concurring.
I join the majority opinion on the issue of severance. I also agree with the majority that the order for paternity testing should be vacated, and that David’s petition for bill of *488review is fatally defective. I write separately, however, because I believe that the petition is fatally defective for a reason not addressed by the majority.
In order to invoke the equitable powers of the court, the first thing a bill of review complainant must do is file a petition. Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex.1979). “This petition must allege factually and with particularity that the prior judgment was rendered as the result of fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposite party or official mistake unmixed with [the complainant’s] own negligence.” Id.
David does not allege accident or official mistake in his petition. Rather, he relies on fraud committed by the opposite party, Amanda. David asserts in his petition that:
[Amanda] precluded [David] from denying paternity of [Paul].... Specifically, [Amanda] fraudulently and wrongfully concealed her knowledge of the identity of [Paul]’s biological father, who is not [David]. Thus, [Davidjs failure to deny paternity was not the result of any negligence or fault of [David],
For the purposes of a bill of review proceeding, there are two kinds of fraud: extrinsic and intrinsic. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex.1984); Davis v. Winningham, 483 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1001-1002 (1950). Extrinsic fraud is fraud committed by the other party that:
1. prevents the losing party from either (a) knowing about a right or defense he is entitled to assert, or (b) having a fair opportunity to present such a right or defense at trial;
2. is committed outside of the trial;
3. is committed directly upon the losing party, his agent, his attorney, or one of his witnesses; and
4. is collateral to the matter that was tried, i.e., it does not relate to a subject that was actually or even potentially an issue in the trial.1
Fraud is intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, when “the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were, or could have been, litigated therein.” Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 313 (quoting Mills v. Baird, 147 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1941, writ ref'd)). In other words, intrinsic fraud relates to a matter “considered and determined” in the proceeding. Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 313. Intrinsic fraud may be perpetrated by the use of fraudulent instruments, perjured testimony, “or any matter which was actually presented to and considered by the trial court in rendering the judgment assailed.” Id. It may also be committed by misleading the adverse party, or that party’s attorney, into acquiescence and approval of an unjust settlement condition. See Bankston v. Bankston, 251 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1952, no writ).
Only the commission of extrinsic fraud will afford relief to a bill of review complainant. Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312; Alexander, 226 S.W.2d at 1002; Mills, 147 S.W.2d at 316. Fraud is extrinsic when it is “collateral to the matter tried and not something which actually or potentially was in issue in the [original] trial.” Davis, 483 S.W.2d at 537.
David’s assertions are allegations of intrinsic fraud. He alleged that Amanda concealed her knowledge of the identity of Paul’s real biological father. This alleged fraudulent act pertains to paternity, an issue involved in the original action. Paternity was an issue in the divorce, whether or not the issue was actually contested. The fact that the divorce decree declares that David is Paul’s father means that paternity is a matter that was “considered and determined” in the divorce proceeding.
Amanda’s alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic. It is not “collateral” to the matter that was tried. Rather, it relates directly to paternity, a subject that was actually an issue in the proceeding. It cannot, therefore, be extrinsic fraud.
*489I believe that David’s petition was fatally defective because it alleged only intrinsic fraud, a type of fraud that does not entitle him to relief. Because my reason for holding David’s petition fatally defective differs with the majority’s, I do not join the majority opinion on this issue, but rather concur.
. These requirements are found in, among other cases, Alexander, 226 S.W.2d at 1001, 1002 (first three requirements); Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312 (fourth requirement).