(Dissenting). I can accept, albeit with some reluctance, the expressed conclusion that “the State had the right to unilaterally reduce the workweek and wages of the employees upon termination of the agreement”. But I cannot subscribe to the proposition that because the termination of collective bargaining terms is “recognized” in the statute, such termination is not an unfair labor practice. Termination is indeed recognized, but termination in the manner here shown is not.
As the majority points out, the “only enforceable arrangements” after termination, and before a new agreement, are those established under 3 V.S.A. § 982(e) by the secretary of administration and the governor. That procedure was not here followed. Whatever the conclusion had this statute been complied with, and recognizing that under our statute the State has rights not accorded the typical employer under federal law, I would still hold that the unilateral change made here in workweek and wages is an unfair labor practice. In my view, the right of the State to make such a change, effective after contract termination, is not an absolute one. It is, rather, conditional upon following 3 V.S.A. § 982(e). Until the approval there specified is sought and obtained, the unilateral changes here involved should be considered an unfair labor practice. It is, in effect, a refusal to bargain collectively, *201and it cannot be justified under the statute as a matter of right, because the statutory procedure was not followed.
Billings, J., concurs in the foregoing dissent.