dissenting.
In essence, the majority says that the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBR) requires a whole new trial — an administrative one this time — to determine whether Robert A. Jones has, indeed, committed the felonies he was already adjudged to have committed in a Maryland court of law. Until then, according to the majority, Jones is entitled to remain an officer of the law. The General Assembly could not have intended such a result.
We must remember Jones’ guilt is not in question. His culpability for violating the laws of this state by purveying child pornography was determined beyond a reasonable doubt in a two-day circuit court trial. He waived his right to appeal those verdicts. Jones was also punished for his transgressions when the trial judge ordered him to perform *491200 hours of community service and pay a $500 fine. But because the judge granted Jones probation before judgment — and only because of that — the majority finds that he was not “convicted” and is entitled to remain a law enforcement officer until he gets an administrative hearing to determine his guilt yet again. Surely the legislature did not intend to subject the witnesses to the possible trauma and inconvenience of another hearing, to force the government to again marshal the evidence used to convict, and to require a new hearing to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the exact same issue that has already been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, solely because the trial judge imposed a sentence of probation before judgment.
On January 12,1990, Jones was charged with the felonies of distribution and possession with intent to distribute child pornography in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1992 RepLVol.), Article 27, § 419A. On January 18, 1990, while the charges were pending, Jones was suspended without pay by the chief of police (in Baltimore City the chief of police is designated as police commissioner) and that suspension was ratified after a hearing pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1992 RepLVol.), Art. 27, § 734A(3), which provides:
“(i) Emergency suspension of police powers without pay may be imposed by the chief if a law enforcement officer has been charged with the commission of a felony.
(ii) Any person so suspended shall be entitled to a prompt hearing.”
On September 7, 1990, at a court trial in the circuit court, Jones was found guilty of distribution of child pornography and of possession with intent to distribute child pornography. Both charges are felonies and each carries up to ten years imprisonment. Jones’ sentencing was set for December 18, 1990. After Jones’ trial, but before his sentencing, the chief of police acting in reliance on Md.Code (1957,1992 RepLVol.), Art. 27, § 730(c) terminated Jones’ employment as a police officer. That section of the Code provides that a law enforcement officer may be terminated without a hear*492ing if the officer has been charged and “convicted” of a felony. It states:
“Hearings for convicted felons. — A law enforcement officer is not entitled to a hearing under this section if the law enforcement officer has been charged and convicted of a felony.”
At his sentencing, Jones received three years supervised probation before judgment (PBJ) pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 641. He was also fined $500 and required to perform 200 hours of community service. Art. 27, § 641(a) states in pertinent part:
“Whenever a person accused of a crime ... is found guilty of an offense, a court exercising criminal jurisdiction, if satisfied that the best interests of the person and the welfare of the people of the State would be served thereby, and with the written consent of the person after determination of guilt ... may stay the entering of judgment, defer further proceedings, and place the person on probation subject to reasonable terms and conditions as appropriate.” (Emphasis added).
By accepting PBJ, Jones conceded the finality of the verdicts of guilty because, in order to receive PBJ, Jones had to both consent to that disposition and waive his right to appeal the verdicts.
Jones then filed a petition for writ of mandamus alleging that the police department violated his constitutional and statutory rights by refusing to reinstate him and give him back pay. His complaint alleged that, since he received PBJ, he no longer is “charged with” and was not “convicted” of any crimes; therefore, he should not have been terminated without a hearing and is entitled to reinstatement, as well as back pay and benefits.
The City objects to readjudicating the same factual finding of guilt that the circuit court found beyond a reasonable doubt. The full hearing under the LEOBR to which the majority holds Jones is entitled is a two-stage process. The first stage requires a finding of guilty or not guilty, simply *493a redetermination of what the circuit court has already decided beyond a reasonable doubt. The second stage, if there is a finding of guilty, is for the board to make a nonbinding recommendation of sanctions to the chief, and for the chief to make the decision whether to dismiss. Art. 27, § 731(a) provides in pertinent part:
“Any decision, order, or action taken as a result of the hearing shall be in writing and shall be accompanied by findings of fact. The findings shall consist of a concise statement upon each issue in the case. A finding of not guilty terminates the action. If a finding of guilt is made, the hearing board shall reconvene the hearing, receive evidence, and consider the law enforcement officer’s past job performance and other relevant information as factors before making its recommendations to the chief.”
