with whom CLIFFORD, Justice, joins, concurring.
I concur in affirming the decision of the Appellate Division in this case. I write separately only because I do not agree with the conceptual basis of the Court's opinion. Specifically, Folsom’s appeal does not involve an exception to the so-called “comparative medical evidence rule.”
Before the 1981 amendments, and before our decision in Haney v. Lane Construction Corp., 422 A.2d 1292 (Me.1980), we had recognized the dual nature of earning incapacity. See e.g. Dailey v. Pinecap Inc., 321 A.2d 492 (Me.1974); Connelly’s Case, 122 Me. 289, 119 A. 664 (1923). The two appeals of Dale Folsom are examples of each aspect of earning incapacity. In Folsom v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 432 A.2d 1244 (Me.1981), Folsom challenged only a finding of diminished medical disability. Despite the fact that the Commissioner had denied NET’S petition for review, we vacated the decision because of the absence of comparative medical evidence to show that Folsom’s medical condi*1039tion had improved. We referred to comparative medical evidence because it was Folsom’s medical condition that, was at issue. In contrast, Folsom’s present appeal concerns the economic aspect of earning incapacity, i.e. the availability of work within Folsom’s physical limitations. See Dailey, 321 A.2d at 495.
The notion that a petition for review, whether initiated by an employee or an employer, carries with it the burden of proving by comparative evidence a change in earning incapacity is not a novel doctrine. It is based on the common sense proposition of avoiding relitigation of matters already settled. Haney, 422 A.2d at 1294. Unfortunately, because change in medical condition is most frequently at issue, the requirement of comparative evidence became commonly called the “comparative medical evidence rule.” We first used the phrase “comparative medical evidence” in Van Horn v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 392 A.2d 52 (Me.1978). In that case the change of circumstances at issue involved only Van Horn’s medical condition. Prior to 1981, we referred to comparative medical evidence only regarding an employee’s medical condition. See Haney, 422 A.2d at 1295; Hamilton v. Dexter Shoe, 402 A.2d 854, 856 (Me.1979); Van Horn, 392 A.2d at 54.
Folsom does not challenge the sufficiency of comparative evidence concerning his improved economic circumstances. Instead, he relies on the 1981 amendments to argue that any petition for review after NET’S first petition must be based solely on comparative medical evidence. That is undoubtedly the plain language of subsection 100(2)(B), but it is not the Legislature’s meaning.
In P.L.1981 ch. 514, § 4 (eff. September 18, 1981), the Legislature sought to encourage early agreement on degree of incapacity by relaxation of the comparative evidence requirement. Pursuant to subsection 100(2)(A), the first petition for review would involve only a determination of the employee's then degree of incapacity. In subsection 100(2)(B) the Legislature intended to restore to the petitioner on any subsequent petition the burden of establishing a change of circumstances. Prior to the 1981 amendments, that burden could be met by evidence showing a change in medical condition or a change in availability of work commensurate with the employee’s physical limitation. Permitting subsequent petitions to be based only on a change in medical condition would lead to absurd results, contrary to the purpose of the Legislature.