[¶ 1] Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Co. appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Humphrey, J.) in favor of Gregory L. Butterfield, on three counts of Butterfield’s five-count complaint. Norfolk argues that the court erred by holding that provisions of the automobile insurance policy, issued by Norfolk, violate Maine’s uninsured motorist statute, 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902(1) (2000), impermissibly limiting *862Gregory’s recovery to injury or damages sustained by persons named in the contract. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
[¶ 2] This case presents a narrow, yet important, question. Previously, we have held that when an uninsured motorist policy tracks the language in Maine’s uninsured motorist statute, liability extends to cover not only named insureds, but any individual for whom a named insured is legally entitled to bring a claim for damages caused by an uninsured motorist. Jack v. Tracy, 1999 ME 13, 722 A.2d 869. The Superior Court addressed the question that necessarily follows: may an insurer use limiting language in an uninsured motorist policy, restricting its coverage to claims brought by named insureds, for injuries sustained by named insureds? We now hold that insurers may not limit uninsured motorist coverage by adding restrictive language to their uninsured motorist policies.1
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 3] Gregory’s twenty-one-year-old daughter, Brandy, died in an automobile accident. Both the vehicle in which Brandy was a passenger and the driver of the other vehicle were uninsured. Gregory is a named insured on an automobile insurance policy issued by Norfolk. He filed a claim with Norfolk for all damages he was legally entitled to recover due to the death of Brandy. Norfolk denied Gregory’s claims, citing language in his policy that limited uninsured motorist recovery to injuries sustained by “insured persons,” or family members within the policy’s definition. The policy defines family members as persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, who reside with the insured. Thus, because Brandy did not reside with Gregory, she was not a named insured under his policy. Gregory sought a declaratory judgment that Norfolk was liable.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 4] “[W]e look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language as a means of effecting the legislative intent.” State v. Shepley, 2003 ME 70, ¶ 12, 822 A.2d 1147, 1151 (quoting Pennings v. Pennings, 2002 ME 3, ¶ 13, 786 A.2d 622, 627) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Unless the statute itself discloses a contrary intent, words in a statute must be given their plain, common, and ordinary meaning, such as [people] of common intelligence would usually ascribe to them.” State v. Vainio, 466 A.2d 471, 474 (Me.1983). An insurance policy incorporates all the relevant mandatory provisions of the statute pursuant to which the policy was drafted. Skidgell v. Universal Underuniters Ins. Co., 1997 ME 149, ¶ 7, 697 A.2d 831, 833. The interpretation of section 2902(1) is a question of law, which we review de novo. See State v. McLaughlin, 2002 ME 55, ¶ 5, 794 A.2d 69, 72.
[¶ 5] Maine law requires that any automobile insurance policy, insuring against liability, include coverage for “the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured, underinsured or hit-and-run motor vehicles, for bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured, underinsured or hit-and-run motor vehicle.” 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902(1). We have held that:
*863In contrast with the liberal construction to be given the remedial statute mandating uninsured motorist coverage in all liability insurance policies issued with respect to any vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state ... courts, in order to carry out the primary purpose of such legislation, will construe conditions and exceptions of the insurance contract, inserted therein in an attempt to limit the coverage prescribed by the statute, strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.
Wescott v. Allstate Ins., 397 A.2d 156, 167 (Me.1979).
[¶ 6] Norfolk’s uninsured motorist policy does not precisely track Maine’s uninsured motorist law. Under Maine’s uninsured motorist statute, insurance policies issued in this State must include “protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from ... uninsured, underinsured or hit-and-run motor vehicles, for bodily injury.” 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902(1). Norfolk’s policy deviates by limiting uninsured motorist coverage to damages an insured is legally entitled to recover because of bodily injury “sustained by an insured.” Had Norfolk’s policy tracked section 2902(1) without qualification, there is no question that Gregory would be able to recover for the death of Brandy, even though she was not a named insured under the policy. See Jack, 1999 ME 13, ¶ 12, 722 A.2d at 871-72.
