Masloff v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty.

LARSEN, Justice,

dissenting.

I dissent.

I.

I agree with the majority that the portion of Section 563.-2(k) of the Second Class County Port Authority Act (hereinaf*429ter Port Authority Act) which restricts standing to seek any relief in any court of this Commonwealth under subsection (k) to the Port Authority Transit (PAT) is invalid in that it violates Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Article I, Section 11 provides:

All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.

The last sentence of Section 563.2(k) — “No party, other than the authority, shall have any standing to seek any relief in any court of this Commonwealth under this [Section 563.2(k) ]” — is contrary to this constitutional mandate and, therefore, is null and void and of no effect. This constitutional infirmity however does not invalidate the rest of the statute which remains in full force and effect as the majority opinion tacitly acknowledges. Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1925.

II.

I strongly disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that reasonable grounds existed for the equitable relief ordered by the Chancellor in this case. The Port Authority Act, as amended in 1986, provides that it is the duty of PAT and the Union to make every reasonable effort to settle all labor disputes by good faith collective bargaining. (55 P.S. § 563.-2(b)). The parties shall commence to bargain collectively at least one hundred days prior to the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. (55 P.S. § 563.2(e)). The act also provides for binding arbitration with the consent of both parties (55 P.S. § 563.2(f)), and for fact-finding by a neutral fact-finder. (55 P.S. § 563.2(g)). If PAT and the Union do not accept the recommendations of the neutral fact-finder and do not mutually agree to submit to final and binding arbitration, the Union shall have the right to strike. (55 P.S. § 563.2(k)). Further, the Port Authority Act provides:

[S]uch strike shall not be prohibited unless or until such a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the *430health, safety or welfare of the public: Provided, That such strike shall not be prohibited on the grounds that it creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public unless the court’s order granting relief further mandates that both parties submit the labor dispute to final and binding interest arbitration by a board of arbitration under the provisions of this section. No party, other than [PAT], shall have any standing to seek any relief in any court of this Commonwealth under this subsection.

55 P.S. § 563.(k). Senior Judge Silvestri Silvestri of the Commonwealth Court, sitting as Chancellor, granted, inter alia, a permanent injunction enjoining appellant, Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85 (Union) and all of its members, from continuing the work stoppage initiated on March 16, 1992. The basis for the Chancellor’s injunction which enjoined the Union’s strike was summarized in his adjudication as follows:

During the parade of thirty (30) witnesses presented by the City, testimony was elicited about the impact of the mass transit strike upon families, individuals, and businesses. Blind, epileptic, professional, student, and blue-collar witnesses testified about the effect of the lack of public transportation upon their lives. While the lack of such transportation is a matter of inconvenience for some, it is devastating to others. Renal, cancer and psychiatric patients are often unable to get to appropriate medical facilities for treatment. Emergency medical services are delayed in attempts to reach citizens in need. Citizens are endangering their safety by walking along public roads to get to work because other modes of transportation are unavailable. Residents have been forced to find alternate living accommodations with friends or family because of the inaccessibility to work, school or day care. From the testimony presented, the City has demonstrated the far-reaching effect the strike has had upon commercial, academic, medical and social institutions.

The Chancellor concluded:

Thus, it is clear that a permanent injunction should issue to return the community to its status prior to March 16, 1992, *431to ensure the safety and prevent immediate and irreparable harm to citizens, and to prevent further harm which would result by a denial of the requested relief.

All of the consequences of the strike described by the Chancellor in his adjudication are precisely the kinds of inconveniences, disruptions and hardships which are incident to and normally expected when a transit strike occurs in a major metropolitan area. For example, it is reasonable to expect that persons who rely on public transportation to go to work or school will walk along public roads to get to work or school during a mass transit strike. Also, it is a normal expectation that business will decline at retail stores which depend upon customers who use public transportation. None of the consequences described by the witnesses in this case can be said to be unexpected or unanticipated by the Legislature when it enacted legislation permitting the Union to strike. The courts and the legislature of this Commonwealth have recognized that certain inconveniences, disruptions and hardships are inherent in any strike and such inherent inconveniences, disruptions and hardships do not constitute a dear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. Armstrong School District v. Armstrong Education Association, 5 Pa.Commw.Ct. 378, 291 A.2d 120 (1972).

