The plaintiff, a citizen of the United States and residing within this judicial district, has brought this action against Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States and Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General of the United States for a declaratory judgment and to enjoin the enforcement and execution of two acts of Congress, namely, the Passport Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211a and § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185, both of which the plaintiff claims are repugnant to the Constitution. Jurisdiction of this Court is *66invoked under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 2201; and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282 and 2284 a three-judge court was convened to pass upon the constitutional questions in issue.
Cross motions have been filed by the respective parties, pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., for the entry of summary j'udgment based on the representation of both parties that there exists in this case no genuine issue as to any material fact. Having heard the arguments of counsel for the respective parties and having considered their amended pleadings, affidavits, briefs and other papers on file, the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff’s motion for summary j'udgment should be denied and the defendants’ motion for summary j'udgment should be granted.
The material facts are undisputed. On March 31, 1962, while the plaintiff was the holder of a valid United States passport of standard form and duration, he applied by letter to the Director of the Passport Office at Washington, D. C., for permission to have his passport validated for travel to Cuba as a tourist. The Passport Office denied him the permission requested, with the explanation that only persons whose travel might be in the best interests of the United States, such as newsmen and businessmen with previously established interests, could be eligible; and specifically that tourist travel was excluded. Thereafter, on May 1, 1962, the petitioner requested a hearing on his application without reciting any new reason, except that he felt justified in wanting to make the trip. He was sent a copy of the current Administrative Procedures of the Passport Office and advised by the acting Deputy Director, citing 22 C.F.R. 51.170 (1958), that in those instances where foreign travel was restricted by geographical limitations, which were generally applicable to everyone, no administrative procedures for review or appeal were provided. Subsequently, on October 11,1962, the petitioner through his attorney advised the Passport Office by letter, that the former had acquired a new passport and renewed petitioner’s request for its validation and a review of any denial. The department advised counsel that in view of the lapse of time, since filing the original application, a new application should be filed, setting forth the purpose of the trip, his expected duration in Cuba, his address while there and assurance of his willingness to register with the Swiss Consulate upon his arrival in Havana.
Thereupon, the petitioner filed a new application for validation, wherein he represented that the purpose of his trip to Cuba was to satisfy his curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba in order to make him a better informed citizen. He represented further, that he expected to stay at the Havana Libre Hotel for approximately two or three weeks and expressed his willingness to register with the Swiss Consulate upon his arrival in Havana.
On November 5, 1962, the petitioner was notified by the Deputy Director of the Passport Office that his “present purpose of visiting Cuba does not meet the standards for validation of your passport.” It should be emphasized that at the time of the Court’s hearing on this motion, petitioner’s counsel stated that he was making no claim of illegality on the basis of his client’s not having been afforded an administrative hearing with reference to the denial of the passport validation and this Court will therefore consider that he has abandoned any claim of illegality on this ground, notwithstanding its recitation in the complaint.
It is the plaintiff’s contention that the Passport Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211a does not authorize the action taken, that said Act and § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 are unconstitutional, because they interfere with the rights of a citizen, in this instance the plaintiff, to the right to travel under the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments; to the freedom of speech, belief and association under the First Amendment and that it is an arbitrary *67and unreasonable denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment; further, that it is an invalid delegation of legislative power because it does not contain adequate standards and safeguards. The petitioner claims that Executive Order 7856 and Presidential Proclamation 3004, 67 Stat. C. 31 fail to provide adequate standards to guide the Secretary of State in promulgating the regulations and giving proper notice to the American citizen whether said regulations are supported by statute or proclamation; and to the extent that the denial rests upon Executive power over foreign relations, it is still subject to constitutional limitations, and the reasons given by the Secretary do not warrant this abridgement.
The plaintiff presently prays for a declaratory judgment and an injunction decreeing that § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 and the Passport Act of July 3, 1926, 44 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211a are unconstitutional and that the Secretary of State’s regulations,1 restricting travel to Cuba are thus without any authority in law and are invalid as to the plaintiff. He also requests that the Secretary of State be directed to validate the petitioner’s passport for travel to Cuba, and that he and the Attorney General of the United States be enjoined from interference with his prospective travel or instituting any criminal procedure by reason thereof when consummated.