[¶ 7] Norfolk relies heavily on cases from other jurisdictions, asserting that the Superior Court’s holding runs counter to a majority view.2 In order to understand why Norfolk’s phalanx of authority is ultimately unpersuasive, a closer look into the past and present of uninsured motorist jurisprudence is helpful.
[¶ 8] Uninsured motorist coverage is a relatively recent development. “In 1955, certain auto insurance companies — in an evident effort to stave off the adoption by states of either compulsory insurance or unsatisfied judgment measures — began to offer uninsured motorist coverage in their own auto policies.”3 Due to increasing costs attributed to uninsured motorists, the majority of states currently require that insurers at least offer uninsured motorist coverage.4
[¶ 9] States adopting uninsured motorist legislation typically used similar or identical language, which insurers have often tracked in the policies they issue. The proliferation of similarly worded uninsured motorist statutes and policies have encouraged courts and litigants to attempt to distill a majority position. The results are *864often misleading, however, as the cases may address different issues, and often base their holdings on legal and policy precedents that are not universally accepted.
[¶ 10] It is necessary, at the outset, to distinguish between two distinct issues. The first and primary issue is whether coverage under a particular uninsured motorist statute and policy extends to cover situations where a named insured brings a claim (usually under a wrongful death theory) based on damages caused by an uninsured motorist when the victim is not named in the policy. The second issue (before us today) is whether, having found that a particular uninsured motorist statute does extend to such claims, may an insurer refuse to insure against these claims by inserting limiting language to its uninsured motorist insurance policies. The first issue is one of scope, whereas the second asks whether the recognized scope may be contractually curtailed.5
[¶ 11] In most of the cases cited by Norfolk, courts are grappling with the first issue, involving scope. The resolution of this fundamental question usually turns on how the jurisdiction has historically approached the interpretation of insurance contracts and statutes. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hammonds, 72 Wash.App. 664, 865 P.2d 560, 563-64 (1994); Gaddis v. Safeco Ins. Co., 58 Wash.App. 537, 794 P.2d 533, 536-37 (1990) (discussing that court’s history of upholding insurance exclusions that bear a relationship to an increased risk borne by an insurer); Valiant Ins. Co. v. Webster, 567 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.1990) (stating that Florida courts have “consistently followed the principle that if the liability portions of an insurance policy would be applicable to a particular accident, the uninsured motorist provisions would likewise be applicable; whereas, if the liability provisions did not apply to a given accident, the uninsured motorist provisions [did not apply]”). Thus, those courts relied upon their respective precedents and policy determinations in resolving the primary question of how far the Legislature intended uninsured motorist laws to reach.
[¶ 12] Any comparison with other jurisdictions must begin with the recognition that we have already interpreted Maine’s uninsured motorist statute to extend coverage to wrongful death claims caused by an uninsured motorist, when the deceased was not an insured under the claimant’s policy.6 Of the cases cited by Norfolk, two appear to be irrelevant;7 two come from jurisdictions that allow an insured to opt out of uninsured motorist coverage;8 another two involve insurance policies that track the states’ uninsured motorist law without limiting language (posing the pre*865cise question addressed by this court in Jack)-,9 and three appear to be on point, involving similar statutes and policies, however containing decisions based on interpretations of the respective states’ uninsured motorist statutes, which conflict with this Court’s analysis in Jack.10” Therefore, none of these cases are particularly helpful in interpreting Maine’s uninsured motorist statute.
[¶ 13] The case before us is informed by a series of cases in which we have interpreted uninsured motorist insurance contracts. In Jack we were faced with facts identical to those involved in the present case: a father sought compensation under his uninsured motorist policy for the wrongful death of his daughter at the hands of an uninsured motorist. In Jack, we were called upon to interpret the meaning of an insurance contract containing language that tracked our uninsured motorist statute.11 The policy in Jack stated that:
[Allstate] will pay damages for bodily injury, sickness, disease or death which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto. Injury must be caused by accident and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured auto.
