dissenting.
I hesitate to add this dissent to an already unconscionably long and tedious opinion, however I must.
It’s possible, to my mind, for a court to simply declare that certain vital statutory elements of an administrative order are missing to such a degree as to require a reversal when, in fact, these elements, for all interests and purposes, are present and the Court is actually substituting its judg*952ment for that of the Commission. I’m afraid that’s what the majority has done here.
The majority in arriving at its conclusions sets out various bits and pieces of testimony that it contends were not noticed by the Commission or applied incorrectly. Then it picks out certain findings of the Commission and faults them as either lacking substantial evidence or lacking the basic underlying findings required by APTRA § 19(e).
It must be remembered that the hearings before the Commission took 17 days. The record is as voluminous as any administrative record I have ever seen. The hearing officer’s proposed findings of fact filled some 22 legal sized pages. In its order the Commission adopted the hearing officer’s findings that there was no need for appellant’s hospital then set out its findings of ultimate facts clearly supported by the above-mentioned underlying facts.
I have no problem in finding substantial evidence to sustain the order. In addition the Commission’s findings in this case satisfy Section 16(b) of APTRA, Article 6252-13a, V.A.C.S. In Texas Savings and Loan Assoc, v. Lewis, 483 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) we found and upheld the required statutory findings of fact where the path that the agency followed could be discerned. Here the ultimate facts and the underlying facts necessary to sustain them are clearly before the Court.
It is elementary that the Commission need not accept the testimony of every expert witness appearing before it nor is it bound to notice every argument or contention submitted to it. Gerst v. Guardian Savings & Loan Association, 434 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.1968); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Lone Star Gas Co., 611 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.Civ.App.1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
I might also point out that this Court has also held that an agency is justified in denying one application which does not meet the applicable criteria and in granting another application which does meet the criteria, and this is true even though the denied application asserts a statutory preference. Strain v. Lewis, 461 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.Civ.App.1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.