THE THREE-JUDGE COURT ISSUE
The preliminary jurisdictional question is whether this proceeding should be heard by a three-judge District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2282. This statute requires such a tribunal as a prerequisite to the granting of any “interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution * * The necessary elements for the convocation of such a court are three-fold: (1) The complaint must allege a basis for equitable relief, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963) ; (2) The constitutional question raised must be substantial. Schneider v. Rusk, 372 U.S. 224, 83 S.Ct. 624, 9 L.Ed.2d 695 (1963); and (3) The Complaint must assail an ‘Act of Congress’, William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171, 59 S.Ct. 804, 83 L.Ed. 1189 (1939).
A judgment for the plaintiff would put the operation of 22 U.S.C. § 211a and 8 U.S.C. § 1185 under the restraint of an equity decree. The constitutional claim is plainly substantial, for in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 1120, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1957) the Supreme Court said: “we deal here with a constitutional right of the citizen, a right which we must assume Congress will be faithful to respect.” The Supreme Court’s refusal to grant certiorari in three cases2 involving geographic restrictions, all arising subsequent to Kent v. Dulles, supra, does not render the present claim insubstantial. The Court has frequently reiterated that “[t]he denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case * * United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490, 43 S.Ct. 181, 182, 67 L.Ed. 361 (1922). See also Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice § 5-7 (3d ed. 1962).
The plaintiff claims, inter alia, that if §§ 211a and 1185 authorize the Secretary to place geographic limitations upon the right to travel, they are unconstitutional by reason of an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the Executive. He argues that a reading of these sections shows that they are devoid of any stand*68ards or principles by which the Secretary is guided.
Inasmuch as this plaintiff seeks affirmatively to enjoin the operation of a passport regulatory system, the propriety of empaneling a three-judge tribunal is manifest. The legislative history of § 2282 indicates that it was enacted to prevent a single federal judge from paralyzing the operation of an entire administrative system by the issuance of a broad injunctive order.
“Repeatedly emphasized during the congressional debates on § 2282 were the heavy pecuniary costs of the unforeseen and debilitating interruptions in the administration of federal law which could be wrought by a single judge’s order, and the great burdens entailed in coping with harassing actions brought one after another to challenge the operation of an entire statutory scheme, wherever jurisdiction over government officials could be acquired, until a judge was ultimately found who would grant the desired injunction. 81 Cong.Rec. 479-481, 2142-2143 (1937).” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, 372 U.S. at 155, 83 S.Ct. at 560, 9 L.Ed.2d 644.
This is truly a substantial constitutional challenge to the sovereignty of this Nation. This plaintiff’s effort to enjoin the Secretary of State from enforcing the statutory law and its attendant regulations is not merely the simple and seemingly harmless application of a lone tourist; it is in fact a pilot case precedent, which if sustained, would open up an immediate thoroughfare for unrestricted travel between the United States and Cuba. Such an act of judicial audacity would not only defeat the clear intention of Congress as established by law,3 but also strike down the declared foreign policy of the Executive Branch of the National Government.4 A substan*69tial constitutional question is in issue. The fact that the statutes’ validity and their attendant regulations are in this instance being upheld, rather than nullified, does not alter the principle. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F.Supp. 445, 452 (D.D.C. 1952).
All of the necessary elements are present to require that this matter be heard and determined by a three-judge court. 28 U.S.C. § 2282.
MERITS
The right of a citizen to travel is a part of the “liberty” of which he cannot be deprived, except by due process of law. This precept is recognized and guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
“ * * * (T)he right of exit is a personal right included within the word ‘liberty’ as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that ‘liberty’ is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress. * * * And if that power is delegated, the standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests. * * * Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.” Kent v. Dulles, supra, 357 U.S. at 129, 78 S.Ct. at 1120, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204.
The issue in this case is whether or not geographical passport restrictions imposed by the Secretary of State in respect to travel to Cuba are authorized by Congressional act and if so are those statutes which purport to grant such authority repugnant to constitutional limitations. It is this Court’s finding that Congress has granted adequate authority to the Executive department to make these regulations, that their application in this instance does not violate due process and the statutes which authorize the regulations, 22 U.S.C.A. § 211a and 8 U.S.C.A. § 1185 are valid and constitutional.