“The ‘clear’ in that epigram is not limited to a threat indubitably etched in every microscopic detail. It includes that which is not speculative but real, not imagined but actual. The ‘present’ in the epigram is not restricted to the climatically imminent. It includes that which exists as contrasted with that which does not yet exist and that which has ceased to exist.” ...
In this light, the determination of whether or not a strike presents a clear and present danger to the health, safety or welfare of the public must, therefore, require the court to find that the danger or threat is real or actual and that a strong likelihood exists that it will occur. Additionally, it seems to us that the ‘danger’ or ‘threat’ concerned must not be one which is normally incident to a strike by public employees. By enacting [legislation] which authorizes *432such strikes, the legislature may be understood to have indicated its willingness to accept certain inconveniences for such are inevitable, but it obviously intended to draw the line at those which pose a danger to the public health, safety or welfare. (Emphasis supplied)

Id. 5 Pa.Commw.Ct. at 383-384, 291 A.2d at 123-124. Thus, the Chancellor erred in enjoining the strike in the instant case.

The majority herein, in reaching to uphold the Chancellor’s injunction, does not rely only upon the inconveniences and disruptions of the public’s normal daily routines as being sufficient to constitute a clear and present danger to the health, safety or welfare of the public, but combines the evidence of the daily inconveniences and disruptions with an unsupported declaration that ambulance, fire and police services and protection were severely hampered in concluding that there was a clear and present danger which justified an injunction. The majority states:

The City’s evidence did not simply establish the disruption of the witnesses’ daily routines, however. The evidence established, inter alia, that public services, such as ambulance, fire and police services, were severely hampered by the increased traffic congestion resulting from the strike. To the extent that Local 85’s argument suggests that the adverse effect on and threat to essential public services such as fire and police protection and emergency medical services are the ordinary and anticipated consequences of a transit strike, we are unpersuaded.

I must respectfully disagree with the majority’s characterization of the evidence and the argument of the Union. There was scant evidence of disruption of the City’s ability to provide adequate fire protection, police protection and emergency medical services because of the strike. As the Union points out in its brief, no testimony was offered by the City pertaining to the City’s ability or inability to provide adequate fire and police protection as a result of the strike. (Brief of Union, p. 24) The only evidence offered by the City which directly pertained to the City’s ability to provide emergency medical services was the testimony of Robert Kennedy, Chief of the *433Bureau of Emergency Medical Services for the City of Pittsburgh Department of Public Safety. (R. pp. 342A-357A) Chief Kennedy testified that peak demand for emergency medical services is from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday. (R. p. 346A) Mr. Kennedy testified that his Bureau did experience some difficulty in moving units to respond to calls. (R. p. 347A) He testified anecdotally to a report of a unit on the North Side of Pittsburgh dispatched to the South Side of Pittsburgh in response to a call at approximately 3:30 p.m. on March 30. Due to the volume of traffic at that time, the unit was unable to cross either the West End bridge or the Fort Duquesne bridge, even with its warning devices, and could not complete the call. (R. p. 347A) He testified as to “having some problem entering downtown [Pittsburgh] from the east due to congestion on Liberty Avenue”; “we are very often forced now to go long distances down Liberty Avenue into town opposing traffic.” (R.P. 348A) Chief Kennedy stated that paramedics have reported to him that they were finding difficulty on secondary roads because of the presence of more traffic than usual on those roads. (R. p. 349A) The traffic conditions and delays described by Chief Kennedy are not dissimiliar to that which is encountered during busy traffic hours when traffic on a major thoroughfare (such as the Parkway East or Parkway West in Pittsburgh) is limited because of the resurfacing and/or repairs of such thoroughfare. The City offered no other evidence of its inability to provide adequate fire and police protection and emergency medical services. In its brief, (at p. 26) the Union candidly states:

The Union does not dispute the economic hardship and the inconvenience caused the public. The Union agrees that these hardships were imposed primarily on that segment of the population which is least able to withstand them, the young, the elderly and those suffering from physical or mental impairments.

