concurring, with whom NEWMAN, Chief Judge, MACK, FERREN, PRYOR and ROGERS, Associate Judges, join in Part II:
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but do not join in the majority opinion because I think, respectfully, the grounds stated do not support the result. Essentially, the majority holds that appellant’s exclusion from the portions of jury selection voir dire conducted at the bench deprived appellant of his right to participate in the exercise of peremptory challenges, and that this was so substantial a violation of his Super.Ct.Crim.R. 43 right of presence during trial that we must reverse.
I
It is the majority’s reliance on a defendant’s right to participate in exercising peremptory challenges that leads me to concur in the result only. There is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges. A trial procedure which omitted them entirely could certainly pass the constitutional due process test of fundamental fairness. See United States v. Washington, 227 U.S. App.D.C. 184, 192-93 n. 5, 705 F.2d 489, 497-98 n. 5 (1983). A regular trial court practice of excluding defendants from the peremptory challenge process would not provide the grounds for a successful constitutional attack.
*1143I realize that the majority opinion has not relied upon a constitutional violation to reverse, but instead has relied upon its construction of Rule 43(a). The majority opinion says that Rule 43(a) has “constitutional underpinnings” (majority, supra at 1137), a statement that this court has made in previous cases. Brodis v. United States, 468 A.2d 1335, 1336 (D.C.1983); Welch v. United States, 466 A.2d 829, 838 (D.C.1983). I think that to decide this case we have to determine how much of a criminal defendant’s right of presence is merely rule-created, and how much is constitutional underpinning. I take this view because I think this court has a certain flexibility in its interpretation of Rule 43(a), but that it does not have the power to construe Rule 43(a) in such a way as to invade the rule’s constitutional underpinnings.
It is noteworthy that there is pending before this court a request by the judges of the Superior Court to modify Rule 43(a) to permit the Superior Court to continue to use the so-called Ridley1 practice of having the defendant remain at counsel table while sensitive portions of jury selection voir dire are held at the bench.2 If there is no constitutional requirement that defendant be able to see and hear each and every part of the voir dire, through presence at the bench or some other equally effective means, then this court is free to grant the Superior Court’s request to amend Rule 43(a) in the fashion requested and is equally free to construe the present language of Rule 43(a) in a manner that takes into account the difficulties that trial judges may encounter in complying with a strict requirement of presence. See generally Robinson v. United States, 456 A.2d 848, 849-50 (D.C.1983) (Belson, J., statement upon denial of rehearing en banc).
II
I think the practice that the trial judge followed in the instant case — in essence the practice proposed in the rule amendment— violates the Constitution. The majority opinion today does not take up the question whether defendant’s presence at the bench is required so that he may effectively exercise his strikes for cause. I think that question is squarely presented by this appeal. It is, to me, apparent that matters can arise at voir dire bench conferences which may directly affect the defendant’s exercise of challenges for cause. It is equally apparent that such matters will not always be of a purely legal nature and thus susceptible to handling by counsel without the assistance of defendant, but instead will frequently involve factual matters relating to jurors’ qualifications concerning which the defendant will be better informed and therefore able to make a significant contribution. A juror being examined at the bench may give answers concerning persons, places, or events that would mean nothing to counsel, but would alert defendant to the existence of a ground for challenge for cause. As the majority opinion points out, Justice Cardozo wrote in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), that “defense may be made easier if the accused is permitted to be present at the examination of jurors ..., for it will be in his power, if present, to give advice or suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct the trial himself.”
In challenges for cause, we are not dealing with mere matters of grace extended to defendants by the legislature and capable of being withdrawn by the legislature. We are dealing with the question whether a given juror is competent and qualified to serve in the trial of a particular case. Thus, the defendant’s inability to participate implicates due process rights and deprives the proceeding of fundamental fairness. Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have held that limita*1144tions on the defendant’s freedom to inquire into veniremen’s bias may violate the defendant’s due process and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973) (unanimous holding that state trial judge violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by disallowing voir dire questions on racial prejudice); Harvin v. United States, 297 A.2d 774 (D.C.1972) (trial judge who sharply restricted voir dire questioning on bias violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, a fundament of our legal system). See also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1634, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored.”); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) (in face of clear evidence that panel members were biased, trial court committed constitutional error in refusing to strike them for cause); Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 333-35 (D.C.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092, 100 S.Ct. 1059, 62 L.Ed.2d 781 (1980) (where there had been extensive publicity, Sixth Amendment inquiry into juror bias turns on the adequacy of voir dire). Our system for striking venire members underscores the vital constitutional importance of strikes for cause: defendants are allowed an unlimited number of strikes for cause, while we grant them only a limited number of peremptory strikes. Super Ct.Crim.R. 24(b).
Counsel for the government conceded at oral argument in the instant case that defendants have a due process right to exercise strikes for cause. Excluding the defendant from voir dire questioning at the bench may have impaired his ability to exercise his strikes for cause and may therefore have deprived him of his fundamental constitutional rights. Under the circumstances, we cannot know whether appellant here suffered such deprivation. Therefore, I join the majority in reversing.
There remains for trial court judges the problem of developing procedures to meet the requirements laid down by this court in Robinson v. United States, 448 A.2d 853 (D.C.1982). No doubt the period of adjustment which has taken place since that opinion was rendered has produced valuable experience on how to minimize any inconvenience caused by the disapproval of the previous long-standing practice of handling sensitive voir dire at the bench while defendant remained at the counsel table. There is no alternative for the trial court other than to accommodate defendants who assert their right of presence while striving to conduct trials in the most efficient possible manner.
. United States v. Ridley, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 412 F.2d 1126 (1969).
. Statement Concerning Proposed Amendment to Rule 43(a) of the Superior Court Criminal Rules, 111 Wash.D.L.Rptr. 2027-28 (October 20, 1983).