In considering this constitutional issue the Court is acutely mindful of the separation of powers and that certain areas *70of government are relegated solely to Congress, others to the Executive and some are common to both. The Executive may act in certain fields until legislative action becomes operative and the law-making power then controls. Congress’ right to lay statutory restrictions on the President when he treads such legislative ground is conceded unanimously by the Supreme Court; an ample safeguard is available if Congress chooses to apply it. Until Congress does so choose, “[w]e (the Court) should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing such powers.” Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311, 36 S.Ct. 106, 108, 60 L.Ed. 297 (1915). The President is the active agent of the Nation, not of the Congress; and he derives that status directly from the Executive powers vested in him by the Constitution. U.S.Const. Art. II, §§ 1, 2, and 3. He must, of course, obey and carry out the laws enacted by Congress, not because he is subservient, but because the Constitution directs him to do so. Thus it becomes obvious that in certain areas of government the authority of the Legislative and Executive departments overlap; and a concurrent authority of both is cognizable.
“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637, 72 S.Ct. 863, 871, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1951) (concurring opinion).
The field of passport regulation and control cuts across the law-making functions of Congress and the Chief Executive’s responsibility in the field of foreign affairs.
“We think the designation of certain areas of the world as forbidden to American travelers falls within the power to conduct foreign affairs. The bare determination that certain areas outside this hemisphere are trouble spots, or danger zones, is a phase of ‘foreign affairs’. Such a determination involves information gleaned through diplomatic sources and channels, and a judgment premised in large part upon foreign policy. The grounds upon which the President would make such a designation are foreign considerations, foreign affairs and policy. Indeed it would seem that such a restriction is in and of itself a foreign policy. It is at least an instrument of foreign policy.” Worthy v. Herter, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 153, 270 F.2d 905, 910 (D.C.Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918, 80 S.Ct. 255, 4 L.Ed.2d 186 (1959).
Passport control was not designed solely as a protection for internal security. To adopt such thinking would be naive and unrealistic. So many phases of internal security are intertwined with foreign affairs in the administration of passport control that the two become inseparable. This area of government requires a joint-control effort of the Congress and the Executive, if the intended results are to be obtained. It is one where Congress legislates broad Ianeways of authority to the Executive, within which he must exercise his discretion in effectively administering that authority in a fast changing climate of world affairs.
Congress has provided that the Executive shall take all necessary steps short of an act of war to protect the rights and liberties of American citizens on foreign soil.5 Certainly it is consistent *71with an overall policy that he should exercise that authority granted by law, to prevent incidents occurring in those countries, where normal diplomatic relations are non-existent. Those who would pursue this right of unlimited freedom to travel abroad at will, are those who would not hesitate to criticize their government for failing to protect them, if the need arose. This attitude is not dampened, even when such action could jeopardize the foreign policy of the nation. Personal vigilance to safeguard freedom should never be permitted to become a sword used for the destruction of the edifice it protests it is protecting.
In this ease the authority of the Secretary of State is founded on two specific acts of the Congress, namely, the Passport Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211a and § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185.
22 U.S.C.A. § 211a:
“The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, * * * under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports.”
8 U.S.C.A. § 1185:
“(a) When the United States is at war or during the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President, * * * and the President shall find that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions in addition to those provided otherwise than by this section be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States, and shall make public proclamation thereof, it shall, until otherwise ordered by the President or the Congress, be unlawful * * *.
“Citizens
“(b) After such proclamation as is provided for in subsection (a) of this section has been made and published and while such proclamation is in force, it shall, except as otherwise provided by the President, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport.”
On December 16, 1950, the President promulgated Presidential Proclamation 2914,6 which declared, for reasons therein set forth, the existence of a national emergency. This executive action preceded and was operative when Congress passed 8 U.S.C. § 1185. Thereafter, on January 17, 1953, pursuant to the foregoing legislation, the President reiterated the existence of the national emergency and accordingly issued a new Presidential Proclamation.7 It is to be noted *72that not only did it promulgate the continued existence of the national emergency previously referred to in the earlier proclamation, but it pointed to the authority emanating from the Immigration and Nationality Act passed by Congress, which became law on June 27, 1952, as the basis for executive action. This proclamation has never been rescinded or otherwise terminated. The existence of the national emergency still continues.