The City concedes that termination of even a convicted felon is not mandatory, and is willing to give Jones a stage-two LEOBR hearing and allow him an opportunity to establish that, in spite of the guilty verdicts, he ought to be reinstated. The City is unwilling to, and should not have to, give Jones a stage-one LEOBR hearing to redetermine guilt.
The primary purpose of a stage-one LEOBR hearing is to make a finding of guilty or not guilty and then, if the finding is guilty, submit a non-binding recommendation as to punishment to the chief of police. See DiGrazia v. County Exec, for Mont. Co., 288 Md. 437, 440-41, 418 A.2d 1191, 1194 (1980). The hearing board is to make “findings of fact” on “each issue in the case.” Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 731(a). In essence, the administrative hearing would be duplicative of the criminal trial and would provide appellant no more protection than did the criminal trial itself. On the other hand, requiring an agency to hold a hearing to consider the same facts a second time will consume considerable time of police personnel, the city attorney, the state police investigator, and the three ranking officers of other municipal departments who serve as *494the hearing board. Relitigating guilt would also cause witnesses to suffer needless trauma and inconvenience.
The City is willing, and arguably may be required under other provisions of the LEOBR, to give Jones a hearing similar to the post-suspension hearing under § 734A(3)(ii) to consider whether, despite the finding of guilty, he should be reinstated. The City should not be required to give Jones a new administrative stage-one hearing to simply redetermine “guilt” because Jones has already been adjudicated guilty by the circuit court. Jones acknowledges the City’s offer of a “name clearing” hearing; he even states in his brief that this hearing “probably would have provided Officer Jones with the procedural safeguards mandated by the LEOBR.” His contention is that, since he is no longer “charged” and he was not “convicted,” he is automatically entitled to reinstatement, back pay, and a whole new hearing to determine guilt.
This Court has emphasized that “the word ‘conviction’ has different meanings and may vary according to the context and purpose of the statute in which it appears. We [have] noted that probation before judgment was a conviction in certain instances, but not a conviction in others.” Shilling v. State, 320 Md. 288, 296, 577 A.2d 83, 87 (1990) (citing Myers v. State, 303 Md. 639, 496 A.2d 312 (1985)). In State v. Hannah, 307 Md. 390, 514 A.2d 16 (1986), we held that probation before judgment was a “final judgment,” and although the defendant may not appeal because of the required waiver of appeal, the State may appeal from this “final judgment” when the court imposes PBJ in violation of a statute.
“[I]n its general and popular sense ‘conviction’ means the establishment of guilt prior to, and independent of, the judgment of the court.” Myers, 303 Md. at 642, 496 A.2d at 313, and cases cited therein. “By contrast, in its legal and technical sense this term means the final judgment and sentence rendered by a court pursuant to a verdict or plea of guilty, and it is frequently used to denote the judgment or sentence.” Id. at 642-43, 496 A.2d at 313-14. This *495Court has, as has the General Assembly, sometimes used the word “conviction” in its “general and popular sense” to mean the verdict of guilty alone, rather than the verdict coupled with the sentence. For a few recent examples see Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 492, 597 A.2d 956, 957 (1991) (the defendant was “convicted by a jury”); Richardson v. State, 324 Md. 611, 613, 598 A.2d 180,181 (1991) (defendant was “convicted by a jury”); Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 4, 595 A.2d 448, 449 (1991) (the defendant was “convicted by a jury”); Biggus v. State, 323 Md. 339, 345, 593 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1991) (The circuit court imposed two consecutive ten-year prison sentences for the two sexual offense “convictions” and merged “conviction” on the other count. For the conviction on the weapons charge, the defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment.); White v. State, 322 Md. 738, 740, 589 A.2d 969, 970 (1991) (defendant was “convicted of murder and related offenses by a jury”); Johnson v. State, 321 Md. 694, 695, 584 A.2d 700, 701 (1991) (defendant was “convicted by a jury”).
In Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578 (1979), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 960,101 S.Ct. 1419, 67 L.Ed.2d 384 (1981), the defendant was found guilty, but not criminally responsible by reason of insanity. The guilty finding without sentence, indeed without criminal culpability, was found to be a “conviction.” We stated:
“Despite the lack of a ‘sentence’ in the context of punishment inflicted, the determination of the trial court as to the disposition of the defendant is as final a judgment following the conviction as if a sentence inflicting punishment had been imposed.” (Emphasis added).
Id. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583.
Jones does not contend that any provision of the PBJ statute precludes his guilty verdict from being treated as a conviction. He recognizes, as does the majority opinion, that whether the legislatively created disposition of PBJ is meant to be a “conviction” as used in the LEOBR is a question of legislative intent. The majority opinion reaches the conclusion that
*496“the legislature intended the preclusive effect of § 730(c) of the LEOBR to operate only when the conviction of a law enforcement officer for a felony was a conviction in the legal and technical sense, i.e., a judgment of conviction. The context and legislative history of § 730(c) do not suggest a contrary result____”
(326 Md. at 489, 606 A.2d at 218). I believe an examination of the context and legislative history of § 730(c) in fact indicates that the legislature intended “conviction” to have its common meaning of verdict rather than its technical meaning of verdict plus sentence. That section was introduced in the 1986 session of the Maryland legislature as House Bill 439 at the request of the Maryland Municipal League (MML). The purpose of the bill was specifically addressed in a letter from MML to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, dated January 30, 1986. MML wrote:
“HB 439 is a reasonable bill that eliminates an unnecessary and expensive hearing without lessening an officer’s due process protections. Conviction of a police officer for a serious criminal offense is rare, but when it occurs the public should not have to pay the expenses for a hearing on facts already settled in a criminal trial.” (Emphasis added).
The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee embraced that proposition and stated:
“This bill eliminates an unnecessary and expensive hearing without lessening the officer’s due process protections. When a police officer is convicted of a serious criminal offense, the public should not have to pay the expense of a hearing on facts already settled in a criminal trial.
******
The intent of this bill is to provide that a law enforcement officer convicted of a felony is not entitled to a hearing under the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights. The purpose of the bill is to eliminate an expensive and unnecessary hearing.” (Emphasis added). *497General Assembly of Maryland, Committee Report System, Summary of Committee Report, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, House Bill 439 Reported Favorably (31 March 1986).
An obvious purpose of § 730(c) is to protect the public from police officers who commit felonies. The chief of police can suspend without pay a police officer who is charged with a felony. I believe the chief of police has a parallel right to discharge a police officer adjudicated guilty of that felony prior to, and regardless of, the sentence imposed. A mere charge of a felony is sufficient to authorize suspension of a police officer without pay. The mere adjudication of guilt in a circuit court ought to be sufficient to authorize termination.
PBJ requires that the defendant be adjudicated guilty either by plea or trial. PBJ may, however, indicate that the defendant does not deserve the full measure of punishment and stigma that the crime ordinarily carries. Whether PBJ constitutes a “conviction” depends on the legislative intent when using the word “conviction.” If “conviction” was intended to mean the factual finding that the crime was committed, PBJ should be a “conviction.” If “conviction” was intended to mean the determination that the crime was committed by a person who deserves all of the punishment and stigma ordinarily resulting from an adjudication of guilty, then PBJ would not be included as a conviction. When “conviction” is used in a statute, we must search for legislative intent with respect to the meaning of the word.
