OPINION
ONION, Presiding Judge.This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary of a habitation, where the punishment was assessed by the court at 45 years’ imprisonment. On September 9, 1980, the appellant entered a plea of guilty before the court to the said offense. Adjudication of his guilt was deferred and he was placed on “probation” for a period of eight years, subject to certain conditions. See Article 42.12, 3a, V.A.C.C.P. On July 20, 1982, the State filed a petition to proceed to adjudication of guilt, alleging that appellant had violated his probationary conditions by committing two aggravated robberies, failing to report to his probation officer as required, and failing to pay restitution and fine.
On September 10, 1982, the court, after a hearing on the State’s petition, proceeded to revoke “probation”1 and adjudge guilt and assess punishment for the burglary of a habitation at 45 years’ imprisonment. See article 42.12, Sec. 3d(b), V.A.C.C.P.
On appeal in a sole ground of error appellant contended the trial court erred in proceeding to adjudication of guilt and assessing punishment without first holding a separate penalty hearing. Appellant argued that such failure was a violation of due process of law, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, United States Constitution, and due course of the law. Article I, Sec. 19, Texas Constitution.
On appeal the Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected his contention and affirmed the conviction. Duhart v. State, 652 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.App.Ft.Worth—1983). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine the correctness of such holding.
Upon entering his guilty plea before the court, and waving trial by jury, the appellant was carefully admonished by the *386trial court in accordance with Article 26.13, Y.A.C.C.P. Appellant was duly admonished that the penalty for burglary of a habitation was for a term of years of not less than five nor more than ninety-nine, or life, and that a fine not to exceed $10,-000.00 might also be assessed. See V.T. C.A., Penal Code, Sees. 30.02 and 12.32. And as the Court of Appeals noted, the trial court cautioned the appellant that if the plea bargain of eight years’ deferred adjudication was accepted but the “probation” granted was later revoked, he would be subject to the full range of punishment for the offense charged.2 Appellant stated he understood the range of penalty and the caution offered. At the unitary trial on the guilty plea the appellant took the witness stand and made a judicial confession. At the close of the trial the court accepted the plea bargain and instructed the appellant as to the probationary condition and again cautioned the appellant as to the consequences of revocation and the range of punishment then possible. The appellant accepted the eight year deferred adjudication which was imposed. He did not at any time ask to offer any additional evidence on punishment.3
At the hearing on the State’s petition to adjudicate guilt the State offered its evidence. Thereafter the appellant testified and then called his mother and his fiancee’. At the conclusion of the testimony the court inquired if either party had anything further to offer. Both sides closed and presented arguments to the court. After revoking “probation” and adjudicating guilt, the court proceeded to assess punishment. When the court inquired if there was any legal reason why sentence should not be pronounced, appellant’s counsel answered, “No, Your Honor.” Sentence was then imposed. At no time did appellant request to present further evidence on punishment or any other issue. He made no proffer of evidence, nor did he perfect a bill of exception. He did not object to any of the procedures nor contend to the trial court he was entitled to a separate hearing on punishment.
On appeal for the first time he contends that due process of law was violated when the trial court did not, sua sponte, offer him a separate hearing on punishment. He does not cite any authority to support his contention, and even at this late date does not tell us what evidence on punishment he was unable to present.
A similar contention to appellant’s was advanced and rejected in Jackson v. State, 628 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.App.—Beaumont—1981) (pet. ref’d.), where the court wrote at p. 120:
*387“Appellant’s sole ground of error is ‘[t]he Court erred in assessing punishment in excess of Appellant’s deferred adjudication period of probation by refusing to allow for a separate hearing on punishment following the determination of guilt.’ As we understand this ground of error, appellant’s complaint is that a separate punishment hearing should be held following an adjudication of guilt pursuant to V.A.C.C.P., Art. 42.12, Sec. 3d(b). The ground, as stated in appellant’s brief, actually complains of the ‘refusal’ to allow for such separate hearing. We find nothing in the record before us indicating that appellant requested such hearing or that any such hearing we refused. However, the record does show that a separate hearing on punishment was not held by the court.
“Appellant contends that following an adjudication of guilt on the original charge, a ‘normal bifurcated trial system’ should be followed and a hearing on punishment shall be held.in accordance with V.A.C.C.P., Art. 37.07. Appellant overlooks the fact that Article 37.07, Sec. 2(b) is applicable only to pleas of not guilty before a jury. It has no application where a defendant waives trial by jury and enters a plea of guilty before the court in a felony less than capital case. See Morales v. State, 416 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Rojas v. State, 404 S.W.2d 30 (Tex.Cr.App.1966); Thomas v. State, 477 S.W.2d 881 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).4
“The contention that two separate hearings are mandatory in proceedings conducted pursuant to Art. 42.12 has been rejected in McNew v. State, 608 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), where it is held that only one hearing—that which is required by Art. 42.12, Sec. 3d(b)—is necessary to afford appellant his right to due process of law.
“It is suggested,' by the wording of appellant’s ground of error, that the court erred in assessing his punishment at ten years confinement after adjudication of guilt when it has assessed seven years ‘probation’ at the time of the deferred adjudication. This contention has been rejected and held not to be error. McNew v. State, supra; Walker v. State, 557 S.W.2d 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).”
We observe that the statute, Article 42.12, Sec. 3d(b), V.A.C.C.P., does not mandate a separate punishment hearing, nor can we conclude that due process of law nor the due course of the law of the land is violated because such a separate hearing is not accorded. Fairness would dictate that a defendant be accorded an opportunity to offer appropriate evidence in mitigation of punishment after the revocation of “probation” and the adjudication of guilt and before the assessment of punishment if such evidence has not already been elicited during the proceedings, particularly if the defendant requests the opportunity.
Under the circumstances in the instant case, we find no merit in appellant’s sole ground of error. The trial court did not err in failing, sua sponte, to conduct a separate proceeding on the issue of punishment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
ODOM and MILLER, JJ., concur in the result.. The court found the evidence sufficient to show that appellant committed the aggravated robbery in paragraph one, that he failed to report and failed to pay restitution and fine. The court found the evidence insufficient to support the allegation of the aggravated robbery in paragraph two.
. In McNew v. State, 608 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (Opinion on Rehearing), the court at p. 177 stated:
"While it would be far better practice for the trial court to admonish a defendant as to the consequences of deferred adjudication, we have held that Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P., does not require such admonishment.”
. In Morales v. State, 416 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), this court wrote:
"Appellant obviously overlooks the fact that Article 37.07, Section 2(b), supra (V.A.C.C.P.), is applicable only to pleas of not guilty before a jury. Rojas v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 404 S.W.2d 30 [(1966)]. It has no application where a defendant waives trial by jury and enters a plea of guilty before the Court in a felony less than capital case. Articles 1.13, 1.14, and 1.15, V.A.C.C.P.” (Emphasis supplied.) Now see Article 37.07, Sec. 2(a), (b) and (c) as amended.
Prior to the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure all trials before the court or jury regardless of plea were unitary trials. Article 37.07, supra, provided for bifurcated trials in pleas of not guilty before a jury. The rule was unchanged for guilty pleas before the court and jury. See Morales v. State, supra.
Article 37.07, supra, was amended after its enactment in 1965. Section 3 thereof now reads in part:
"Sec. 3. Evidence of prior criminal record in all criminal cases after a finding of guilty.
“(a) Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the state and the defense as to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character....”
This provision insofar as it applies to pleas of guilty before a judge or jury does not call for bifurcated trials in those situations. The statute generally applies to pleas of not guilty before a jury.
. See also Arismendez v. State, 595 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Thom v. State, 563 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).