The House Judiciary Committee of the Congress had compiled for its use in 1958, all those provisions of law which had been brought into effect by the declaration of a national emergency by the President. It was again revised in 1962 and published as the “Report to the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, ‘Provisions of Federal Law in Effect in Time of National Emergency’.” The foreword of the report prepared by the Committee’s Chairman states:
“The emergency proclaimed by the President in 1950 had not yet been terminated and the chronic state of international tensions made it clear that it would not be terminated in the foreseeable future. * * *
“The heightened international tensions which developed in the latter part of 1961 created a new interest in the legal consequences of the actions which might be taken in the cold war by Congress or the President. In particular, there was substantial concern with knowing exactly what legislation would become effective upon the declaration of a *73national emergency by the President or Congress, or both.”
On Page 23, pargaraph 6(c) of this report th'e statute presently in question, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 appears.
Presidential Proclamation 3004 specifically incorporated by reference the regulations previously prescribed by the Secretary of State and published under Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations §§ 53.1 to 53.9; and in addition it authorized the Secretary to revoke, modify or amend these regulations as he might find the interests of the United States to require. The applicable portions provide:
§ 53.1 “The term ‘United States’ as used in this part includes the Canal Zone, and all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
§ 53.2 “No citizen of the United States or person who owes allegiance to the United States shall depart from or enter into or attempt to depart from or enter into any part of the United States as defined in § 53.1, unless he bears a valid passport which has been issued by or under authority of the Secretary of State or unless he comes within one of the exceptions prescribed in § 53.3.
g 53.3. “No valid passport shall be required of a citizen of the United States or of a person who owes allegiance to the United States:
(a) “* * *
(b) “When traveling between the United States and any country or territory in North, Central, or South America or in any island adjacent thereto: Provided, That this exception shall not be applicable to any such person when traveling to or arriving from a place outside the United States for which a valid passport is required under this part, if such travel is accomplished via any country or territory in North, Central, or South America or any island adjacent thereto: * * *
•X- -X- -X- -X- * *
§ 53.8 “Nothing in this part shall be construed to prevent the Secretary of State from exercising the discretion resting in him to refuse to issue a passport, to restrict its use to certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, or to' withdraw a passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in certain countries.”
On January 16, 1961 the Secretary of State, pursuant to the authority contained in Presidential Proclamation 3004, amended 22 C.F.R. § 53.3(b) (1958) by Department Regulation 108.456, 26 F.R. 482 so as to provide:
§ 53.3(b) “When traveling between the United States and any country, territory or Island adjacent thereto in North, Central or South America, excluding Cuba: * *
Simultaneously, Public Notice 179 was publicized,8 and the Department of State distributed Press Release No. 24 9 both *74of which promulgated more fully the purpose of the regulations and the administrative policy of the department in their application.
The issues in this case are clearly distinguishable from Kent v. Dulles, supra. The Court there held that these two statutes, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 and 22 U.S.C. § 211a, did not authorize the Secretary to withhold passports of citizens, because of their beliefs or associations; and that the employment of such a standard could not be used to restrain the citizen’s right of free movement.
“We, therefore, hesitate to impute to Congress, when in 1952 it made a passport necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of the Secretary of State, a purpose to give him unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose.” Kent v. Dulles, supra, 357 U.S. at 128, 78 S.Ct. at 1119, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204.
“The government may have the power to forbid the travel of all citizens to particular geographic areas because of war or national emergency. It does not have the power to restrain travel of citizens with whose politics it disagrees.” Boudin (Plaintiff’s counsel), The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 Colum.L. Rev. 47, 74 (1956).
In the present case, Congress established by law the President’s right to regulate and control passport visas within broad bounds of Executive discretion. There has been no claim of arbitrariness in the administration of these regulations. No passport has been claimed to have been denied, because of the applicant’s personal beliefs, writings, character, race, religion, or the like. It does in fact bar the travel of all Americans to a specific geographical area. The mere fact that administratively all tourist travel is banned, while bona fide newspapermen and people with previous business interests in Cuba may be considered as eligible for travel is not an arbitrary criteria which would violate due process.
