Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :I dissent.
Despite the majority’s pronouncement to the contrary, The Surety of the Peace Statute, Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, as amended, 19 P.S. §23, provides for a criminal (or at the least, a quasi-criminal) proceeding. Beyond a doubt, the likelihood of incarceration for *47those charged thereunder (particularly the indigent defendant) is as great, if not greater, than for those traditionally charged with the commission of crime. Accordingly, it is my view, that defendants charged under the Statute are entitled to the same procedural constitutional protections, including proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as are all others charged with the commission of crime. See Santos v. Nahiwa, 53 Hawaii 40, 487 P. 2d 283 (1970). Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967). “Like many common law doctrines the peace bond has become a non-heroic Don Quixote of the law, which like the last knight errant of chivalry, ‘now wanders aimlessly through the reports, still vigorous, but equally . . . dangerous.’ While extended applicability of the fourteenth amendment to state proceedings has secured for criminal defendants the right to counsel, to trial by jury, to confrontation and cross-examination, to notice, and to a transcript of lower court proceedings when required for appeal, the defendant in a peace bond proceeding has remained neglected. ... As [t]he Supreme Court has recently held, [Winship, supra, Gault, supra] . . . the label attached to a proceeding cannot in and of itself defeat the requirements of the fourteenth amendment. The realities of the proceeding are controlling. ‘It is the likelihood of involuntary incarceration . . . which commands observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process.’ [Heryford v. Parker, 396 F. 2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968) ].” 24 Yand. L. Rev. 405, 408-09 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
I would affirm the order of the court of common pleas.