By focusing on the PBJ, the majority exalts the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings and forgets the critical element before us: that Jones is guilty of the crimes charged. Whatever value this focus on PBJ may have in other contexts, it has no place in evaluating Jones’ LEOBR claims. I believe the issue is not merely whether PBJ was intended to be a “conviction,” but is more precisely whether the verdict of guilty was intended to be a “conviction.” The majority holds that the legislature intended that there can be no termination of a police officer’s employment despite a *498plea of guilty or a verdict of guilt of even the most severe felony unless and until the officer is sentenced for the felony. Thus, a police officer adjudicated guilty of a felony who is remanded to jail pending sentencing cannot be terminated because there has been no “conviction,” and even though in jail pending sentencing, the person remains a police officer until again adjudicated guilty at a police trial board hearing or until sentenced to something other than PBJ. It seems more logical that the legislature intended that the chief of police have the authority to terminate any police officer found guilty of a felony. Police officers should be law-abiding people in whom the public can place confidence and trust. In holding that a police officer cannot be fired immediately after being adjudicated guilty of a felony, this Court threatens the public’s right to be assured that police officers are men and women of moral integrity. I see no reason why termination without a hearing should await sentencing and why a whole new determination of guilt should be required solely because the trial judge chose one sentencing option (PBJ) over another.
In Gunning v. Codd, 65 A.D.2d 415, 411 N.Y.S.2d 280, 283 (1978), the court stated, “We cannot agree that a jury verdict of guilty in a felony case can on one hand label the offender as unfit to hold office and, on the other, say he may continue in public office until sentenced.” On further appeal to the state’s highest court, that court noted that the vacatur of public office is absolute upon conviction, and subsequent events, such as a stay of execution of judgment or even reversal of conviction on appeal, do not affect the vacatur. Gunning v. Codd, 49 N.Y.2d 495, 427 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210, 403 N.E.2d 1208 (1980). The Gunning court reasoned that, “to await vacatur of a public office until judgment is entered, moreover, would unconscionably reward those who, despite having breached the public trust, may purposefully delay sentencing and thwart public policy.” 427 N.Y.S.2d at 211, 403 N.E.2d at 1210. Additionally the court said:
*499“Once the jury determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that petitioner committed a felony, public policy demands that his position be vacated immediately---- By the same token, to permit a public officer, found guilty by a jury of his peers, to remain in office pending sentencing and thereby afford him the opportunity to obtain a lifetime pension would circumvent the clearly defined purpose of [New York’s] Public Officers Law. Such a result simply cannot be tolerated.”
Id.
If “conviction” is given its everyday meaning, it implies that adjudication of guilt of a felony is sufficient to discharge a law enforcement officer regardless of the sentence imposed. The General Assembly gave the chief of police the power to terminate based on the felonious conduct that formed the basis of the guilty verdict. This interpretation neither alters protections afforded an officer during an investigation nor affects rights during interrogation. It simply allows agency personnel to terminate a law enforcement officer who is adjudicated to be a felonious law breaker, regardless of the particular sentence imposed.
Although accepting Jones’ argument that, since he was given PBJ he was not “convicted,” the majority fails to address Jones’ contention that, since he was not “convicted,” he must be reinstated with back pay. It is unclear if the majority is suggesting that Jones’ “charges” and accompanying suspension without pay should continue for the entire three years of his probation, or if it is suggesting that, since he had a trial and was not “convicted,” Jones may be eligible for full reinstatement and back pay, especially if at his new hearing the City is unable to secure all of the witnesses and evidence to again prove Jones is guilty of the felonies.
It is clear that after the guilty verdicts, if Jones’ fine and probation had not been “before judgment,” Jones would be “convicted” and could be discharged without a hearing. For the reasons stated, I do not believe that, merely because the judge chose to label the fine and probation *500“before judgment,” there must be a full new administrative hearing to once again determine if Jones is guilty of these heinous felonies as a precondition to the chief of police being able to discharge Jones. Where a police officer has received due process in a criminal trial, no need exists, regardless of the sentence imposed, to provide the officer with a second opportunity to relitigate issues that were considered during the trial and resulted in a finding of guilt. I respectfully dissent. Judges KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.