“ * * * (J)udicial review even of the formula of selection is narrow and it is limited to determining whether the basis of the choice bears some rational relationship to the ends to be served. The distinction made between news agencies with a demonstrated interest in foreign news coverage and individual reporters must have some relevance to the purpose to be achieved. *•»«** -»
“The foreign policy considerations give the Secretary wide latitude in drawing a line and defining criteria.” Frank v. Herter, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 269 F.2d 245, 247-248 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918, 80 S.Ct. 256, 4 L.Ed.2d 187 (1959).10
*75The petitioner claims that if that power has been granted to the Executive pursuant to the law-making functions of Congress, the standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-430, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1934).
“ ‘The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.’ ” Locke’s Appeal, 72 Pa.St. 491, 498, quoted in, Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694, 12 S.Ct. 495, 505, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1891).
“But the authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an administrative to a legislative character because the violation thereof is punished as a public offense.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521, 31 S.Ct. 480, 484, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1910).
To claim that Congressional statutes which authorize the Executive to make and administer regulations are not constitutional would destroy the theme of legislative action in multiple fields of accepted governmental regulation. The real test to be applied is whether or not the power delegated in this instance is under the circumstances, so vague, indefinite, and lacking in standards, as to constitute an unwarranted and illegal attempt to delegate to the Executive the Legislative power to make law.
The authority granted defined with general specificity the conditions under which the Executive was authorized to act. Both in time of war and upon the declaration by the President of a national emergency, when the President finds that the interests of the United States requires, may these restrictions on travel departure and entry be imposed. The time or term of their application is limited until the President or Congress shall otherwise order. All of the conditions precedent established by law for the exercise of the power have been fulfilled.11
Government is much like a clock mechanism ; in order to perform its functions effectively it must operate. To do so in this area of passport administration, which is so inter-related with foreign affairs, considerable discretion and elbow-room must be granted to the Executive.
“Practically every volume of the United States Statutes contains one or more acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the President in respect of subjects affecting foreign relations, which either leave the exercise of the power to his unrestricted judgment, or provide a standard far more general than that which has always been considered requisite with regard to domestic affairs.” United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 324, 57 S.Ct. 216, 223, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936).
“ ‘It is essential to meet the situation that the Executive should have wide discretion and wide authority of action. No one can foresee the different means which may be adopted by hostile nations to secure mili*76tary information or spread propaganda and discontent. It is obviously impracticable to appeal to Congress for further legislation in each new emergency. Swift Executive action is the only effective counter-stroke.’ ” Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, H.R.Rep. No. 485, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, quoted in Kent v. Dulles, supra 357 U.S. at 133, 78 S.Ct. at 1122, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (Clark, J., dissenting).
That part of the plaintiff’s prayer for relief which requests that the criminal enforcement provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (c) be enjoined is not warranted. The law complained of is not in contravention to the Federal Constitution. There are no grounds upon which this Court would be justified in interfering with the criminal enforcement aspects of this statute.
“The duty to enforce the criminal law is vested by the Constitution not in the judicial arm of the government but in the executive. * * * It would be an improvident trespass upon the separation of the powers, if not a complete usurpation of power, were the court to grant immunity in advance of an actual transaction.” International Longshoremen’s Ass’n. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 212 F.Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev’d on other grounds, 326 F.2d 916 (2 Cir., 1964).
“The court of equity has at times been called upon to enjoin the enforcement of a criminal prosecution. The rule has been firmly established that it will not ordinarily intervene to enjoin the enforcement of the law by the prosecuting officials * * * unless under proper circumstances there would be irreparable injury, and the sole question involved is one of law * * * where a clear legal right to the relief is established.” Reed v. Littleton, 275 N.Y. 150, 9 N.E.2d 814, 815-816 (1937).
Therefore, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied; defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. So ordered.
. See p. 82 infra.
