OPINION
ROBERTS, Judge.The appellant was found guilty of the offense of resisting arrest; punishment was assessed at confinement for 120 days in the county jail.
The appellant contends that the jury charge contains fundamental error in that it authorized a conviction on theories not alleged in the information. The information alleged that the appellant did:
“intentionally prevent and obstruct I. D. Phillips, a person that the [appellant] knew to be a peace officer from effecting the arrest of the [appellant], by striking I. D. Phillips with his fist.”
*516It is readily apparent that the information alleged a specific means of resisting arrest —“by striking I. D. Phillips with his fist.” The trial court’s charge failed to restrict the jury’s consideration of the various means used by the appellant in resisting the arrest to this specific use of force. Instead the court charged the jury as follows:
“Now if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 11th day of June, 1977 in Dallas County, Texas, I. D. Phillips was a peace officer, to wit, a police officer of the city of Dallas, Texas, and that the defendant, Rayford Odell Sample knew the said I. D. Phillips was then and there such peace officer, and that the said I. D. Phillips did attempt to make an arrest of Rayford Odell Sample and the defendant intentionally prevented or obstructed the said I. D. Phillips from effecting such arrest by using force against the said I. D. Phillips then you will find the defendant guilty as charged in the information, and you will make no finding in this verdict as to punishment. If you do not so find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, then you will acquit the Defendant and say by your verdict Not Guilty.” (Emphasis added.)
A charge which authorizes a conviction on theories not alleged in the indictment or information is fundamentally defective. Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). The court’s charge in the instant case failed to require the jury to find that the appellant resisted arrest by committing the act described in the information. Rather the charge authorized the jury to convict the appellant if it found that the appellant used any force in resisting the arrest. This was error. Sandig v. State, 580 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Thompson v. State, 577 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
Although the judgment must be reversed we still must address the appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient, for this ground would entitle the appellant to a judgment of acquittal rather than a new trial. Rains v. State, 604 S.W.2d 118 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). See United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 F.2d 888, 896 (5th Cir.1978).
The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the proof that he resisted arrest “by striking I. D. Phillips with his fist.” I. D. Phillips, a Dallas police officer, testified that he arrested the appellant on June 11, 1977, after the appellant refused to sign a speeding citation. The officer further testified concerning the arrest as follows:
“Q. All right. Officer, after you told the Defendant that he was under arrest, what did you do?
“A. I took hold of the Defendant’s right arm to turn him towards the squad car to search him.
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“Q. When you attempted to place the Defendant at the front of your squad car so you could search him, what did the Defendant do?
“A. When I took hold of the Defendant, he immediately tried to jerk away from me.
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“Q. Okay. And then what did the Defendant do?
“A. At that time, the Defendant swung at me with his left hand and hit me on the right side of my face.
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And on June 11, 1977, in Dallas County, Texas, did Rayford Odell Sample strike you with his fist? «©
Yes, sir, he did. >
Were you a Dallas police officer on June 11, 1977? .©
Yes, sir, I was. >
And were you trying to effect the arrest of Rayford Odell Sample on June 11, 1977, in Dallas County, Texas when you were hit by Ray-ford Odell Sample with his fist? «O
Yes, sir, I was.”
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to show that the appellant resisted arrest “by striking I. D. Phillips with his fist.” *517The State’s proof that the appellant also used other force in resisting the arrest did not render the evidence insufficient. The appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is overruled.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
DALLY, J., dissents.
Before the court en banc.