Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Smith:I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that the instant case is controlled by Harring v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 70 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 173, 452 A.2d 914 (1982), which does not involve a civil proceeding where a claimant exercises his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as in the matter sub judice. There is sufficient evidence of record here to sustain the findings of fact and determination by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.
A brief narrative of relevant record contents follows. Claimant, arrested on October 14, 1986, was charged by the Philadelphia Police Commissioner Kevin Tucker with thirty counts of bribery, thirty counts of obstruction of the administration of law, one count of tampering with public records, two counts of conspiracy and one count of unsworn falsification and false reports. Prior to his arrest, Claimant was assigned to the Chief Inspector’s Squad as an investigator of illegal vice activities. On October 23, 1986, Claimant was served by Employer with a notice of intention to dismiss which indicated that Claimant’s dismissal was based upon a Police Department investigation which disclosed Claimant’s involvement in accepting a monetary payoff from a known illegal numbers banker and setting up a numbers runner for a false arrest. See Notice of Intention to Dismiss; Exhibit #6.
*134At the referee’s hearing, Employer called Claimant as a witness. Claimant, represented by counsel, invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination due to the pending criminal charges and refused to answer questions related to the criminal activities alleged in the notice of dismissal. As a result, the referee, at the suggestion of Employer’s counsel, held the case open to permit Employer time to draft written questions and to allow Claimant an opportunity to respond to Employer’s questions in writing. Upon submission of the written questions, Claimant again refused to answer on the advice of counsel. The referee thereafter reversed the Office of Employment Security (OES) and awarded benefits to Claimant, concluding that Employer had not met its burden of proof. The Board reversed the referee, determining that Claimant’s criminal activity while a member of the police force rose to the level of willful misconduct in connection with his work.
This writer recognizes that in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the employer bears the burden of proving a charge of willful misconduct. Williams v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 109 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 329, 531 A.2d 88 (1987). Willful misconduct has been defined as:
(1) the wanton and willful disregard of the employer’s interest, (2) the deliberate violation of rules, (3) the disregard of standards of behavior which an employer can rightfully expect from his employe, or (4) negligence which manifests culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional and substantial disregard for the employer’s interests or the employee’s duties and obligations.
Kentucky Fried Chicken of Altoona, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 90, 97, 309 A.2d 165, 168-169 (1973). More*135over, the Board, as factfinder, is entitled to assess the credibility of witnesses, determine the weight to be accorded their testimony, and to consider all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the testimony. Peak v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 509 Pa. 267, 501 A.2d 1383 (1985).
Claimant contends that his dismissal based on the substantive acts outlined in the notice of intention to dismiss are mere allegations and that the record fails to contain substantial evidence to support a finding that Claimant committed the alleged infractions. The notice of intention to dismiss, admitted into the record without objection, indicates that Claimant was arrested and charged with numerous counts of criminal activity. Claimant admits that he was arrested and charged with various crimes on his OES summary of interview form and further indicated that he did not appeal his discharge nor the Police Commissioner’s determination.
The instant matter is controlled by Caloric Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 70 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 182, 452 A.2d 907 (1982), where this Court had occasion to review a discharge case involving a claimant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Although affirming the Board’s decision to award benefits because the employer’s evidence standing alone did not prove any wrongdoing, this Court stated the following:
The Fifth Amendment ‘not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’ Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, [94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274] (1973).
*136However, as distinguished from the situation in criminal cases, the Fifth Amendment ‘does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions where they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment “does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause”.’ Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, [96 S.Ct. 1551, 1558, 47 L.Ed.2d 810] (1976), citing 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence 439 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). Therefore, the board properly could draw some inference from claimant’s exercise of the Fifth Amendment.
The pivotal question ... is whether the inference which may result from claimant’s exercise of his privilege—either alone or in conjunction with the exhibits—can constitute ‘substantial evidence’ to satisfy our longstanding requirement that the employer has the burden of establishing that the discharge was for willful misconduct.
Id. at 187-188, 452 A.2d at 909-910. Thus, Claimant’s silence in the face of Employer’s inquiry into specific and detailed allegations of wrongdoing during the course of Claimant’s employment supports the credibility of the evidence introduced into the record, which evidence standing alone indicates willful misconduct. Employer representative submitted evidence to OES which was admitted and made a part of the hearing record. The Board could properly draw adverse inferences from Claimant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege, and in its role as factfinder, specifically resolved the issue of credibility in favor of Employer. Further, this Court has acknowledged the existence of a long-standing legal proposition that in a civil proceeding, the factfinder is permitted to infer from an absence of a party’s testimony that the testimony, if honestly given, would have been *137unfavorable. See Harring. Thus, the record viewed as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Boards findings and conclusion that Employer has sustained its burden of proving willful misconduct.