. Porter v. Herter, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 400, 278 F.2d 280 (D.C.Cir. 1960), cert denied, 361 U.S. 918. 80 S.Ct. 260, 4 L.Ed. 2d 185 (1959); Worthy v. Herter, 106 U.S.App.D.0. 153, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918, 80 S.Ct. 255, 4 L.Ed.2d 186 (1959); Frank v. Herter, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 269 F.2d 245 (D.C.Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918, 80 S.Ct. 256, 4 L.Ed.2d 187 (1959).
. (a) Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 215, 66 Stat. 163, 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
(b) On October 3, 1962, the Congress passed a joint resolution stating that the United States is determined, inter alia: “ * * * to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere * * 76 Stat. 697.
. (a) In March of 1963, President Kennedy participated in a conference with the Presidents of the five Central American Republics and Panama. A result of this conference was the Declaration of Costa Rica a passage of which is quoted below:
“The Presidents agree that Ministers of Government of the seven countries should meet as soon as possible to develop and put into immediate effect common measures to restrict the movement of their nationals to and from Cuba, and the flow of material, propaganda and funds from that country.
“This meeting will take action, among other things, to secure stricter travel and passport controls, including appropriate limitations in passports and other travel documents on travel to Cuba. Cooperative arrangements among not only the countries meeting here but also among all OAS members will have to be sought to restrict more effectively not only those movements of people for subversive purposes but also to prevent insofar as possible the introduction of money, propaganda, materials, and arms. Arrangements for additional sea and air surveillance and interception within territorial waters will be worked out with cooperation from the United States.” 48 Dept. State Bull. 511, 517 (April 8, 1963).
(b) Pursuant to the agreement entered into in Costa Rica, a meeting of the Ministers of Government took place in April of 1963 at Managua, Nicaragua. Resolution I of that meeting is significant to the instant matter:
“The meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San Jose, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963.
AGREES
“To recommend to their Governments that they adopt, within the limitations of their respective constitutional provisions, measures to be put into effect immediately, to prohibit, restrict and discourage the movement of their na*69tionals to and from Cuba. To this end, they propose the adoption of the following measures:
“1) Provide, as a general rule, that every passport or other travel document which may be issued carry a stamp which indicates that said passport is not valid for travel to Cuba.
“2) Declare officially that nationals who are permitted to travel to Cuba should have the permission duly inscribed in their official travel document.
“3) Promulgate regulations restricting the granting of visas to foreigners who have travelled to Cuba within a stipulated period of time.
“4) Notify travel agencies and transport companies of their measures for due compliance; and inform the governments of other countries through the most appropriate means.
“5) Request the Governments of the Hemisphere:
“(a) Not to allow the nationals of signatory countries to travel to Cuba unless they possess a valid passport or other document issued by their country of origin valid for such travel;
“ (b) Not to accept visas, tourist cards or other documents issued to their nationals for travel to Cuba which do not form an integral (non-detachable) part of their passports or other travel documents;
“(c) To observe the limitations placed in the passports or other travel documents of the nationals of signatory governments and not allow them to depart for Cuba;
“(d) To inform the signatory countries through appropriate channels of refusal to allow one of their nationals to depart for Cuba; and
“(e) To provide the signatory Governments the names of their nationals which may appear on the passenger list of any airplane or ship going to or coming from Ouba.” 48 Dept. State Bull. 719 (May 6, 1963).
(c) “Embargo On All Trade With Cuba,” Proc. No. 3447, 76 Stat. 1446, U.S. Code Cong, and Adm.News 1962, p. 4173.
(d) “Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba,” Proc. No. 3504, 27 F.R. 10401, U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News 1962, p. 4241.
(e) “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 31 C.E.R. 515.201 (Supp.1963).
. 22 U.S.C.A. § 1732: “Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release *71so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.”
. Proe. No. 2914, 64 Stat. a454.