Nevertheless, none of the evidence presented by the City constitutes evidence of a clear and present danger to the health, safety or welfare of the public under the standards *434adopted in Armstrong School District v. Armstrong Education Association, supra. The disruptions of routine daily activities such as, travelling to and from employment, school, meetings, business appointments, personal appointments, medical appointments, social functions, etc. are indeed significant and often painful inconveniences to the public, particularly for the young and the elderly. These disruptions and inconveniences are inherent in the very nature of any mass transit strike in a metropolitan area. The majority, by elevating these disruptions and inconveniences to a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public renders the right to strike granted transit workers by the Port Authority Act illusory. I cannot conceive of a strike by transit employees which did not impact the public in the various ways described by the witnesses in this case. Surely, the disruptive effect of a mass transit strike upon the public is rightfully a matter for concern. In enacting the Port Authority Act, 55 P.S. § 551, et seq., however, the General Assembly weighed the competing interests which would be affected by legislation permitting Port Authority employees to strike and enacted legislation in favor of allowing such strikes. The majority’s opinion in this case which makes it inevitable that all strikes by Port Authority employees will be enjoined upon petition renders the Legislature’s action useless.

III.

The Chancellor, in his order of April 10, 1992, granted an injunction which enjoins the Union and its members from continuing the work stoppage initiated on March 16, 1992 and directs that the union members return to work. The Chancellor further directed that, “Beginning on the 13th day of April 1992 at 10:00 o’clock A.M. and continuing each day thereafter until an agreement is effectuated, the duly authorized representatives of the Union and Port Authority shall meet with the court in its chambers at 614 Frick Building, 435 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219, for the purpose of engaging in collective bargaining under the supervision of this court.” The Chancellor did not order PAT and the Union to submit their labor *435dispute to final and binding interest arbitration as required by the Port Authority Act which specifically provides, in relevant part, as follows:

[T]he employees shall have the right to strike ..., and such strike shall not be prohibited unless or until such a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public: Provided, That such strike shall not be prohibited on the grounds that it creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public unless the court’s order granting relief further mandates that both parties submit the labor dispute to final and binding interest arbitration by a board of arbitration under the provisions of this section, (emphasis supplied)

55 P.S. § 563.2(k) The statute is unmistakably clear. A court has no authority to prohibit a strike even when it finds that the strike presents a clear and present danger to the health, safety and welfare of the public unless it simultaneously orders the parties to binding arbitration. Thus, even if it can be said that the Chancellor did not abuse his discretion in granting an injunction and that the evidence of record supports his findings (which I, of course, dispute), it is clear that the Chancellor erred in ordering court supervised collectively bargaining instead of final and binding interest arbitration as mandated by the legislature. When a strike is lawfully enjoined under the provisions of the Port Authority Act, the labor dispute must be resolved by binding arbitration and by no other means. 55 P.S. § 563.2(k) The majority’s conclusion that binding arbitration is mandatory only when PAT brings an action to enjoin a strike is contrary to the plain words of the statute and the clear intent of the legislature. Furthermore, the majority reaches that erroneous conclusion by fallacious logic. That is, the majority, on the one hand strikes down as unconstitutional the last sentence of Section 563.2(k) which provides, “No party, other than the authority, shall have any standing to seek any relief in any court of this Commonwealth under this [Section 563.2(k) ]”, and then uses that very same sentence to support its refusal to apply the valid and constitutional portion of Section 563.2(k) that mandates, with*436out exception, final and binding interest arbitration anytime and everytime an injunction enjoining a strike is issued. The majority cannot have it both ways.

IV.

Next, the Chancellor's order prohibiting public statements on the continuing court supervised negotiations violates Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides, inter aha, that “All courts shall be open”. Additionally, the Chancellor’s order constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint and is violative of Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.... (Emphasis supplied)

See Commonwealth v. French, — Pa. -, 611 A.2d 175 (1992). The Commonwealth Court’s order which mandates court supervised collective bargaining sessions declares that such sessions shall be a continuation of the public hearing which began on April 7, 1992. By that order, the court has designated the bargaining sessions as proceedings of the judicial branch of government. Thus, the provisions of Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution specifically forbid the prohibition on public statements imposed by the court’s order.

