highways, no citation of authority is required to establish that an arbitration award ordering a company to reinstate an over-the-road truck driver caught drinking liquor on duty violates public policy. Alcohol impairs a person’s coordination, and inhibits his ability to reason rationally. Ingestion of alcohol slows the reflexes. It induces drowsiness. It slows response time to external stimuli. It dulls the senses. In recognition of alcohol’s undisputedly debilitating characteristics, every state in the union prohibits driving while under its influence. A driver who imbibes the spirits endangers not only his own life, but the health and safety of all other drivers. These considerations are convincing enough with respect to drivers of automobiles. They become even more compelling when the driver is regularly employed to course the highways in a massive tractor-trailer rig.” 712 F.2d at 124.
I would hold it against public policy to require an employer such as MTA to establish that a driver had actually operated his transit vehicle under the influence of alcohol *396before it could discharge him for drinking. Accordingly, I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Judges ELDRIDGE and COUCH concur in the views here expressed.