. Proe. No. 3004, 67 Stat. c31:
“WHEREAS section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, enacted on June 27, 1952 (Public Law 414, 82nd Congress; 66 Stat. 163, 190), authorizes the President to impose restrictions and prohibitions in addition to those otherwise provided by that Act upon the departure of persons from, and their entry into, the United States when the United States is at war or during the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President or, as to aliens, whenever there exists a state of war between or among two or more states, and when the President shall find that the interests of the United States so require; and
“WHEREAS the national emergency the existence of which was proclaimed on December 16, 1950, by Proclamation 2914 still exists; and
“WHEREAS because of the exigencies of the international situation and of the national defense then exist*72ing Proclamation No. 2523 of November 14, 1941, imposed certain restrictions and prohibitions, in addition to those otherwise provided by law, upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States; and
“WHEREAS the exigencies of the international situation and of the national defense still require that certain restrictions and prohibitions, in addition to those otherwise provided by law, be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States:
“NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRX S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and by section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, do hereby find and publicly proclaim that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions, in addition to those otherwise provided by law, be imposed upon the departure of persons from, and their entry into, the United States; and I hereby prescribe and make the following rules, regulations, and orders with respect thereto:
“1. The departure and entry of citizens and nationals of the United States from and into the United States, including the Canal Zone, and all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, shall be subject to the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State and published as sections 53.1 to 53.9 inclusive, of Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Such regulations are hereby incorporated into and made a part of this proclamation; and the Secretary of State is hereby authorized to revoke, modify, or amend such regulations as he may find the interests of the United States to require.
“2. * * *
“3. * * *
“4_ * * *
“5. I hereby direct all departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate with the Secretary of State in the execution of Ms authority under this proclamation and any subsequent proclamation, rule, regulation, or order issued in pursuance hereof; and such departments and agencies shall upon request make available to the Secretary of State for that purpose the services of their respective officials and agents. I enjoin upon all officers of the United States charged with the execution of the laws thereof the utmost diligence in preventing violations of Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and this proclamation, including the regulations of the Secretary of State incorporated herein and made a part hereof, and in bringing to trial and punishment any persons violating any provision of that section or of this proclamation.
“To the extent permitted by law, this proclamation shall take effect as of December 24, 1952.”
. It read:
“In view of the conditions existing in Cuba and in the absence of diplomatic relations between that country and the United States of America I find that the unrestricted travel by United States citizens to or in Cuba would be contrary to the foreign policy of the United States and would be otherwise inimical to the national interest.
“Therefore pursuant to the authority invested in me by Sections 124 and 126 of Executive Order No. 7856, issued on March 31, 1938, (3 F.R. 681, 6S7, 22 CFR 51.75 and 51.77) under authority of Section 1 of the Act of Congress approved July 3, 1926, (44 Stat. 887, 22 USO 211a), all United States passports are hereby declared to be invalid for travel to or in Cuba except the passports of United States citizens now in Cuba. Upon departure of such citizens from Cuba their passports shall be subject to this order.
“Hereafter United States passports shall not be valid for travel to or in Cuba unless specifically endorsed for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State or until this order is revoked.” 26 Fed.Reg. 492.
. It read:
“The Department of State announced today that in view of the United States *74Government’s inability, following the break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba, to extend normal protective services to Americans visiting Cuba, United States citizens desiring to go to Cuba must until further notice obtain passports specifically endorsed by the Department of State for such travel. All outstanding passports, except those of United States citizens remaining in Cuba, are being declared invalid for travel to Cuba unless specifically endorsed for such travel.
“The Department contemplates that exceptions to these regulations will be granted to persons whose travel may be regarded as being in the best interests of the United States, such as newsmen or businessmen with previously established business interests.
“Permanent resident aliens cannot travel to Cuba unless special permission is obtained for this purpose through the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.
“Federal regulations are being amended to put these requirements into effect.
“These actions have been taken in conformity with the Department’s normal practice of limiting travel to those countries with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations.” Press Release No. 24.
. It is significant to consider, in addition to the statutes in issue in the present *75ease, the basic grant by Congress of power to the Secretary of State. 5 U.S. C.A. § 156: “The Secretary of State shall perform such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the President relative to correspondences, commissions, or instructions to or with public ministers or consuls from the United States, or to negotiations with public ministers from foreign states or princes, or to memorials or other applications from foreign public ministers or other foreigners, or to such other matters respecting foreign affairs as the President of the United States shall assign to the department, and he shall conduct the business of the department in such manner as the President shall direct.”
. See supra note 7.