Jack, 1999 ME 13, ¶ 4, 722 A.2d at 870.
[¶ 14] Relying on the plain language cited above, we held that Allstate’s policy required that it compensate its insured for the wrongful death of the insured’s daughter. See Jack, 1999 ME 13, ¶¶ 9-12, 722 A.2d at 871-72. The operative words in the contract were those extending coverage for claims the insured was legally entitled to bring. We have recently reaffirmed this holding: “[A]n insured heir with a claim against an uninsured tortfeasor ... sufficiently states a claim recognized under Maine law.” Flaherty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 ME 72, ¶22, 822 A.2d 1159, 1168 (citing Jack, 1999 ME 13, ¶¶9-12, 722 A.2d at 871-72).
[¶ 15] Possibly in response to this line of cases, insurers began adding limiting language in their insurance contracts. The policy language before us today states that Norfolk covers “damages ... an insured is legally entitled to recover ... because of bodily injury ... sustained by an insured” (emphasis added). The policy still attempts to comply with the requirements in our uninsured motorist statute while simultaneously avoiding the result reached in Jack and Flaherty by requiring that the injured person be an insured. The ques*866tion before us today, therefore, is whether insurers can avoid the result reached in Jack and Flaherty by adding limiting language to their uninsured motorist policies. Put another way: does Maine’s uninsured motorist statute, 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902, require that insurers provide uninsured motorist coverage in situations like those found in Jack; Flaherty, and the present case?
[¶ 16] This is a question of statutory interpretation. It is clear that liability does not flow from Norfolk’s policy, and we must now decide whether this is an impermissible limitation on uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to section 2902. We must pick up where we left off: in Jack, 1999 ME 13, ¶ 10, 722 A.2d at 871, we recognized that an insured heir with a claim against an uninsured tortfeasor sufficiently states a claim recognized under Maine law, and that the coverage sought is a consequence of the plain language of uninsured motorist policies that (unlike Norfolk’s) track our uninsured motorist statute. Can we now hold that this coverage, though recognized, is not a requirement of our uninsured motorist statute? Applying the analysis of our previous cases, we must answer in the negative.
[¶ 17] We have said that the following “plain language” commands the type of coverage sought by the plaintiff:
[Allstate] will pay damages for bodily injury, sickness, disease or death which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto. Injury must be caused by accident and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured auto.
(Emphasis added.) Jack, 1999 ME 13, ¶ 4, 722 A.2d at 870. Interpreting this policy, we concluded that its plain language required Allstate to provide precisely the type of coverage sought in the present case. The present case turns not on the interpretation of a contract but on the meaning of the words in the statute. If section 2902 requires that insurers provide the type of coverage excised by Norfolk’s contract then the limitation cannot stand.
[¶ 18] We must interpret the uninsured motorist statute to determine whether insurers are required to provide the type of coverage that we determined flowed from Allstate’s language cited above. Section 2902(1) provides:
No policy insuring against liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this State ... unless coverage is provided ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured ... motor vehicles.
24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902(1) (emphasis added). The operative language in both the contract in Jack and the uninsured motorist statute are the same. The statute requires that insurers (at a minimum) provide coverage for persons insured who are “legally entitled” to recover from an uninsured motorist; the Allstate policy interpreted in Jack extended coverage when an insured is “legally entitled” to recover from an uninsured motorist. Interpreting this “plain language,” we concluded that coverage extended to insured persons who were legally entitled to bring a wrongful death claim as a result of the death of a person killed by an uninsured motorist.
[¶ 19] An analysis of the same language must yield the same result. Norfolk suggests that the coverage is permissible under the statute, but not required. This makes little sense as Maine’s uninsured motorist statute outlines the bare requirements that an insurer must satisfy prior to issuing a policy in Maine. If section 2902 speaks to wrongful death claims of the *867type at issue here, then it does so in the context of requiring that insurers extend coverage to this situation.
