■ Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Musmanno :On June 29, 1953, Dewey S. Walker, temporarily absent from the Harrisburg State Hospital, of which he was a patient, was struck by an automobile owned by Lester R. Mummert, Sr., and operated by his son, Lester R. Mummert, Jr. He was taken to the Hospital and remained there until December 17, 1955, when he was discharged as cured. On December 21, 1956, he brought suit in trespass against the Mummerts for the injuries sustained on June 29, 1953. The defendants answered and averred that the plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the Act of 1895 (P. L. 236) which requires that trespass actions be instituted within two years following the date of the alleged trespass. The plaintiff replied that he was not barred by the time limitation set out in the Act of 1895 because at the time of the accident he was non compos mentis. The Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed.
• In affirming the judgment of the Court below, this Court, speaking through the majority, says: “Of course, *153it is always unfortunate when an innocent injured party, through no fault of his own, is denied deserved compensation from a wrongdoer.” But this sincere expression of sympathy does not help the injured party. Of course, there are situations where the law is powerless to remedy a recognized wrong, but this is not this case. As far back as 1713 the Legislature of Pennsylvania provided that where a person of unsound mind is injured, “he shall be at liberty” to bring an action in trespass against the alleged wrongdoer when he shall have recovered his sanity. (1713, March 27, 1 Sm. L. 76, Sec. 5) Were we more humane, and just, in 1713 than we are in 1958?
The Act of 1713 has never been repealed. It is true that in 1895 (June 24, 1895, P. L. 236) the Legislature reduced, from 6 to 2 years, the period of time within which trespass actions may be initiated, but it did not say in that statute or any other statute that an insane person is held to the same standard of responsibility as a sane person. Nor would it be in keeping with an enlightened humanity to so legislate. A human being without a sound mind is as helpless as a ship without a rudder, as impotent as a motor vehicle with no steering gear, and as pathetic as a bird with a broken wing. An insane person does not know his rights and knows even less how to protect them.
Of course, the law provides that guardians may be appointed for the insane, but if such guardianship does not come into being, is the abused and neglected victim further to be punished because the world has forgotten him? To penalize a demented person for what he does or fails to do is like visiting punishment upon a sleeping person for his bad dreams.
The Majority cites Peterson v. Delaware River Ferry Co., 190 Pa. 364, as authority for its decision. *154That case ruled that a minor is bound by the statute of limitations as much as an adult, but it said nothing about insane persons. It did say of the Act of 1895 that “its terms are general, and make no exceptions in favor of persons under disability.” But such a statement, so far as the case at bar is. concerned, is mere obiter dictum. We are not bound to apply to one. set of facts a decision which covers a completely different set of facts.
The law should be no less correct than the signals of a lighthouse guiding a disabled ship through the night and-the' fog into port and safety. To beam a course which applies to weather and nautical cbnditions wholly different from the elements presently obtaining could send a stricken vessel onto the rocks of disaster. To apply to an insane person a set of rules which applies to sane minors is to send his ship of justice to the bottom of the sea.
There can be a vast difference between the incapacity of a sane minor and an insane person (minor or •adult). In the vast majority of cases the child has living parents or is in the custody of persons concerned about his welfare. The insane person may not. only be wholly alone but even wholly incapable of relating what has happened to others who may take an interest in his troubles.
The Majority Opinion says that “if this Court in the Peterson case was correct in assessing the legislative intent as expressed in the Act of 1895, and the failure of the 'legislature in the ensuing sixty years to amend the act suggests that the Court was, then we are not at liberty to disregard the legislative will in order to obviate anomalies created by the act.”
I cannot accept the argument that “the failure of the Legislature” to overrule a decision of this Court suggests that the Legislature has approved of what *155this Court has done. The writer of the Majority Opinion as well as the writer of this Dissenting Opinion served in the Legislature of Pennsylvania and I do not believe that he can recollect, as indeed I am certain I cannot, of any action or attitude of the General Assembly which would indicate that it undertakes to comb through the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to decide which it shall attack and which it shall let live. The Géneral Assembly is not a super-Court and this Court should not set itself up as a super-Legislature.
. When the Legislature in 1895 amended the Act of 1713 to the extent of reducing the time within which trespass actions may be brought, but in no way touched the subject of allowing persons non compos mentis to¡ bring actions after attaining sound memory, it should be assumed that it did not intend to alter this feature, of the Act of 1713. On what basis does this Court impute to the Legislature what it did not say and did not do or give any evidence of wanting to do?
The law is intended to be the essence of reason but where is the reason and where is the logic which says that the statute of limitations is tolled if an insane person’s property rights are. involved, but it is not tolled if he has been seriously injured? Is the law more concerned about a person’s house than his body? A house may burn down and still be rebuilt, but a severed leg can never be made to grow again.
The law, of course, has progressed much since 1713, but in the respect that it protects the rights of insane persons I am constrained to say that I am more pleased with the colonial legislation than I am with this Court’s legislation as manifested in the Peterson case, —the ease which the Majority regards as controlling but which I see either as not applying at all or as an auger scuttling the ship of justice of the plaintiff in the present proceedings.