Blouch v. Clifford R. Zinn & Son, Inc.

JOHNSON, Judge,

dissenting:

I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority Opinion which finds that Aetna waived the limitations in its agency agreement with Zinn, and reinstates the jury verdict against Aetna. In the second phase of the case, the jury was instructed as follows:

Now, in this phase of the case, the plaintiff, Aetna, contends that it has been rendered liable to pay a verdict because its agent, Zinns, did not comply with the agency agreement____ [I]t is Aetna’s position that the limitation of authority imposed by them on Mr. Zinn was exceeded and, therefore, Aetna should not have to pay this verdict but Mr. Zinn does for breaching the agency agreement.
Mr. Zinn, on the other hand, contends that he at all times complied with the terms of the agency agreement. In particular, he said that he did not extend credit to Mr. Blouch because under the terms of the agency agreement, ... [he] was prohibited from extending the time for the payment of premiums____
... [M]embers of the jury, you must concentrate on this agreement, the limitations imposed on the authority of an agent and whether or not Mr. Zinn violated it.
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that he did, then your verdict would be in favor of Aetna. If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not exceed his authority, the limitations of his authority as set forth in the agreement, then your verdict would be in his favor____

N.T., 12/15/82 at 324-26 (emphasis added).

It is clear that the jury was instructed simply to determine whether Zinn complied with the terms of his agree*340ment with Aetna. Although the portion of the charge cited by the majority at page 6 of the Opinion asked the jury whether Aetna altered the terms of the agreement, the “past practices” referred to immediately preceding relate to previous insurance policies written by Zinn on behalf of Mr. Blouch, which were not Aetna policies. N.T., 12/15/82 at 328. Indeed, the trial court reiterated, “You are to determine whether or not this agency agreement has been exceeded by Mr. Zinn. If it has, then your verdict is for the plaintiff, Aetna. If he has not, then your verdict is in favor of Mr. Zinn.” N.T., 12/15/82 at 329. Moreover, Zinn never advanced the position that if the jury should find he exceeded the scope of his authority, the jury must then consider whether Aetna condoned his practices and thereby altered the terms of the agency agreement. Zinn merely relied upon his theory that he at all times complied with the terms of the agreement as written.

In reviewing Aetna’s motion for judgment n.o.v., the trial court properly considered the evidence most favorable to Zinn as verdict winner and all reasonable inferences therefrom, see Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa.Super. 11, 476 A.2d 427 (1984), and concluded that the jury could not possibly find that credit had been extended by Zinn to Blouch on the one hand, but that Zinn had not violated his agreement with Aetna on the other. This Court must similarly view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict winner on an appeal from the entry of a judgment n.o.v. Handfinger v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 439 Pa. 130, 132, 266 A.2d 769, 771 (1970). Resolving all doubts in favor of the verdict, I find this to be a clear case in which judgment n.o.v. was properly entered. See Tyus v. Resta, supra; Atkins v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, 489 Pa. 344, 414 A.2d 100 (1980).

Even if the question of whether or not Aetna enforced the terms of its agreement with Zinn was properly advanced and considered by the jury, I do not find enough evidence in the record before us to support the majority’s theory that Aetna knew or should have known that Zinn *341was extending credit. Zinn’s testimony on direct examination, N.T., 12/15/82 at 315, without more, does not lead to the conclusion that Aetna should be aware that policies were delivered prior to the receipt of premiums.

While I agree with the majority’s disposition of the remaining issues, I would affirm the trial court’s granting of judgment n.o.v.