[¶ 20] Uninsured motorist policies originally tracked the language in uninsured motorist statutes not because they wanted to adopt greater coverage than was required under the statute, but rather in an attempt to comply with the minimum requirements of the law. Unless we retreat from our interpretation of the policy language in Jack, we cannot now hold that the same words create a different result. The Legislature has set standards for minimal coverage. Insurers must meet that standard. Norfolk’s policy does not meet the requirements of section 2902.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting: CLIFFORD and ALEXANDER, JJ.
. Because we affirm the Superior Court's decision, we do not address Gregory’s alternative argument that he is entitled to relief based on an independent claim for emotional distress pursuant to the plain wording of his uninsured motorist policy.
. Delancey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 491 (5th Cir.1990); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wainscott, 439 F.Supp. 840 (D.Alaska 1977); Bartning v. State Farm Fire & Cos., 164 Ariz. 370, 793 P.2d 127 (Ct.App.1990); Smith v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 186 Cal.App.3d 239, 230 Cal.Rptr. 495 (1986); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Chacon, 939 P.2d 517 (Colo.Ct.App.1997); Valiant Ins. Co. v. Webster, 567 So.2d 408 (Fla.1990); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. George, 326 Ill.App.3d 1065, 261 Ill.Dec. 236, 762 N.E.2d 1163 (2002); Ivey v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 569 N.E.2d 692 (Ind.Ct.App.1991); Lafleur v. Fid. & Cas. Ins. Co. of New York, 385 So.2d 1241 (La.Ct.App.1980); Gillespie v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 343 So.2d 467 (Miss. 1977); Livingston v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 444 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Gamboa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 756, 726 P.2d 1386 (1986); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hammonds, 72 Wash.App. 664, 865 P.2d 560 (1994).
. Gary T. Schwartz, Symposium: A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist Plans, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 419, 422 (1987).
. Mark Arthur Saltzman, Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group, 15 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 895 (2000) (discussing the proliferation of uninsured motorist laws).
. In other words, the issue becomes whether the scope of the uninsured motorist statute is permissive, or obligatory.
. Our holding in Jack v. Tracy, 1999 ME 13, 722 A.2d 869, thus, conflicts with settled law in jurisdictions such as Florida. "No Florida decision has allowed a survivor to recover under the wrongful death statute where the decedent could not have recovered.” Valiant Ins. Co., 567 So.2d at 411.
. Gamboa, 726 P.2d at 1387-88 (the main issue before the court was whether stacking insurance policies is permitted); Ivey, 569 N.E.2d at 694-95 (plaintiff's claim was dismissed because he had failed to appoint a personal representative within the two-year time frame required by the statute).
.Farmers Ins. Exch., 939 P.2d at 520; La-fleur, 385 So.2d at 1244-45. The decision by these states to allow their citizens to opt out of uninsured motorist coverage suggests a different legislative intent, and makes any comparison with Maine's uninsured motorist law insignificant.
. Bartning, 793 P.2d at 128-29; Auto Club Ins. Ass’n v. DeLaGarza, 433 Mich. 208, 444 N.W.2d 803, 805 (1989).
. Smith, 186 Cal.App.3d at 242-43, 230 Cal.Rptr. 495 (holding that the objective of California’s uninsured motorist laws is the protection for injuries sustained by an insured); Livingston, 927 S.W.2d at 446 (holding that the Legislature did not intend for survivors to pursue a wrongful death claim under their own uninsured motorist policy); Delancey, 918 F.2d at 495 (policyholders can never recover for injuries or death of a person not insured under the policy); Gillespie, 343 So.2d at 470 (the subject of an uninsured motorist claim must be an insured to recover under a uninsured motorist policy). Each of these decisions is based on a narrower interpretation of the respective uninsured motorist law than that adopted by us.
.Our uninsured motorist statute requires that insurers provide coverage "for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured, underinsured or hit-and-run motor vehicles, for bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured, underinsured or hit- and-run motor vehicle.” 24 — A M.R.S.A. § 2902(1) (2000) (emphasis added).