Further, the Commonwealth Court’s order constitutes a prior restraint in violation of First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

“ ‘Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this [or any] Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,’ “the State” ’ carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.’ ” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. *437713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L.Ed 2d 822, 824-825 (1971) (per curiam, quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1578, 29 L.Ed.2d 1, 5-6 (1971). See Also: Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). As a general rule, the press is free to publish that which transpires during a public hearing and cannot be subjected to prior restraint with respect thereto. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311, 97 S.Ct. 1045, 1047, 51 L.Ed 2d 355, 358 (1977). That which occurs in a public courtroom is public property. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1516, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, 613 (1966); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1254, 91 L.Ed. 1546, 1551 (1947). Absent a state interest of the highest order, the state may not prevent or punish the publication of truthful information of public significance which has been lawfully obtained. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-102, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 2670, 61 L.Ed 2d 399, 404 (1979). ‘[E]ven a short-lived “gag” order in a case of widespread concern to the community constitutes a substantial prior restraint and causes irreparable injury to First Amendment interests as long as it remains in effect.’ Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole ... 463 U.S. [1303] at [1304], 103 S.Ct. [3524] at 3525, 77 L.Ed 2d [1284] at 1287 [ (1983) ].

Commonwealth v. Genovese, 337 Pa.Super.Ct. 485, 493, 487 A.2d 364, 368 (1985).

The majority declined to address this issue for the reason that “neither of the parties has asserted that the Commonwealth Court has denied it authorization to make any public statements upon request.” I believe that the ostrich position adopted by the majority with respect to the restraint on speech ordered by the Chancellor is erroneous. The mere fact that the parties must obtain the Commonwealth Court’s permission to make or publish a statement is an unlawful prior restraint and violates Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

*438V.

Finally, the majority’s opinion in this case renders the Port Authority Transit workers as the only public employees in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who are effectively deprived of the right to strike and have no right to binding arbitration. For example, Act 195, the Public Employe Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 1101.101, et seq. provides public employees, such as school teachers, with the right to strike after the required collective bargaining processes have been used and exhausted. 43 P.S. § 1101.1003. Those public employees who, under Act 195, are excepted from the right to strike, such as prison guards, mental hospital guards and court personnel, have their labor disputes resolved by binding arbitration. 43 P.S. § 1101.805. Procedures involving collective bargaining by policemen and firemen are mandated by Act 111, 43 P.S. § 217.1, et seq. Act 111 provides that labor disputes which have reached an impasse in bargaining shall be resolved by binding arbitration. 43 P.S. § 217.4.

Under the majority’s holding today that the inconveniences and hardships resulting from the transit strike constitute a clear and present danger to the health, safety and welfare of the public, and its construction of Section 563.2(k) of the Port Authority Act, the Port Authority Transit employees are left naked. They are effectively deprived of the right to strike and stripped of their right to binding arbitration. Now, there is no incentive for the Port Authority to bargain in good faith to avert a strike. The majority’s opinion encourages the Port Authority to hold fast to its bargaining position, whether it be reasonable or unreasonable, and wait until the transit workers call for a work stoppage and go out on strike. As soon as a strike impacts upon the the public with the inconveniences, delays and hardships that are inherent in such a work stoppage, the Port Authority is further encouraged to do nothing and wait for political pressure to build and cause a third party in interest, such as the City of Pittsburgh, to seek an injunction which has the twofold result of curtailing the strike and emasculating the transit workers’ statutory right to final and binding interest arbitration. It is beyond all possibility that *439the Legislature intended such a result. The majority, in singling out these public employees as a unique class effectively unable to strike and deprived of the right of final and binding interest arbitration, violates the constitutional mandate of equal protection guaranteed by Article I, § 26, Pennsylvania Constitution and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.

For all of the above reasons, I dissent.

NIX, C.J., joins in parts I, II, and III of this dissenting opinion.